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windows-nt/Source/XPSP1/NT/ds/security/protocols/kerberos/server/gettgs.cxx

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//+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Microsoft Windows
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation, 1992 - 1993.
//
// File: gettgs.cxx
//
// Contents: GetTGSTicket and support functions
//
// Classes:
//
// Functions:
//
// History: 04-Mar-94 wader Created
//
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#include "kdcsvr.hxx"
#include "kdctrace.h"
#include <tostring.hxx>
#include <userall.h>
#include "fileno.h"
#define FILENO FILENO_GETTGS
extern LARGE_INTEGER tsInfinity;
extern LONG lInfinity;
UNICODE_STRING KdcNullString = {0,0,NULL};
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Name: KdcGetS4UPac
//
// Synopsis: Track down the user acct for PAC info.
//
// Effects: Get the PAC
//
// Arguments: S4UClientName - ClientName from S4U PA Data
// PAC - Resultant PAC (signed w/? key)
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: KDC_ERR_ or KRB_AP_ERR errors only
//
// Notes: Free client name and realm w/
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
KdcGetS4UTicketInfo(
IN PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME S4UClientName,
IN OUT PUSER_INTERNAL6_INFORMATION * UserInfo,
IN OUT PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES_LIST GroupMembership,
IN OUT PKERB_EXT_ERROR ExtendedError
)
{
KERBERR KerbErr;
UNICODE_STRING S4UClient = {0};
KDC_TICKET_INFO S4UClientInfo;
KerbErr = KerbConvertKdcNameToString(
&S4UClient,
S4UClientName,
NULL
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Get the user information...
//
KerbErr = KdcGetTicketInfo(
&S4UClient,
SAM_OPEN_BY_UPN_OR_ACCOUNTNAME, // extra flags?
S4UClientName,
NULL,
&S4UClientInfo,
ExtendedError,
NULL,
USER_ALL_KDC_GET_PAC_AUTH_DATA,
0L,
UserInfo,
GroupMembership
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "Getting the ticket info for S4U req failed - %x\n", KerbErr));
DsysAssert(FALSE);
goto Cleanup;
}
Cleanup:
KerbFreeString(&S4UClient);
FreeTicketInfo(
&S4UClientInfo
);
return KerbErr;
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: KdcAuditAccountMapping
//
// Synopsis: Generates, if necessary, a success/failure audit for name
// mapping. The names are converted to a string before
// being passed to the LSA.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
VOID
KdcAuditAccountMapping(
IN PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME ClientName,
IN KERB_REALM ClientRealm,
IN OPTIONAL PKDC_TICKET_INFO MappedTicketInfo
)
{
UNICODE_STRING ClientString = {0};
PUNICODE_STRING MappedName = NULL;
UNICODE_STRING UnicodeRealm = {0};
UNICODE_STRING NullString = {0};
KERBERR KerbErr;
BOOLEAN Successful;
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(MappedTicketInfo))
{
if (!SecData.AuditKdcEvent(KDC_AUDIT_MAP_SUCCESS))
{
return;
}
Successful = TRUE;
MappedName = &MappedTicketInfo->AccountName;
}
else
{
if (!SecData.AuditKdcEvent(KDC_AUDIT_MAP_FAILURE))
{
return;
}
MappedName = &NullString;
Successful = FALSE;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertRealmToUnicodeString(
&UnicodeRealm,
&ClientRealm
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
return;
}
if (KERB_SUCCESS(KerbConvertKdcNameToString(
&ClientString,
ClientName,
&UnicodeRealm
)))
{
LsaIAuditAccountLogon(
SE_AUDITID_ACCOUNT_MAPPED,
Successful,
&GlobalKdcName,
&ClientString,
MappedName,
0 // no status
);
KerbFreeString(
&ClientString
);
}
KerbFreeString(
&UnicodeRealm
);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Name: KdcInsertAuthorizationData
//
// Synopsis: Inserts auth data into a newly created ticket.
//
// Arguments: FinalTicket - Ticket to insert Auth data into
// EncryptedAuthData - Auth data (optional)
// SourceTicket - Source ticket
//
// Notes: This copies the authorization data from the source ticket
// to the destiation ticket, and adds the authorization data
// passed in. It is called by GetTGSTicket.
//
// This assumes that pedAuthData is an encrypted
// KERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA.
// It will copy all the elements of that list to the new ticket.
// If pedAuthData is not supplied (or is empty), and there is
// auth data in the source ticket, it is copied to the new
// ticket. If no source ticket, and no auth data is passed
// in, nothing is done.
//
//----------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
KdcInsertAuthorizationData(
OUT PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET FinalTicket,
OUT PKERB_EXT_ERROR pExtendedError,
IN OPTIONAL PKERB_ENCRYPTED_DATA EncryptedAuthData,
IN OPTIONAL PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME S4UClientName,
IN BOOLEAN DoingS4U,
IN PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET SourceTicket,
IN BOOLEAN AddResourceGroups,
IN OPTIONAL PKDC_TICKET_INFO OriginalServerInfo,
IN OPTIONAL PKERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY OriginalServerKey,
IN OPTIONAL PKERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY TargetServerKey
)
{
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA SourceAuthData = NULL;
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA FinalAuthData = NULL;
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA PacAuthData = NULL;
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA NewPacAuthData = NULL;
KERBERR KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA_LIST * TempAuthData = NULL;
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA NextAuthData;
PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME ClientName = NULL;
PKERB_IF_RELEVANT_AUTH_DATA * IfRelevantData = NULL;
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA SuppliedAuthData = NULL;
UNICODE_STRING DummyName = {0};
SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES_LIST S4UGroupMembership = {0};
PUSER_INTERNAL6_INFORMATION S4UUserInfo = NULL;
TRACE(KDC, InsertAuthorizationData, DEB_FUNCTION);
D_DebugLog(( DEB_T_TICKETS, "Inserting authorization data into ticket.\n" ));
//
// First try to decrypt the supplied authorization data
//
if (!DoingS4U)
{
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(EncryptedAuthData))
{
KerbErr = KerbDecryptDataEx(
EncryptedAuthData,
&SourceTicket->key,
KERB_NON_KERB_SALT, // WAS BUG: wrong salt, removed per MikeSw
&EncryptedAuthData->cipher_text.length,
EncryptedAuthData->cipher_text.value
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_WARN,
"KLIN(%x) Failed to decrypt encrypted auth data: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),
KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Now decode it
//
KerbErr = KerbUnpackData(
EncryptedAuthData->cipher_text.value,
EncryptedAuthData->cipher_text.length,
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA_LIST_PDU,
(PVOID *) &TempAuthData
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
if (TempAuthData != NULL)
{
SuppliedAuthData = *TempAuthData;
}
}
if (SourceTicket->bit_mask & KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_authorization_data_present)
{
DsysAssert(SourceTicket->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_authorization_data != NULL);
SourceAuthData = SourceTicket->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_authorization_data;
//
// Get the AuthData from the source ticket
//
KerbErr = KerbGetPacFromAuthData(
SourceAuthData,
&IfRelevantData,
&PacAuthData
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to get pac from auth data: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),
KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
}
//
// The new auth data is the original auth data appended to the
// supplied auth data. The new auth data goes first, followed by the
// auth data from the original ticket.
//
//
// Update the PAC, if it is present.
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(OriginalServerKey) && (PacAuthData != NULL))
{
KerbErr = KdcVerifyAndResignPac(
OriginalServerKey,
TargetServerKey,
OriginalServerInfo,
AddResourceGroups,
PacAuthData
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to verify & resign pac: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),
KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Copy the old auth data & insert the PAC
//
KerbErr = KdcInsertPacIntoAuthData(
SourceAuthData,
(IfRelevantData != NULL) ? *IfRelevantData : NULL,
PacAuthData,
&FinalAuthData
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to insert pac into auth data: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),
KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
}
}
if (DoingS4U)
{
//
// Use the PAC from the S4U data to return in the TGT / Service Ticket
//
KerbErr = KdcGetS4UTicketInfo(
S4UClientName,
&S4UUserInfo,
&S4UGroupMembership,
pExtendedError
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KdcGetPacAuthData(
S4UUserInfo,
&S4UGroupMembership,
TargetServerKey,
NULL, // no credential key
AddResourceGroups,
FinalTicket,
S4UClientName,
&NewPacAuthData,
pExtendedError
);
SamIFreeSidAndAttributesList(&S4UGroupMembership);
SamIFree_UserInternal6Information( S4UUserInfo );
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "Failed to get S4UPacAUthData\n"));
DsysAssert(FALSE);
goto Cleanup;
}
FinalAuthData = NewPacAuthData;
NewPacAuthData = NULL;
}
//
// If there was no original PAC, try to insert one here. If the ticket
// was issued from this realm we don't add a pac.
