441 lines
16 KiB
C
441 lines
16 KiB
C
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/*++
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Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
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Module Name:
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wdmsec.h
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Abstract:
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This header exposes secuity routines to drivers that need them.
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Author:
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Adrian J. Oney - April 21, 2002
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Revision History:
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--*/
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#ifndef _WDMSEC_H_
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#define _WDMSEC_H_
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#pragma once
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_KERNEL_ONLY is an "empty" ACL. User mode code (including
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// processes running as system) cannot open the device.
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//
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// This could be used by a driver creating a raw WDM PDO. The INF would specify
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// lighter security settings. Until the INF was processed, the device would
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// be nonopenable by user mode code.
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//
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// Similarly, a legacy driver might use this ACL, and let its install app open
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// the device up at runtime to individual users. The install app would update
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// the class key with a very target ACL and reload the driver. The empty ACL
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// would only kick in only if the driver was loaded without the appropriate
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// security applied by the install app.
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//
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// In all of these cases, the default is strong security, lightened as
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// necessary (just like chemistry, where the rule is "add acid to water,
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// never water to acid").
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//
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// Example usage:
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// IoCreateDeviceSecure(..., &SDDL_DEVOBJ_KERNEL_ONLY, &Guid, ...);
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(SDDL_DEVOBJ_KERNEL_ONLY, L"D:P");
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*/
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_KERNEL_ONLY;
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//
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// IoCreateDeviceSecure can be used to create a WDM PDO that initially can be
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// opened only by kernel mode, at least until an INF is supplied. Note that
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// IoCreateDeviceSecure should *never* be used for an FDO!!!
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//
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#define SDDL_DEVOBJ_INF_SUPPLIED SDDL_DEVOBJ_KERNEL_ONLY
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL is similar to SDDL_DEVOBJ_KERNEL_ONLY, except that in
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// addition to kernel code, user mode code running as *SYSTEM* is also allowed
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// to open the device for any access.
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//
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// A legacy driver might use this ACL to start with tight security settings,
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// and let its service open the device up at runtime to individual users via
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// SetFileSecurity API. In this case, the service would have to be running as
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// system.
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//
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// (Note that the DEVOBJ SDDL strings in this file don't specify any
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// inheritance. This is because inheritance isn't a valid concept for things
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// behind a device object, like a file. As such, these SDDL strings would have
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// to be modified with inheritance tokens like "OICI" to be used for things
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// like registry keys or file. See the SDK's documentation on SDDL strings for
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// more information.)
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL, L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)");
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*/
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL;
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_ALL allows the kernel, system, and admin complete
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// control over the device. No other users may access the device
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(
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SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_ALL,
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L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)"
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);
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*/
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_ALL;
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RX allows the kernel and system complete control
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// over the device. By default the admin can only read from the device (the
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// admin can of course override this manually).
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//
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// The X refers to traversal, meaning the access to the namespace *beneath* a
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// device object. This only has an effect on storage stacks today. To lock down
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// the namespace behind a device (for example, if the device doesn't _have_ a
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// namespace), see the documentation on FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN flag to
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// IoCreateDevice{Secure}.
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(
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SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RX,
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L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GRGX;;;BA)"
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);
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*/
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RX;
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_R allows the kernel and system complete
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// control over the device. By default the admin can access the entire device,
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// but cannot change the ACL (the admin must take control of the device first)
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//
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// Everyone (the WORLD SID) is given read access. "Untrusted" code *cannot*
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// access the device (untrusted code might be code launched via the Run-As
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// option in Explorer. By default, World does not cover Restricted code.)
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//
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// Also note that traversal access is not granted to normal users. As such,
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// this might not be an appropriate descriptor for a storage device with a
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// namespace.
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(
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SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_R,
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L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GRGWGX;;;BA)(A;;GR;;;WD)"
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);
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*/
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_R;
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_R_RES_R allows the kernel and system
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// complete control over the device. By default the admin can access the entire
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// device, but cannot change the ACL (the admin must take control of the device
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// first)
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//
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// Everyone (the WORLD SID) is given read access. In addition, "restricted" or
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// "untrusted" code (the RES SID) is also allowed to access code. Untrusted
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// code might be code launched via the Run-As option in Explorer. By default,
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// World does not cover Restricted code.
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//
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// (Odd implementation detail: Due to the mechanics of restricting SIDs, the
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// RES SID in an ACL should never exist outside the World SID).
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//
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// Also note that traversal access is not granted to normal users. As such,
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// this might not be an appropriate descriptor for a storage device with a
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// namespace.
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(
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SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_R_RES_R,
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L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GRGWGX;;;BA)(A;;GR;;;WD)(A;;GR;;;RC)"
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);
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*/
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_R_RES_R;
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_RW_RES_R allows the kernel and system
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// complete control over the device. By default the admin can access the entire
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// device, but cannot change the ACL (the admin must take control of the device
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// first)
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//
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// Everyone (the WORLD SID) can read or write to the device. However,
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// "restricted" or "untrusted" code (the RES SID) can only read from the device.