//
else if ((PacAuthData == NULL) && !SecData.IsOurRealm(&SourceTicket->client_realm))
{
KDC_TICKET_INFO ClientTicketInfo = {0};
SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES_LIST GroupMembership = {0};
PUSER_INTERNAL6_INFORMATION UserInfo = NULL;
//
// Try mapping the name to get a PAC
//
KerbErr = KerbConvertPrincipalNameToKdcName(
&ClientName,
&SourceTicket->client_name
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KdcGetTicketInfo(
&DummyName,
SAM_OPEN_BY_ALTERNATE_ID,
ClientName,
&SourceTicket->client_realm,
&ClientTicketInfo,
pExtendedError,
NULL, // no handle
USER_ALL_KDC_GET_PAC_AUTH_DATA,
0L, // no extended fields
&UserInfo,
&GroupMembership
);
if (KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KdcAuditAccountMapping(
ClientName,
SourceTicket->client_realm,
&ClientTicketInfo
);
FreeTicketInfo(&ClientTicketInfo);
KerbFreeKdcName(&ClientName);
KerbErr = KdcGetPacAuthData(
UserInfo,
&GroupMembership,
TargetServerKey,
NULL, // no credential key
AddResourceGroups,
FinalTicket,
NULL, // no S4U client
&NewPacAuthData,
pExtendedError
);
SamIFreeSidAndAttributesList(&GroupMembership);
SamIFree_UserInternal6Information( UserInfo );
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
} else if (KerbErr == KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN) {
KdcAuditAccountMapping(
ClientName,
SourceTicket->client_realm,
NULL
);
KerbFreeKdcName(&ClientName);
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
}
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// If we got a PAC, stick it in the list
//
if (NewPacAuthData != NULL)
{
//
// Copy the old auth data & insert the PAC
//
KerbErr = KerbCopyAndAppendAuthData(
&NewPacAuthData,
SourceAuthData
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to insert pac into auth data: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
FinalAuthData = NewPacAuthData;
NewPacAuthData = NULL;
}
}
//
// if there was any auth data and we didn't copy it transfering the
// PAC, do so now
//
if ((SourceAuthData != NULL) && (FinalAuthData == NULL))
{
KerbErr = KerbCopyAndAppendAuthData(
&FinalAuthData,
SourceAuthData
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
}
if (SuppliedAuthData != NULL)
{
KerbErr = KerbCopyAndAppendAuthData(
&FinalAuthData,
SuppliedAuthData
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
}
if (FinalAuthData != NULL)
{
FinalTicket->bit_mask |= KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_authorization_data_present;
FinalTicket->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_authorization_data = FinalAuthData;
FinalAuthData = NULL;
}
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
Cleanup:
KerbFreeAuthData(
FinalAuthData
);
if (TempAuthData != NULL)
{
KerbFreeData(
PKERB_AUTHORIZATION_DATA_LIST_PDU,
TempAuthData
);
}
KerbFreeAuthData(NewPacAuthData);
if (IfRelevantData != NULL)
{
KerbFreeData(
PKERB_IF_RELEVANT_AUTH_DATA_PDU,
IfRelevantData
);
}
return(KerbErr);
}
//+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: BuildTicketTGS
//
// Synopsis: Builds (most of) a TGS ticket
//
// Arguments: ServiceTicketInfo - Ticket info for the requested service
// ReferralRealm - Realm to build referral to
// RequestBody - The request causing this ticket to be built
// SourceTicket - The TGT used to make this request
// Referral - TRUE if this is an inter-realm referral ticke
// CommonEType - Contains the common encryption type between
// client and server
// NewTicket - The new ticket built here.
//
//
// History: 24-May-93 WadeR Created
//
// Notes: see 3.3.3, A.6 of the Kerberos V5 R5.2 spec
//
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
BuildTicketTGS(
IN PKDC_TICKET_INFO ServiceTicketInfo,
IN PKERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY RequestBody,
IN PKERB_TICKET SourceTicket,
IN BOOLEAN Referral,
IN OPTIONAL PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME S4UClientName,
IN OPTIONAL PUNICODE_STRING S4UClientRealm,
IN ULONG CommonEType,
OUT PKERB_TICKET NewTicket,
IN OUT PKERB_EXT_ERROR ExtendedError
)
{
KERBERR KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
KERB_TICKET OutputTicket;
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET EncryptedTicket;
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET SourceEncryptPart;
LARGE_INTEGER SourceRenewUntil;
LARGE_INTEGER SourceEndTime;
LARGE_INTEGER SourceStartTime;
LARGE_INTEGER TicketLifespan;
LARGE_INTEGER TicketRenewspan;
UNICODE_STRING NewTransitedInfo = {0,0,NULL};
UNICODE_STRING ClientRealm = {0,0,NULL};
UNICODE_STRING TransitedRealm = {0,0,NULL};
UNICODE_STRING OldTransitedInfo = {0,0,NULL};
STRING OldTransitedString;
ULONG KdcOptions = 0;
BOOLEAN fKpasswd = FALSE;
ULONG TicketFlags = 0;
ULONG SourceTicketFlags = 0;
PKERB_HOST_ADDRESSES Addresses = NULL;
TRACE(KDC, BuildTicketTGS, DEB_FUNCTION);
D_DebugLog(( DEB_T_TICKETS, "Building a TGS ticket\n" ));
SourceEncryptPart = (PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) SourceTicket->encrypted_part.cipher_text.value;
OutputTicket = *NewTicket;
EncryptedTicket = (PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) OutputTicket.encrypted_part.cipher_text.value;
KdcOptions = KerbConvertFlagsToUlong( &RequestBody->kdc_options );
//
// Get the times from the source ticket into a usable form
//
if (SourceEncryptPart->bit_mask & KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_renew_until_present)
{
KerbConvertGeneralizedTimeToLargeInt(
&SourceRenewUntil,
&SourceEncryptPart->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_renew_until,
0
);
}
else
{
SourceRenewUntil.QuadPart = 0;
}
KerbConvertGeneralizedTimeToLargeInt(
&SourceEndTime,
&SourceEncryptPart->endtime,
0
);
if (SourceEncryptPart->bit_mask & KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_starttime_present)
{
KerbConvertGeneralizedTimeToLargeInt(
&SourceStartTime,
&SourceEncryptPart->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_starttime,
0
);
}
else
{
SourceStartTime.QuadPart = 0;
}
//
// Check to see if the request is for the kpasswd service, in
// which case, we only want the ticket to be good for 2 minutes.
//
KerbErr = KerbCompareKdcNameToPrincipalName(
&RequestBody->server_name,
GlobalKpasswdName,
&fKpasswd
);
if (!fKpasswd || !KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
TicketLifespan = SecData.KdcTgsTicketLifespan();
TicketRenewspan = SecData.KdcTicketRenewSpan();
}
else
{
TicketLifespan.QuadPart = (LONGLONG) 10000000 * 60 * 2;
TicketRenewspan.QuadPart = (LONGLONG) 10000000 * 60 * 2;
}
//
// TBD: We need to make the ticket 10 minutes if we're doing s4U
//
KerbErr = KdcBuildTicketTimesAndFlags(
0, // no client policy
ServiceTicketInfo->fTicketOpts,
&TicketLifespan,
&TicketRenewspan,
NULL, // no logoff time
NULL, // no acct expiry.
RequestBody,
SourceEncryptPart,
EncryptedTicket,
ExtendedError
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to build ticket times and flags: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
TicketFlags = KerbConvertFlagsToUlong( &EncryptedTicket->flags );
SourceTicketFlags = KerbConvertFlagsToUlong( &SourceEncryptPart->flags );
KerbErr = KerbMakeKey(
CommonEType,
&EncryptedTicket->key
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
OldTransitedString.Buffer = (PCHAR) SourceEncryptPart->transited.contents.value;
OldTransitedString.Length = OldTransitedString.MaximumLength = (USHORT) SourceEncryptPart->transited.contents.length;
//
// Fill in the service names
//
if (Referral)
{
PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME TempServiceName;
//
// For referral tickets we put a the name "krbtgt/remoterealm@localrealm"
//
//
// We should only be doing this when we didn't get a non-ms principal
//
KerbErr = KerbBuildFullServiceKdcName(
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName,
SecData.KdcServiceName(),
KRB_NT_SRV_INST,
&TempServiceName
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertKdcNameToPrincipalName(
&OutputTicket.server_name,
TempServiceName
);
KerbFreeKdcName(&TempServiceName);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// If we got here on a referral ticket and are generating one
// and the referral ticket we received was not from the client's
// realm, add in the transited information.
//
if (!KerbCompareRealmNames(
&SourceEncryptPart->client_realm,
&SourceTicket->realm))
{
KerbErr = KerbStringToUnicodeString(
&OldTransitedInfo,
&OldTransitedString
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertRealmToUnicodeString(
&TransitedRealm,
&SourceTicket->realm
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertRealmToUnicodeString(
&ClientRealm,
&SourceEncryptPart->client_realm
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KdcInsertTransitedRealm(
&NewTransitedInfo,
&OldTransitedInfo,
&ClientRealm,
&TransitedRealm,
SecData.KdcDnsRealmName()
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
}
}
else
{
UNICODE_STRING TempServiceName;
//
// If the client didn't request name canonicalization, use the
// name supplied by the client
//
if (((KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_name_canonicalize) != 0) &&
((ServiceTicketInfo->UserAccountControl & USER_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) == 0))
{
if (ServiceTicketInfo->UserId == DOMAIN_USER_RID_KRBTGT)
{
PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME TempServiceName = NULL;
KerbErr = KerbBuildFullServiceKdcName(
SecData.KdcDnsRealmName(),
SecData.KdcServiceName(),
KRB_NT_SRV_INST,
&TempServiceName
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertKdcNameToPrincipalName(
&OutputTicket.server_name,
TempServiceName
);
KerbFreeKdcName(&TempServiceName);
}
else
//
// We no longer use the NC bit to change the server name, so just
// duplicate the non-NC case, and return the server name from
// the TGS_REQ. NC is still used for building PA DATA for referral
// however. and we should keep it for TGT renewal. TS 2001-4-03
//
{
KerbErr = KerbDuplicatePrincipalName(
&OutputTicket.server_name,
&RequestBody->KERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY_server_name
);
}
}
else
{
KerbErr = KerbDuplicatePrincipalName(
&OutputTicket.server_name,
&RequestBody->KERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY_server_name
);
}
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
}
//
// Copy all the other strings over
//
EncryptedTicket->client_realm = SourceEncryptPart->client_realm;
//
// S4U dance... Get the client name and realm from
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(S4UClientName) &&
ARGUMENT_PRESENT(S4UClientRealm) &&
!Referral)
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "Swapping real client name for S4U CLient name\n"));
KerbErr = KerbConvertKdcNameToPrincipalName(
&EncryptedTicket->client_name,
S4UClientName
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertUnicodeStringToRealm(
&EncryptedTicket->client_realm,
S4UClientRealm
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
}
else
{
KerbErr = KerbDuplicatePrincipalName(
&EncryptedTicket->client_name,
&SourceEncryptPart->client_name
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
EncryptedTicket->client_realm = SourceEncryptPart->client_realm;
}
//
// If the client did not request canonicalization, return the same
// realm as it sent. Otherwise, send our DNS realm name
//
// if (((KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_name_canonicalize) != 0) ||
// ((ServiceTicketInfo->UserAccountControl & USER_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) == 0))
//
// {
OutputTicket.realm = SecData.KdcKerbDnsRealmName();
// }
// else
// {
// OutputTicket.realm = RequestBody->realm;
// }
//
// Insert transited realms, if present
//
if (NewTransitedInfo.Length != 0)
{
STRING TempString;
KerbErr = KerbUnicodeStringToKerbString(
&TempString,
&NewTransitedInfo
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
EncryptedTicket->transited.transited_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
EncryptedTicket->transited.contents.value = (PUCHAR) TempString.Buffer;
EncryptedTicket->transited.contents.length = (int) TempString.Length;
}
else
{
EncryptedTicket->transited.transited_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
EncryptedTicket->transited.contents.value = (PUCHAR) MIDL_user_allocate(OldTransitedString.Length);
if (EncryptedTicket->transited.contents.value == NULL)
{
KerbErr = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
goto Cleanup;
}
EncryptedTicket->transited.contents.length = (int) OldTransitedString.Length;
RtlCopyMemory(
EncryptedTicket->transited.contents.value,
OldTransitedString.Buffer,
OldTransitedString.Length
);
}
//
// Insert the client addresses. We only update them if the new ticket
// is forwarded of proxied and the source ticket was forwardable or proxiable
// - else we copy the old ones
//
if ((((TicketFlags & KERB_TICKET_FLAGS_forwarded) != 0) &&
((SourceTicketFlags & KERB_TICKET_FLAGS_forwardable) != 0)) ||
(((TicketFlags & KERB_TICKET_FLAGS_proxy) != 0) &&
((SourceTicketFlags & KERB_TICKET_FLAGS_proxiable) != 0)))
{
if ((RequestBody->bit_mask & addresses_present) != 0)
{
Addresses = RequestBody->addresses;
}
}
else
{
if ((SourceEncryptPart->bit_mask & KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_client_addresses_present) != 0)
{
Addresses = SourceEncryptPart->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_client_addresses;
}
}
if (Addresses != NULL)
{
EncryptedTicket->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_client_addresses = Addresses;
EncryptedTicket->bit_mask |= KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_client_addresses_present;
}
//
// The authorization data will be added by the caller, so set it
// to NULL here.
//
EncryptedTicket->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_authorization_data = NULL;
OutputTicket.ticket_version = KERBEROS_VERSION;
*NewTicket = OutputTicket;
Cleanup:
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KdcFreeInternalTicket(&OutputTicket);
}
KerbFreeString(&NewTransitedInfo);
KerbFreeString(&OldTransitedInfo);
KerbFreeString(&ClientRealm);
KerbFreeString(&TransitedRealm);
return(KerbErr);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: KdcVerifyTgsLogonRestrictions
//
// Synopsis: Verifies that a client is allowed to request a TGS ticket
// by checking logon restrictions.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ClientName - Name of client to check
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: KDC_ERR_NONE or a logon restriction error
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
KdcCheckTgsLogonRestrictions(
IN PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME ClientName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ClientRealm,
OUT PKERB_EXT_ERROR pExtendedError
)
{
KERBERR Status;
UNICODE_STRING MappedClientRealm = {0};
BOOLEAN ClientReferral;
KDC_TICKET_INFO ClientInfo = {0};
SAMPR_HANDLE UserHandle = NULL;
PUSER_INTERNAL6_INFORMATION UserInfo = NULL;
LARGE_INTEGER LogoffTime;
NTSTATUS LogonStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
//
// If the client is from a different realm, don't bother looking
// it up - the account won't be here.
//
if (!SecData.IsOurRealm(
ClientRealm
))
{
return(KDC_ERR_NONE);
}
//
// Normalize the client name
//
Status = KdcNormalize(
ClientName,
NULL,
ClientRealm,
KDC_NAME_CLIENT,
&ClientReferral,
&MappedClientRealm,
&ClientInfo,
pExtendedError,
&UserHandle,
USER_ALL_KERB_CHECK_LOGON_RESTRICTIONS,
0L,
&UserInfo,
NULL // no group memberships
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to normalize name ", KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
KerbPrintKdcName(DEB_ERROR,ClientName);
goto Cleanup;
}
Status = KerbCheckLogonRestrictions(
UserHandle,
NULL, // No client address is available
&UserInfo->I1,
KDC_RESTRICT_PKINIT_USED | KDC_RESTRICT_IGNORE_PW_EXPIRATION, // Don't bother checking for password expiration
&LogoffTime,
&LogonStatus
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_WARN,"KLIN (%x) Logon restriction check failed: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),Status));
//
// This is a *very* important error to trickle back. See 23456 in bug DB
//
FILL_EXT_ERROR(pExtendedError, LogonStatus, FILENO, __LINE__);
goto Cleanup;
}
Cleanup:
KerbFreeString( &MappedClientRealm );
FreeTicketInfo( &ClientInfo );
SamIFree_UserInternal6Information( UserInfo );
if (UserHandle != NULL)
{
SamrCloseHandle(&UserHandle);
}
return Status;
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: KdcBuildReferralInfo
//
// Synopsis: Builds the referral information to return to the client.
// We only return the realm name and no server name
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ReferralRealm - realm to refer client to
// ReferralInfo - recevies encoded referral info
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
KdcBuildReferralInfo(
IN PUNICODE_STRING ReferralRealm,
OUT PKERB_PA_DATA_LIST *ReferralInfo
)
{
KERBERR KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
PKERB_PA_DATA_LIST ListElem = NULL;
KERB_PA_SERV_REFERRAL ReferralData = {0};
//
// Fill in the unencoded structure.
//
KerbErr = KerbConvertUnicodeStringToRealm(
&ReferralData.referred_server_realm,
ReferralRealm
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
ListElem = (PKERB_PA_DATA_LIST) MIDL_user_allocate(sizeof(KERB_PA_DATA_LIST));
if (ListElem == NULL)
{
KerbErr = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
goto Cleanup;
}
RtlZeroMemory(ListElem, sizeof(KERB_PA_DATA_LIST));
ListElem->value.preauth_data_type = KRB5_PADATA_REFERRAL_INFO;
KerbErr = KerbPackData(
&ReferralData,
KERB_PA_SERV_REFERRAL_PDU,
(PULONG) &ListElem->value.preauth_data.length,
&ListElem->value.preauth_data.value
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
*ReferralInfo = ListElem;
ListElem = NULL;
Cleanup:
if (ListElem != NULL)
{
if (ListElem->value.preauth_data.value != NULL)
{
KdcFreeEncodedData(ListElem->value.preauth_data.value);
}
MIDL_user_free(ListElem);
}
KerbFreeRealm(&ReferralData.referred_server_realm);
return(KerbErr);
}
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Name: I_RenewTicket
//
// Synopsis: Renews an internal ticket.