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//
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// Also note that normal users are not given traversal accesss. It is probably
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// unnecessary anyway, as most devices don't manage a seperate namespace
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// (ie, they set FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN).
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(
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SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_RW_RES_R,
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L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GRGWGX;;;BA)(A;;GRGW;;;WD)(A;;GR;;;RC)"
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);
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*/
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_RW_RES_R;
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_WORLD_RWX_RES_RWX allows the kernel and system complete
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// control over the device. By default the admin can access the entire device,
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// but cannot change the ACL (the admin must take control of the device first)
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//
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// Everyone else, including "restricted" or "untrusted" code can read or write
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// to the device. Traversal beneath the device is also granted (removing it
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// would only effect storage devices, except if the "bypass-traversal"
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// privilege was revoked).
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(
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SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_RWX_RES_RWX,
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L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GRGWGX;;;BA)(A;;GRGWGX;;;WD)(A;;GRGWGX;;;RC)"
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);
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*/
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_RWX_RES_RWX;
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_A is listed for completeness. This allows the
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// kernel and system complete control over the device. By default the admin
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// can access the entire device, but cannot change the ACL (the admin must take
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// control of the device first)
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//
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// Everyone (the WORLD SID) can *append* data to the device. "Restricted" or
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// "untrusted" code (the RES SID) cannot access the device. See ntioapi.h for
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// the individual bit definitions of device rights.
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//
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// Note also that normal users can send neither read nor write IOCTLs (The read
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// device data right is bit 0, the write device data right is bit 1 - neither
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// bits are set below).
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(
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SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_A,
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L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GRGWGX;;;BA)(A;;0x0004;;;WD)"
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);
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_RWX_WORLD_A;
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*/
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//
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// SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_ALL_WORLD_ALL_RES_ALL is listed for completeness.
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// This ACL would give *any* user *total* access to the device, including the
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// ability to change the ACL, locking out other users!!!!!
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//
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// As this ACL is really a *very* bad idea, it isn't exported by this library.
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// Don't make an ACL like this!
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//
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/*
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DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STING(
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SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_ALL_WORLD_ALL_RES_ALL,
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"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GA;;;WD)(A;;GA;;;RC)"
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);
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extern const UNICODE_STRING SDDL_DEVOBJ_SYS_ALL_ADM_ALL_WORLD_ALL_RES_ALL;
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*/
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/*
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The following SIDs represent *accounts* on the local machine:
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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System ("SY", S-1-5-18, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID)
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The OS itself (including its user mode components.)
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Local Service ("LS", S-1-5-19, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_LOCAL_SERVICE_RID)
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A predefined account for services that presents user credentials for local
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resources and annonymous credentials for network access.
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Available on XP and later.
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Network Service ("NS", S-1-5-20, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_NETWORK_SERVICE_RID)
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A predefined account for services that presents user credentials for local
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resources and the machine ID for network access.
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Available on XP and later.
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(A local *account* for a guest and a default administrator also exist, but
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the corresponding SDDL abbreviations are not supported by this library.
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Use the corresponding group SIDs instead.)
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The following SIDs represent *groups* on the local machine:
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-----------------------------------------------------------
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Administrators ("BA", S-1-5-32-544, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID:DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS)
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The builtin administrators group on the machine. This is not the same
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as the builtin Administrator *account*.
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Builtin users group ("BU", S-1-5-32-545, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID:DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS)
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Group covering all local user accounts, and users on the domain.
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Builtin guests group ("BG", S-1-5-32-546, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID:DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS)
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Group covering users logging in using the local or domain guest account.
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This is not the same as the builtin Guest *account*.
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The below SIDs describe the authenticity of the user's identity:
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----------------------------------------------------------------
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Authenticated Users ("AU", S-1-5-11, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_AUTHENTICATED_USER_RID)
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Any user recognized by the local machine or by a domain. Note that
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users logged in using the Builtin Guest account are not authenticated.
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However, members of the Guests group with individual accounts on the
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machine or domain are authenticated.
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Anonymous Logged-on User ("AN", S-1-5-7, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_ANONYMOUS_LOGON_RID)
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Any user logged on without an identity, for instance via an anonymous
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network session. Note that users logged in using the Builtin Guest
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account are neither authenticated nor anonymous. Available on XP and
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later.
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World ("WD", S-1-1-0, SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_WORLD_RID)
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Prior to Windows XP, this SID covers every session: authenticated,
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anonymous, and the Builtin Guest account.
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For Windows XP and later, this SID does not cover anonymous logon
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sessions - only authenticated and the Builtin Guest account.
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Note that untrusted or "restricted" code is also not covered by the
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World SID. See the Restricted Code SID description for more
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information.