//
// Arguments: SourceTicket - Source ticket for this request
// ServiceName - Name of service for ticket
// ClientRealm - Realm of client
// ServiceTicketInfo - Ticket info from service account
// RequestBody - Body of ticket request
// NewTicket - Receives new ticket
// CommonEType - Receives common encryption type for service ticket
// TicketKey - Receives key used to encrypt the ticket
//
// Notes: Validates the ticket, gets the service's current key,
// and builds the reply.
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
I_RenewTicket(
IN PKERB_TICKET SourceTicket,
IN PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME ServiceName,
IN PKDC_TICKET_INFO ServiceTicketInfo,
IN PKERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY RequestBody,
IN PULONG CommonEType,
OUT PKERB_TICKET NewTicket,
OUT PKERB_EXT_ERROR pExtendedError
)
{
KERBERR KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET SourceEncryptPart = (PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) SourceTicket->encrypted_part.cipher_text.value;
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET NewEncryptPart = (PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) NewTicket->encrypted_part.cipher_text.value;
PKERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY ServerKey;
BOOLEAN NamesEqual = FALSE;
TRACE(KDC, I_RenewTicket, DEB_FUNCTION);
D_DebugLog(( DEB_TRACE, "Trying to renew a ticket to "));
D_KerbPrintKdcName(DEB_TRACE, ServiceName );
//
// Make sure the original is renewable.
//
if ((KerbConvertFlagsToUlong(&SourceEncryptPart->flags) & KERB_TICKET_FLAGS_renewable) == 0)
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_WARN, "KLIN(%x) Attempt made to renew non-renewable ticket\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Make sure the source ticket service equals the service from the ticket info
//
KerbErr = KerbCompareKdcNameToPrincipalName(
&SourceTicket->server_name,
ServiceName,
&NamesEqual
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
if (!NamesEqual)
{
//
// Make sure we the renewed ticket is for the same service as the original.
//
FILL_EXT_ERROR(pExtendedError, STATUS_KDC_INVALID_REQUEST, FILENO, __LINE__);
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Find the common crypt system.
//
KerbErr = KerbFindCommonCryptSystem(
RequestBody->encryption_type,
ServiceTicketInfo->Passwords,
NULL,
CommonEType,
&ServerKey
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KdcReportKeyError(
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName,
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName,
KDCEVENT_NO_KEY_UNION_TGS,
RequestBody->encryption_type,
ServiceTicketInfo->Passwords
);
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Build the renewal ticket
//
KerbErr = BuildTicketTGS(
ServiceTicketInfo,
RequestBody,
SourceTicket,
FALSE, // not referral
NULL, // not doing s4u
NULL, // not doing s4u
*CommonEType,
NewTicket,
pExtendedError
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,
"KLIN(%x) Failed to build TGS ticket for renewal: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// BuildTicket puts a random session key in the ticket,
// so replace it with the one from the source ticket.
//
KerbFreeKey(
&NewEncryptPart->key
);
KerbErr = KerbDuplicateKey(
&NewEncryptPart->key,
&SourceEncryptPart->key
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Insert the auth data into the new ticket.
//
//
// BUG 455049: if the service password changes, this will cause problems
// because we don't resign the pac.
//
KerbErr = KdcInsertAuthorizationData(
NewEncryptPart,
pExtendedError,
(RequestBody->bit_mask & enc_authorization_data_present) ?
&RequestBody->enc_authorization_data : NULL,
NULL,
FALSE,
SourceEncryptPart,
FALSE, // don't add local groups
NULL,
NULL,
NULL
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to insert authorization data: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
Cleanup:
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KdcFreeInternalTicket(
NewTicket
);
}
return(KerbErr);
}
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Name: I_Validate
//
// Synopsis: Validates a post-dated ticket so that it can be used.
// This is not implemented.
//
// Arguments: pkitSourceTicket - (in) ticket to be validated
// pkiaAuthenticator -
// pService - (in) service ticket is for
// pRealm - (in) realm service exists in
// pktrRequest - (in) holds nonce for new ticket
// pkdPAData - (in)
// pkitTicket - (out) new ticket
//
// Notes: See 3.3 of the Kerberos V5 R5.2 spec
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
I_Validate(
IN PKERB_TICKET SourceTicket,
IN PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME ServiceName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING ClientRealm,
IN PKERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY RequestBody,
OUT PULONG CommonEType,
OUT PKERB_TICKET NewTicket,
OUT PKERB_EXT_ERROR pExtendedError
)
{
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
#ifdef notdef
TRACE(KDC, I_Validate, DEB_FUNCTION);
HRESULT hr;
D_DebugLog(( DEB_TRACE, "Trying to validate a ticket to '%ws' for '%ws'...\n",
pkitSourceTicket->ServerName.accsid.pwszDisplayName,
pkitSourceTicket->kitEncryptPart.Principal.accsid.pwszDisplayName ));
PrintRequest( DEB_T_TICKETS, pktrRequest );
PrintTicket( DEB_T_TICKETS, "Ticket to validate:", pkitSourceTicket );
if ( (pkitSourceTicket->kitEncryptPart.fTicketFlags &
(KERBFLAG_POSTDATED | KERBFLAG_INVALID))
!= (KERBFLAG_POSTDATED | KERBFLAG_INVALID) )
{
hr = KDC_E_BADOPTION;
}
else if (_wcsicmp(pkitSourceTicket->ServerName.accsid.pwszDisplayName,
pasService->pwszDisplayName) != 0)
{
hr = KDC_E_BADOPTION;
}
else
{
TimeStamp tsNow, tsMinus, tsPlus;
GetCurrentTimeStamp( &tsNow );
tsMinus = tsNow - SkewTime;
tsPlus = tsNow + SkewTime;
PrintTime(DEB_TRACE, "Current time: ", tsNow );
PrintTime(DEB_TRACE, "Past time: ", tsMinus );
PrintTime(DEB_TRACE, "Future time: ", tsPlus );
if (pkitSourceTicket->kitEncryptPart.tsStartTime > tsPlus )
hr = KRB_E_TKT_NYV;
else if (pkitSourceTicket->kitEncryptPart.tsEndTime < tsMinus )
hr = KRB_E_TKT_EXPIRED;
else
{
*pkitTicket = *pkitSourceTicket;
pkitTicket->kitEncryptPart.fTicketFlags &= (~KERBFLAG_INVALID);
hr = S_OK;
}
}
return(hr);
#endif // notdef
}
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Name: I_GetTGSTicket
//
// Synopsis: Gets an internal ticket using a KDC ticket (TGT).
//
// Arguments: SourceTicket - TGT for the client
// ServiceName - Service to get a ticket to
// RequestBody - Body of KDC request message
// ServiceTicketInfo - Ticket info for the service of the
// source ticket
// TicketEncryptionKey - If present, then this is a
// enc_tkt_in_skey request and the PAC should be
// encrypted with this key.
// CommonEType - Receives common encrytion type
// NewTicket - Receives newly created ticket
// ReplyPaData - Contains any PA data to put in the reply
//
// Notes: See GetTGSTicket.
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
I_GetTGSTicket(
IN PKERB_TICKET SourceTicket,
IN PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME ServiceName,
IN PUNICODE_STRING RequestRealm,
IN PKERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY RequestBody,
IN PKDC_TICKET_INFO ServiceTicketInfo,
IN OPTIONAL PKERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY TicketEncryptionKey,
IN OPTIONAL PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME S4UClientName,
IN OPTIONAL PUNICODE_STRING S4UClientRealm,
OUT PULONG CommonEType,
OUT PKERB_TICKET Ticket,
OUT PKERB_PA_DATA_LIST * ReplyPaData,
OUT PKERB_EXT_ERROR pExtendedError
)
{
KERBERR KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
UNICODE_STRING LocalServiceName;
UNICODE_STRING ServicePrincipal;
UNICODE_STRING ServiceRealm = {0};
UNICODE_STRING ClientRealm = {0};
BOOLEAN Referral = FALSE;
KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET EncryptedTicket = {0};
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET OutputEncryptedTicket = NULL;
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET SourceEncryptPart = NULL;
PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME TargetPrincipal = ServiceName;
KERB_TICKET NewTicket = {0};
PKERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY ServerKey;
PKERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY OldServerKey;
KDC_TICKET_INFO OldServiceTicketInfo = {0};
ULONG NameFlags = 0;
ULONG KdcOptions = 0;
BOOLEAN GetS4UPac = FALSE;
TRACE(KDC, I_GetTGSTicket, DEB_FUNCTION);
//
// Store away the encrypted ticket from the output ticket to
// assign it at the end.
//
SourceEncryptPart = (PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) SourceTicket->encrypted_part.cipher_text.value;
OutputEncryptedTicket = (PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) Ticket->encrypted_part.cipher_text.value;
NewTicket.encrypted_part.cipher_text.value = (PUCHAR) &EncryptedTicket;
//
// Copy the space for flags from the real destination.
//
EncryptedTicket.flags = OutputEncryptedTicket->flags;
LocalServiceName.Buffer = NULL;
D_DebugLog(( DEB_TRACE, "Trying to build a new ticket to "));
D_KerbPrintKdcName( DEB_TRACE, ServiceName );
KdcOptions = KerbConvertFlagsToUlong( &RequestBody->kdc_options );
if (KdcOptions & (KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_unused7 |
KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_reserved |
KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_unused9) )
{
DebugLog(( DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Bad options in TGS request: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), KdcOptions ));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Check if the client said to canonicalize the name
//
// if ((KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_name_canonicalize) != 0)
{
NameFlags |= KDC_NAME_CHECK_GC;
}
//
// Verify this account is allowed to issue tickets.
//
if ((ServiceTicketInfo->UserId != DOMAIN_USER_RID_KRBTGT) &&
((ServiceTicketInfo->UserAccountControl & USER_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) == 0))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"Trying to make a TGS request with a ticket to %wZ\n",
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName ));
KerbErr = KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Copy the ticket info into the old structure. It will be replaced with
// new info from Normalize.
//
OldServiceTicketInfo = *ServiceTicketInfo;
RtlZeroMemory(
ServiceTicketInfo,
sizeof(KDC_TICKET_INFO)
);
//
// If the client name is in our realm, verify client
// identity and build the PAC for the client.
//
if ( ARGUMENT_PRESENT(S4UClientRealm) &&
SecData.IsOurRealm(S4UClientRealm) )
{
// Fester:
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "Doing S4U client lookup!\n"));
GetS4UPac = TRUE;
}
//
// If we have to refer, Normalize will put the credentials of the target
// realm in ServiceTicketInfo. Otherwise, it will be NULL.
//
KerbErr = KdcNormalize(
TargetPrincipal,
NULL,
RequestRealm,
NameFlags | KDC_NAME_SERVER | KDC_NAME_FOLLOW_REFERRALS,
&Referral,
&ServiceRealm,
ServiceTicketInfo,
pExtendedError,
NULL, // no user handle
0L, // no fields to fetch
0L, // no extended fields
NULL, // no user all information
NULL // no group membership
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_WARN,"KLIN(%x) Failed to normalize ", KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
KerbPrintKdcName(DEB_WARN,ServiceName);
DebugLog((DEB_WARN,"\t 0x%x\n",KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
if (ServiceTicketInfo != NULL)
{
if ((ServiceTicketInfo->UserId != DOMAIN_USER_RID_KRBTGT) &&
(ServiceTicketInfo->UserAccountControl & USER_ACCOUNT_DISABLED) != 0)
{
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
D_DebugLog((DEB_WARN,"KLIN(%x) Failed to normalize, account is disabled ",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
KerbPrintKdcName(DEB_WARN,ServiceName);
D_DebugLog((DEB_WARN,"\t 0x%x\n",KerbErr));
FILL_EXT_ERROR(pExtendedError, STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED, FILENO, __LINE__);
goto Cleanup;
}
}
//
// If this isn't an interdomain trust account, go ahead and issue a normal
// ticket.
//
if ((ServiceTicketInfo->UserAccountControl & USER_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) == 0)
{
//
// Find the common crypt system.
//
KerbErr = KerbFindCommonCryptSystem(
RequestBody->encryption_type,
ServiceTicketInfo->Passwords,
NULL,
CommonEType,
&ServerKey
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KdcReportKeyError(
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName,
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName,
KDCEVENT_NO_KEY_UNION_TGS,
RequestBody->encryption_type,
ServiceTicketInfo->Passwords
);
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Check whether service is interactive, 'cause you can't
// get a ticket to an interactive service.
//
KerbErr = BuildTicketTGS(
ServiceTicketInfo,
RequestBody,
SourceTicket,
Referral,
S4UClientName,
S4UClientRealm,
*CommonEType,
&NewTicket,
pExtendedError
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to build TGS ticket for %wZ : 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), &LocalServiceName, KerbErr ));
goto Cleanup;
}
}
else
{
//
// Need to build a referal ticket.
//
D_DebugLog(( DEB_T_KDC, "GetTGSTicket: referring to domain '%wZ'\n",
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName ));
//
// Verify that if the trust is not transitive, the client is from
// this realm.
//
SourceEncryptPart =(PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) SourceTicket->encrypted_part.cipher_text.value;
if (((ServiceTicketInfo->fTicketOpts & AUTH_REQ_TRANSITIVE_TRUST) == 0) &&
(ServiceTicketInfo->UserId != DOMAIN_USER_RID_KRBTGT))
{
if (!SecData.IsOurRealm(&SourceEncryptPart->client_realm))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_WARN,"Client from realm %s attempted to access non transitve trust to %wZ : illegal\n",
SourceEncryptPart->client_realm,
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName
));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
}
//
// Verify that the trust for the client is transitive as well, if it isn't
// from this domain. This means that if the source ticket trust isn't
// transitive, then this ticket can't be used to get further
// tgt's, in any realm.
//
// e.g. the TGT from client comes from a domain w/ which we don't
// have transitive trust.
//
if (((OldServiceTicketInfo.fTicketOpts & AUTH_REQ_TRANSITIVE_TRUST) == 0) &&
(OldServiceTicketInfo.UserId != DOMAIN_USER_RID_KRBTGT))
{
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
//
// This is probably not a common error, but could
// indicate a configuration problem, so log an explicit
// error. See bug 87879.
//
if (KerbErr == KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED)
{
KerbErr = KerbConvertRealmToUnicodeString(
&ClientRealm,
&SourceEncryptPart->client_realm
);
if (KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
ReportServiceEvent(
EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE,
KDCEVENT_FAILED_TRANSITIVE_TRUST,
0, // no raw data
NULL, // no raw data
2, // number of strings
ClientRealm.Buffer,
ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName.Buffer
);
}
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Find the common crypt system.
//
KerbErr = KerbFindCommonCryptSystem(
RequestBody->encryption_type,
ServiceTicketInfo->Passwords,
NULL,
CommonEType,
&ServerKey
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KdcReportKeyError(
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName,
&ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName,
KDCEVENT_NO_KEY_UNION_TGS,
RequestBody->encryption_type,
ServiceTicketInfo->Passwords
);
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = BuildTicketTGS(
ServiceTicketInfo,
RequestBody,
SourceTicket,
TRUE,
NULL, // not doing s4u
NULL, // not doing s4u
*CommonEType,
&NewTicket,
pExtendedError
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to build TGS ticket for %wZ : 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), &ServiceTicketInfo->AccountName, KerbErr ));
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// If this is a referral/canonicaliztion, return the target realm
//
if (Referral && ((KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_name_canonicalize) != 0))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_TRACE,"Building referral info for realm %wZ\n",
&ServiceRealm ));
KerbErr = KdcBuildReferralInfo(
&ServiceRealm,
ReplyPaData
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
}
}
OldServerKey = KerbGetKeyFromList(
OldServiceTicketInfo.Passwords,
SourceTicket->encrypted_part.encryption_type
);
DsysAssert(OldServerKey != NULL);
if (OldServerKey == NULL)
{
KerbErr = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Insert the auth data into the new ticket.
//
KerbErr = KdcInsertAuthorizationData(
&EncryptedTicket,
pExtendedError,
(RequestBody->bit_mask & enc_authorization_data_present) ?
&RequestBody->enc_authorization_data : NULL,
S4UClientName,
GetS4UPac,
(PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) SourceTicket->encrypted_part.cipher_text.value,
((ServiceTicketInfo->UserId != DOMAIN_USER_RID_KRBTGT) &&
((ServiceTicketInfo->UserAccountControl & USER_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) == 0)), // only insert for non-referrals
&OldServiceTicketInfo,
OldServerKey,
ARGUMENT_PRESENT(TicketEncryptionKey) ? TicketEncryptionKey : ServerKey
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to insert authorization data: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
*Ticket = NewTicket;
*OutputEncryptedTicket = EncryptedTicket;
Ticket->encrypted_part.cipher_text.value = (PUCHAR) OutputEncryptedTicket;
Cleanup:
//
// Now free the original service ticket info (which was for the KDC) so
// we can get it for the real service
//
FreeTicketInfo(
&OldServiceTicketInfo
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KdcFreeInternalTicket(
&NewTicket
);
}
KerbFreeString(
&ServiceRealm
);
KerbFreeString(
&ClientRealm
);
return(KerbErr);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: KerbUnpackAdditionalTickets
//
// Synopsis: Unpacks the AdditionalTickets field of a KDC request
// and (a) verifies that the ticket is TGT for this realm
// and (b) the ticket is encrypted with the corret key and
// (c) the ticket is valid
//
// Effects: allocate output ticket
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: there can only be one additional ticket
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
KdcUnpackAdditionalTickets(
IN PKERB_TICKET_LIST TicketList,
OUT PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET * AdditionalTicket
)
{
KERBERR KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET EncryptedTicket = NULL;
UNICODE_STRING ServerNames[3];
PKERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY EncryptionKey = NULL;
PKERB_TICKET Ticket;
KERB_REALM LocalRealm;
KDC_TICKET_INFO KrbtgtTicketInfo = {0};
//
// Verify that there is a ticket & that there is only one ticket
//
//
// TBD: Make this work w/ S4U && U2U as there will be more than 1 ticket
// at that point. Evaluate options by lowest id first...