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The below SIDs describe how the user logged into the machine:
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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Interactive Users ("IU", S-1-5-4, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_INTERACTIVE_RID)
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Users who initally logged onto the machine "interactively", such as
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local logons and Remote Desktops logons.
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Network Logon User ("NU", S-1-5-2, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_NETWORK_RID)
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Users accessing the machine remotely, without interactive desktop
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access (ie, file sharing or RPC calls).
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Terminal Server Users (---, S-1-5-14, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_TERMINAL_SERVER_RID)
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Interactive Users who *initially* logged onto the machine specifically
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via Terminal Services or Remote Desktop.
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(NOTE: There is currently no SDDL token for this SID. Furthermore, the
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presence of the SID doesn't take into account fast user switching
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either.)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
The below SID deserves special mention:
|
||
|
|
---------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Restricted Code ("RC", S-1-5-12, SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY:SECURITY_RESTRICTED_CODE_RID)
|
||
|
|
This SID is used to control access by untrusted code.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
ACL validation against tokens with RC go through *two* checks, one
|
||
|
|
against the token's normal list of SIDs (containing WD for instance),
|
||
|
|
and one against a second list (typically containing RC and a subset of
|
||
|
|
the original token SIDs). Only if both tests pass is access granted.
|
||
|
|
As such, RC actually works in *combination* with other SIDs.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
When RC is paired with WD in an ACL, a *superset* of Everyone
|
||
|
|
_including_ untrusted code is described. RC is thus rarely seen in
|
||
|
|
ACL's without the WD token.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
// Supply overrideable library implementation of IoCreateDeviceSecure.
|
||
|
|
// This function is similar to IoCreateDevice, except that it only creates
|
||
|
|
// named device objects. This function would be used to create raw PnP PDOs and
|
||
|
|
// legacy device objects. The DefaultSDDLString specifies security while the
|
||
|
|
// ClassGuid allows the administrator to override the defaults. Every driver
|
||
|
|
// should pass in a ClassGuid (if no relevant Guid exists, just invent a new
|
||
|
|
// one with guidgen.exe). The classguid parameter is crucial as it allows the
|
||
|
|
// admin to tighten security (for instance, the admin might deny access to a
|
||
|
|
// specific user).
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
// Note: This function should *not* be used to create a WDM FDO or Filter. The
|
||
|
|
// only type of device object in a WDM stack that can be created using
|
||
|
|
// IoCreateDeviceSecure is a PDO!
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
// See DDK documentation for more details.
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
#undef IoCreateDeviceSecure
|
||
|
|
#define IoCreateDeviceSecure WdmlibIoCreateDeviceSecure
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
||
|
|
WdmlibIoCreateDeviceSecure(
|
||
|
|
IN PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject,
|
||
|
|
IN ULONG DeviceExtensionSize,
|
||
|
|
IN PUNICODE_STRING DeviceName OPTIONAL,
|
||
|
|
IN DEVICE_TYPE DeviceType,
|
||
|
|
IN ULONG DeviceCharacteristics,
|
||
|
|
IN BOOLEAN Exclusive,
|
||
|
|
IN PCUNICODE_STRING DefaultSDDLString,
|
||
|
|
IN LPCGUID DeviceClassGuid OPTIONAL,
|
||
|
|
OUT PDEVICE_OBJECT *DeviceObject
|
||
|
|
);
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
// Supply library internal implementation of RtlInitUnicodeStringEx
|
||
|
|
// This function is similar to RtlInitUnicodeString, except that it handles the
|
||
|
|
// case where a string exceeds UNICODE_STRING_MAX_CHARS (it does not probe or
|
||
|
|
// check alignments though).
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
// See DDK documentation for more details.
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
#undef RtlInitUnicodeStringEx
|
||
|
|
#define RtlInitUnicodeStringEx WdmlibRtlInitUnicodeStringEx
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
||
|
|
WdmlibRtlInitUnicodeStringEx(
|
||
|
|
OUT PUNICODE_STRING DestinationString,
|
||
|
|
IN PCWSTR SourceString OPTIONAL
|
||
|
|
);
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
// Supply overrideable library implementation of IoValidateDeviceIoControlAccess
|
||
|
|
// This function allows a driver running on .NET server to process
|
||
|
|
// FILE_ANY_ACCESS IOCTLs as if they were FILE_READ_ACCESS, FILE_WRITE_ACCESS,
|
||
|
|
// or both.
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
// See DDK documentation for more details.
|
||
|
|
//
|
||
|
|
#undef IoValidateDeviceIoControlAccess
|
||
|
|
#define IoValidateDeviceIoControlAccess WdmlibIoValidateDeviceIoControlAccess
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
NTSTATUS
|
||
|
|
WdmlibIoValidateDeviceIoControlAccess(
|
||
|
|
IN PIRP Irp,
|
||
|
|
IN ULONG RequiredAccess
|
||
|
|
);
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
||
|
|
} // extern "C"
|
||
|
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
#endif // _WDMSEC_H_
|
||
|
|
|