// S4UToSelf (12)
//
if ((TicketList == NULL) || (TicketList->next != NULL))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Trying to unpack null ticket or more than one ticket\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
KerbErr = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = SecData.GetKrbtgtTicketInfo(&KrbtgtTicketInfo);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
Ticket = &TicketList->value;
//
// Verify the ticket, first with the normal password list
//
ServerNames[0] = *SecData.KdcFullServiceKdcName();
ServerNames[1] = *SecData.KdcFullServiceDnsName();
ServerNames[2] = *SecData.KdcFullServiceName();
EncryptionKey = KerbGetKeyFromList(
KrbtgtTicketInfo.Passwords,
Ticket->encrypted_part.encryption_type
);
if (EncryptionKey == NULL)
{
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// NOTE: we only allow additional tickets from our realm. This
// means cross-realm TGTs can't be used as additional tickets.
//
KerbErr = KerbVerifyTicket(
Ticket,
3, // 3 names
ServerNames,
SecData.KdcDnsRealmName(),
EncryptionKey,
&SkewTime,
&EncryptedTicket
);
//
// if it failed due to wrong password, try again with older password
//
if ((KerbErr == KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) && (KrbtgtTicketInfo.OldPasswords != NULL))
{
EncryptionKey = KerbGetKeyFromList(
KrbtgtTicketInfo.OldPasswords,
Ticket->encrypted_part.encryption_type
);
if (EncryptionKey == NULL)
{
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP;
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KerbVerifyTicket(
&TicketList->value,
2, // 2 names
ServerNames,
SecData.KdcDnsRealmName(),
EncryptionKey,
&SkewTime,
&EncryptedTicket
);
}
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to verify additional ticket: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
LocalRealm = SecData.KdcKerbDnsRealmName();
//
// Verify the realm of the ticket
//
if (!KerbCompareRealmNames(
&LocalRealm,
&Ticket->realm
))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Additional ticket realm is wrong: %s instead of %s\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__), Ticket->realm, LocalRealm));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Verify the realm of the client is the same as our realm
//
if (!KerbCompareRealmNames(
&LocalRealm,
&EncryptedTicket->client_realm
))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Additional ticket client realm is wrong: %s instead of %s\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),EncryptedTicket->client_realm, LocalRealm));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto Cleanup;
}
*AdditionalTicket = EncryptedTicket;
EncryptedTicket = NULL;
Cleanup:
if (EncryptedTicket != NULL)
{
KerbFreeTicket(EncryptedTicket);
}
FreeTicketInfo(&KrbtgtTicketInfo);
return(KerbErr);
}
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Name: KdcFindS4UClientAndRealm
//
// Synopsis: Decodes PA DATA to find PA_DATA_FOR_USER entry.
//
// Effects: Get a client name and realm for processing S4U request
//
// Arguments: PAList - Preauth data list from TGS_REQ
// ServerKey - Key in authenticator, used to sign PA_DATA.
// ClientRealm - Target for client realm
// ClientName - Principal to get S4U ticket for
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: KDC_ERR_ or KRB_AP_ERR errors only
//
// Notes: Free client name and realm w/
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
KdcFindS4UClientAndRealm(
IN PKERB_PA_DATA_LIST PaList,
IN OUT PUNICODE_STRING ClientRealm,
IN OUT PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME * ClientName
)
{
KERBERR Kerberr = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
PKERB_PA_DATA PaData = NULL;
PKERB_PA_FOR_USER S4URequest = NULL;
*ClientName = NULL;
RtlInitUnicodeString(
ClientRealm,
NULL
);
PaData = KerbFindPreAuthDataEntry(
KRB5_PADATA_S4U,
PaList
);
if (NULL == PaData)
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "No S4U pa data \n"));
Kerberr = KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto Cleanup;
}
Kerberr = KerbUnpackData(
PaData->preauth_data.value,
PaData->preauth_data.length,
KERB_PA_FOR_USER_PDU,
(PVOID* ) &S4URequest
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(Kerberr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "Failed to unpack PA_FOR_USER\n"));
goto Cleanup;
}
Kerberr = KerbConvertRealmToUnicodeString(
ClientRealm,
&S4URequest->client_realm
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(Kerberr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
Kerberr = KerbConvertPrincipalNameToKdcName(
ClientName,
&S4URequest->client_name
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(Kerberr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
Cleanup:
if (S4URequest != NULL)
{
KerbFreeData(
KERB_PA_FOR_USER_PDU,
S4URequest
);
}
return Kerberr;
}
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Name: HandleTGSRequest
//
// Synopsis: Gets a ticket using a KDC ticket (TGT).
//
// Effects: Allocates and encrypts a KDC reply
//
// Arguments: ClientAddress - Optionally contains client IP address
// RequestMessage - contains the TGS request message
// RequestRealm - The realm of the request, from the request
// message
// OutputMessage - Contains the buffer to send back to the client
// Requires:
//
// Returns: KDC_ERR_ or KRB_AP_ERR errors only
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
KERBERR
HandleTGSRequest(
IN OPTIONAL SOCKADDR * ClientAddress,
IN PKERB_TGS_REQUEST RequestMessage,
IN PUNICODE_STRING RequestRealm,
OUT PKERB_MESSAGE_BUFFER OutputMessage,
OUT PKERB_EXT_ERROR pExtendedError
)
{
KERBERR KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
KDC_TICKET_INFO ServerTicketInfo = {0};
KDC_TICKET_INFO TgtTicketInfo = {0};
KERB_TICKET SourceTicket = {0};
KERB_TICKET NewTicket = {0};
KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET EncryptedTicket = {0};
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET SourceEncryptPart = NULL;
PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET AdditionalTicket = NULL;
PKERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY RequestBody = &RequestMessage->request_body;
KERB_TGS_REPLY Reply = {0};
KERB_ENCRYPTED_KDC_REPLY ReplyBody = {0};
PKERB_AP_REQUEST UnmarshalledApRequest = NULL;
PKERB_AUTHENTICATOR UnmarshalledAuthenticator = NULL;
PKERB_PA_DATA ApRequest = NULL;
PKERB_PA_DATA_LIST ReplyPaData = NULL;
KERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY ReplyKey = {0};
PKERB_ENCRYPTION_KEY ServerKey;
PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME ServerName = NULL;
PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME ClientName = NULL;
PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME S4UClientName = NULL;
UNICODE_STRING ClientRealm = {0};
UNICODE_STRING ClientStringName = {0};
UNICODE_STRING ServerStringName = {0};
UNICODE_STRING S4UClientRealm = {0};
PUNICODE_STRING S4URealm = NULL;
ULONG CommonEType;
ULONG KdcOptions = 0;
ULONG TicketFlags = 0;
ULONG ReplyTicketFlags = 0;
BOOLEAN Validating = FALSE;
BOOLEAN UseSubKey = FALSE;
BOOLEAN Renew = FALSE;
BOOLEAN CheckAdditionalTicketMatch = FALSE;
KDC_TGS_EVENT_INFO TGSEventTraceInfo = {0};
TRACE(KDC, HandleTGSRequest, DEB_FUNCTION);
//
// Initialize [out] structures, so if we terminate early, they can
// be correctly marshalled by the stub
//
NewTicket.encrypted_part.cipher_text.value = (PUCHAR) &EncryptedTicket;
EncryptedTicket.flags.value = (PUCHAR) &TicketFlags;
EncryptedTicket.flags.length = sizeof(ULONG) * 8;
ReplyBody.flags.value = (PUCHAR) &ReplyTicketFlags;
ReplyBody.flags.length = sizeof(ULONG) * 8;
KdcOptions = KerbConvertFlagsToUlong( &RequestBody->kdc_options );
//
// Start event tracing
//
if (KdcEventTraceFlag){
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Guid = KdcHandleTGSRequestGuid;
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Class.Type = EVENT_TRACE_TYPE_START;
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Flags = WNODE_FLAG_TRACED_GUID;
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Size = sizeof (EVENT_TRACE_HEADER) + sizeof (ULONG);
TGSEventTraceInfo.KdcOptions = KdcOptions;
TraceEvent(
KdcTraceLoggerHandle,
(PEVENT_TRACE_HEADER)&TGSEventTraceInfo
);
}
//
// Check for additional tickets
//
if ((RequestBody->bit_mask & additional_tickets_present) != 0)
{
//
// The ticket must be unpacked with the krbtgt key
//
KerbErr = KdcUnpackAdditionalTickets(
RequestBody->additional_tickets,
&AdditionalTicket
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to unpack additional tickets: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
}
//
// Make sure that if there is a ticket, then enc_tkt_in_skey is set and
// if not, then it isn't set
//
//
// TBD: S4UToProxy (E) Ok to have additional ticket if
// CNAME-IN-ADDL-TKT set.
//
if ((((KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_enc_tkt_in_skey) != 0) ^
(AdditionalTicket != NULL)))
{
// tbd: more logic for determining if multiple addl tickets are "bad option"
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Client didn't match enc_tkt_in_skey with additional tickts : %d vs %d\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),((KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_enc_tkt_in_skey) != 0),
(AdditionalTicket != NULL)));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Pass data to next level, w/ flag
//
// TBD: S4UToProxy (D)
// Forwardable flag must be set in the service ticket
// Check our options, that the additional ticket has bit set.
// This additional service ticket must have the fwdable flag set,
// and must validate correctly.
//
// We'll need to crack the server key, and the ticket, as validation of
// identity.
//
//
// The server name is optional.
//
if ((RequestBody->bit_mask & KERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY_server_name_present) != 0)
{
KerbErr = KerbConvertPrincipalNameToKdcName(
&ServerName,
&RequestBody->KERB_KDC_REQUEST_BODY_server_name
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Verify the at the server name is the same as the client name
// from the addional ticket by getting the ticket info for supplied
// TGT for the server. Later on we will compare it against the real
// ticket info.
//
if (AdditionalTicket != NULL)
{
PKERB_INTERNAL_NAME TgtClientName = NULL;
UNICODE_STRING TgtRealmName = {0};
UNICODE_STRING CrackedRealm = {0};
BOOLEAN Referral = FALSE;
KerbErr = KerbConvertPrincipalNameToKdcName(
&TgtClientName,
&AdditionalTicket->client_name
);
if (KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KerbErr = KerbConvertRealmToUnicodeString(
&TgtRealmName,
&AdditionalTicket->client_realm
);
if (KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
// TBD: make sure normalize takes into account
// deleg restrictions, but not here, for god' sake.
// .
KerbErr = KdcNormalize(
TgtClientName,
&TgtRealmName,
&TgtRealmName,
KDC_NAME_CLIENT | KDC_NAME_INBOUND,
&Referral,
&CrackedRealm,
&TgtTicketInfo,
pExtendedError,
NULL, // no user handle
0L, // no fields to fetch
0L, // no extended fields
NULL, // no user all
NULL // no group membership
);
if (KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
KerbFreeString(&CrackedRealm);
if (Referral)
{
KerbErr = KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
}
else
{
CheckAdditionalTicketMatch = FALSE;
}
}
KerbFreeString(&TgtRealmName);
}
KerbFreeKdcName(&TgtClientName);
}
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to normalize client name from supplied ticket\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
goto Cleanup;
}
}
}
else
{
//
// There must be an additional ticket.
//
if (AdditionalTicket == NULL)
{
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertPrincipalNameToKdcName(
&ServerName,
&AdditionalTicket->client_name
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
}
//
// Convert the server name to a string for auditing.
//
KerbErr = KerbConvertKdcNameToString(
&ServerStringName,
ServerName,
NULL
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
D_DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "GetTGSTicket called. Service=" ));
D_KerbPrintKdcName(DEB_TRACE, ServerName );
//
// The TGS and authenticator are in an AP request in the pre-auth data.
// Find it and decode the AP request now.
//
if ((RequestMessage->bit_mask & KERB_KDC_REQUEST_preauth_data_present) == 0)
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,
"KLIN(%x) No pre-auth data in TGS request - not allowed.\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Get the TGT from the PA data.
//
ApRequest = KerbFindPreAuthDataEntry(
KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ,
RequestMessage->KERB_KDC_REQUEST_preauth_data
);
if (ApRequest == NULL)
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) No pre-auth data in TGS request - not allowed.\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
FILL_EXT_ERROR(pExtendedError, STATUS_NO_PA_DATA, FILENO, __LINE__);
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Verify the request. This includes decoding the AP request,
// finding the appropriate key to decrypt the ticket, and checking
// the ticket.
//
KerbErr = KdcVerifyKdcRequest(
ApRequest->preauth_data.value,
ApRequest->preauth_data.length,
ClientAddress,
TRUE, // this is a kdc request
&UnmarshalledApRequest,
&UnmarshalledAuthenticator,
&SourceEncryptPart,
&ReplyKey,
NULL, // no ticket key
&ServerTicketInfo,
&UseSubKey,
pExtendedError
);
//
// If you want to validate a ticket, then it's OK if it isn't
// currently valid.
//
if (KerbErr == KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV && (KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_validate))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_TRACE,"Validating a not-yet-valid ticket\n"));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_NONE;
}
else if (KerbErr == KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED)
{
//
// Bug 276943: When the authenticator is encrypted with something other
// than the session key, KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY must be
// returned per RFC 1510
//
D_DebugLog((DEB_TRACE,"Could not decrypt the ticket\n"));
KerbErr = KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
}
//
// Verify the checksum on the ticket, if present
//
if ( KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr) &&
(UnmarshalledAuthenticator != NULL) &&
(UnmarshalledAuthenticator->bit_mask & checksum_present) != 0)
{
KerbErr = KdcVerifyTgsChecksum(
&RequestMessage->request_body,
&ReplyKey,
&UnmarshalledAuthenticator->checksum
);
}
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to verify TGS request: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),KerbErr));
FILL_EXT_ERROR(pExtendedError, STATUS_KDC_INVALID_REQUEST, FILENO, __LINE__);
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Now that we've validated the request,
// Check to see if the cname in padata bit is set, and
// we have the KDC option set.
//
if ((KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_cname_in_pa_data) != 0)
{
KerbErr = KdcFindS4UClientAndRealm(
RequestMessage->KERB_KDC_REQUEST_preauth_data,
&S4UClientRealm,
&S4UClientName
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "KdcFindS4UClientAndRealm failed\n"));
FILL_EXT_ERROR(pExtendedError, STATUS_NO_PA_DATA, FILENO, __LINE__);
goto Cleanup;
}
S4URealm = &S4UClientRealm;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertPrincipalNameToKdcName(
&ClientName,
&SourceEncryptPart->client_name
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
KerbErr = KerbConvertKdcNameToString(
&ClientStringName,
ClientName,
NULL
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// And the realm
//
KerbErr = KerbConvertRealmToUnicodeString(
&ClientRealm,
&SourceEncryptPart->client_realm
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// If the client is in this domain and if we are supposed to
// verify the client's account is still good,
// do it now.
//
if ((SecData.KdcFlags() & AUTH_REQ_VALIDATE_CLIENT) != 0)
{
LARGE_INTEGER AuthTime;
LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime;
NtQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime);
KerbConvertGeneralizedTimeToLargeInt(
&AuthTime,
&SourceEncryptPart->authtime,
0
);
//
// Only check if we haven't checked recently
//
if ((CurrentTime.QuadPart > AuthTime.QuadPart) &&
((CurrentTime.QuadPart - AuthTime.QuadPart) > SecData.KdcRestrictionLifetime().QuadPart))
{
KerbErr = KdcCheckTgsLogonRestrictions(
ClientName,
&ClientRealm,
pExtendedError
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_WARN, "KLIN(%x) Client failed TGS logon restrictions: 0x%x : ",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),KerbErr));
KerbPrintKdcName(DEB_WARN, ClientName);
goto Cleanup;
}
}
}
//
// Build a ticket struture to pass to the worker functions
//
SourceTicket = UnmarshalledApRequest->ticket;
SourceTicket.encrypted_part.cipher_text.value = (PUCHAR) SourceEncryptPart;
//
// Build the new ticket
//
D_DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "Handle TGS request: Client = %wZ,\n ",&ClientRealm));
D_KerbPrintKdcName(DEB_TRACE, ClientName);
D_DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "\t ServerName = \n"));
D_KerbPrintKdcName(DEB_TRACE, ServerName);
//
// Pass off the work to the worker routines
//
if (KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_renew)
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_T_KDC,"Renewing ticket ticket\n"));
Renew = TRUE;
KerbErr = I_RenewTicket(
&SourceTicket,
ServerName,
&ServerTicketInfo,
RequestBody,
&CommonEType,
&NewTicket,
pExtendedError
);
}
else if (KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_validate)
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_T_KDC,"Validating ticket\n"));
KerbErr = I_Validate(
&SourceTicket,
ServerName,
&ClientRealm,
RequestBody,
&CommonEType,
&NewTicket,
pExtendedError
);
Validating = TRUE;
}
else
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_T_KDC,"Getting TGS ticket\n"));
KerbErr = I_GetTGSTicket(
&SourceTicket,
ServerName,
RequestRealm,
RequestBody,
&ServerTicketInfo,
AdditionalTicket != NULL ? &AdditionalTicket->key : NULL,
S4UClientName,
S4URealm,
&CommonEType,
&NewTicket,
&ReplyPaData,
pExtendedError
);
}
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
DebugLog((DEB_WARN,"KLIN(%x) TGS ticket worker failed: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
DsysAssert(ServerTicketInfo.Passwords != NULL);
//
// Check to see if the additional ticket supplied is the one for this
// server, if necessary
//
if (CheckAdditionalTicketMatch )
{
if (ServerTicketInfo.UserId != TgtTicketInfo.UserId)
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Supplied ticket is not for server: %wZ vs. %wZ\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),&TgtTicketInfo.AccountName,
&ServerTicketInfo.AccountName ));
KerbErr = KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
goto Cleanup;
}
}
//
// Determine the keys to encrypt the ticket with. (The key to encrypt the
// reply with was determined by CheckTicket.)
if ((KdcOptions & KERB_KDC_OPTIONS_enc_tkt_in_skey) &&
(AdditionalTicket != NULL))
{
//
// Use the session key from the tgt
//
ServerKey = &AdditionalTicket->key;
} else {
ServerKey = KerbGetKeyFromList(
ServerTicketInfo.Passwords,
CommonEType
);
DsysAssert(ServerKey != NULL);
if (ServerKey == NULL)
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,
"KLIN(%x) BADERROR: cannot find server key while validating\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__)));
KerbErr = KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP;
goto Cleanup;
}
}
KerbErr = BuildReply(
NULL,
RequestBody->nonce,
&NewTicket.server_name,
NewTicket.realm,
((EncryptedTicket.bit_mask & KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_client_addresses_present) != 0) ?
EncryptedTicket.KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_client_addresses : NULL,
&NewTicket,
&ReplyBody
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Put in any PA data for the reply
//
if (ReplyPaData != NULL)
{
ReplyBody.encrypted_pa_data = (struct KERB_ENCRYPTED_KDC_REPLY_encrypted_pa_data_s *) ReplyPaData;
ReplyBody.bit_mask |= encrypted_pa_data_present;
}
//
// Now build the real reply and return it.
//
Reply.version = KERBEROS_VERSION;
Reply.message_type = KRB_TGS_REP;
Reply.KERB_KDC_REPLY_preauth_data = NULL;
Reply.bit_mask = 0;
Reply.client_realm = SourceEncryptPart->client_realm;
Reply.client_name = SourceEncryptPart->client_name;
//
// Copy in the ticket
//
KerbErr = KerbPackTicket(
&NewTicket,
ServerKey,
CommonEType,
&Reply.ticket
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x) Failed to pack ticket: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Copy in the encrypted part
//
KerbErr = KerbPackKdcReplyBody(
&ReplyBody,
&ReplyKey,
ReplyKey.keytype,
KERB_ENCRYPTED_TGS_REPLY_PDU,
&Reply.encrypted_part
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
D_DebugLog((DEB_ERROR,"KLIN(%x)Failed to pack KDC reply body: 0x%x\n",
KLIN(FILENO, __LINE__),KerbErr));
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Now build the real reply message
//
KerbErr = KerbPackData(
&Reply,
KERB_TGS_REPLY_PDU,
&OutputMessage->BufferSize,
&OutputMessage->Buffer
);
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Audit the successful ticket generation
//
if (SecData.AuditKdcEvent(KDC_AUDIT_TGS_SUCCESS))
{
BYTE ServerSid[MAX_SID_LEN];
GUID LogonGuid;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PKERB_TIME pStartTime;
pStartTime =
&(((PKERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET) NewTicket.encrypted_part.cipher_text.value)->KERB_ENCRYPTED_TICKET_starttime);
Status = LsaIGetLogonGuid(
&ClientStringName,
&ClientRealm,
(PBYTE) pStartTime,
sizeof(KERB_TIME),
&LogonGuid
);
ASSERT(NT_SUCCESS( Status ));
KdcMakeAccountSid(ServerSid, ServerTicketInfo.UserId);
KdcLsaIAuditKdcEvent(
Renew ? SE_AUDITID_TICKET_RENEW_SUCCESS : SE_AUDITID_TGS_TICKET_REQUEST,
&ClientStringName,
&ClientRealm,
NULL, // no client SID
&ServerTicketInfo.AccountName,
ServerSid,
(PULONG) &KdcOptions,
NULL, // success
&CommonEType,
NULL, // no preauth type
GET_CLIENT_ADDRESS(ClientAddress),
&LogonGuid
);
}
Cleanup:
//
// Complete the event
//
if (KdcEventTraceFlag){
//These variables point to either a unicode string struct containing
//the corresponding string or a pointer to KdcNullString
PUNICODE_STRING pStringToCopy;
WCHAR UnicodeNullChar = 0;
UNICODE_STRING UnicodeEmptyString = {sizeof(WCHAR),sizeof(WCHAR),&UnicodeNullChar};
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Class.Type = EVENT_TRACE_TYPE_END;
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Flags = WNODE_FLAG_USE_MOF_PTR |
WNODE_FLAG_TRACED_GUID;
// Always output error code. KdcOptions was captured on the start event
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[0].DataPtr = (ULONGLONG) &KerbErr;
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[0].Length = sizeof(ULONG);
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Size =
sizeof (EVENT_TRACE_HEADER) + sizeof(MOF_FIELD);
// Build counted MOF strings from the unicode strings.
// If data is unavailable then output a NULL string
if (ClientStringName.Buffer != NULL &&
ClientStringName.Length > 0)
{
pStringToCopy = &ClientStringName;
}
else {
pStringToCopy = &UnicodeEmptyString;
}
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[1].DataPtr =
(ULONGLONG) &pStringToCopy->Length;
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[1].Length =
sizeof(pStringToCopy->Length);
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[2].DataPtr =
(ULONGLONG) pStringToCopy->Buffer;
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[2].Length =
pStringToCopy->Length;
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Size += sizeof(MOF_FIELD)*2;
if (ServerStringName.Buffer != NULL &&
ServerStringName.Length > 0)
{
pStringToCopy = &ServerStringName;
}
else
{
pStringToCopy = &UnicodeEmptyString;
}
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[3].DataPtr =
(ULONGLONG) &pStringToCopy->Length;
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[3].Length =
sizeof(pStringToCopy->Length);
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[4].DataPtr =
(ULONGLONG) pStringToCopy->Buffer;
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[4].Length =
pStringToCopy->Length;
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Size += sizeof(MOF_FIELD)*2;
if (ClientRealm.Buffer != NULL &&
ClientRealm.Length > 0)
{
pStringToCopy = &ClientRealm;
}
else
{
pStringToCopy = &UnicodeEmptyString;
}
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[5].DataPtr =
(ULONGLONG) &pStringToCopy->Length;
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[5].Length =
sizeof(pStringToCopy->Length);
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[6].DataPtr =
(ULONGLONG) pStringToCopy->Buffer;
TGSEventTraceInfo.eventInfo[6].Length =
pStringToCopy->Length;
TGSEventTraceInfo.EventTrace.Size += sizeof(MOF_FIELD)*2;
TraceEvent(
KdcTraceLoggerHandle,
(PEVENT_TRACE_HEADER)&TGSEventTraceInfo
);
}
//
// Audit *most* failures (see bug 37126)
//
if (!KERB_SUCCESS(KerbErr) &&
SecData.AuditKdcEvent(KDC_AUDIT_TGS_FAILURE))
{
// it is not uncommon to hit this error when
// clients attempt to get a ticket outside of their
// realm...
if (KerbErr != KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN && SecData.IsOurRealm(RequestRealm))
{
KdcLsaIAuditKdcEvent(
SE_AUDITID_TGS_TICKET_REQUEST,
(ClientStringName.Buffer != NULL) ? &ClientStringName : &KdcNullString,
&ClientRealm, // no domain name
NULL,
&ServerStringName,
NULL,
&KdcOptions,
(PULONG) &KerbErr,
NULL, // no etype
NULL, // no preauth type
GET_CLIENT_ADDRESS(ClientAddress),
NULL // no logon guid
);
}
}
KerbFreeKdcName(
&ClientName
);
KerbFreeString(
&ClientRealm
);
KerbFreeKdcName(
&S4UClientName
);
KerbFreeString(
&S4UClientRealm
);
KerbFreeKdcName(
&ServerName
);
KerbFreeKey(
&ReplyKey
);
KdcFreeKdcReplyBody(
&ReplyBody
);
KerbFreeString(
&ClientStringName
);
KerbFreeString(
&ServerStringName
);
//
// If we are validating the ticket key is in the serverticketinfo
//
if (AdditionalTicket != NULL)
{
KerbFreeTicket(AdditionalTicket);
}
if (ReplyPaData != NULL)
{
KerbFreePreAuthData(ReplyPaData);
}
KerbFreeApRequest(UnmarshalledApRequest);
KerbFreeAuthenticator(UnmarshalledAuthenticator);
KerbFreeTicket(SourceEncryptPart);
KdcFreeInternalTicket(&NewTicket);
FreeTicketInfo(&ServerTicketInfo);
FreeTicketInfo(&TgtTicketInfo);
KdcFreeKdcReply(
&Reply
);
return(KerbErr);
}
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