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windows-nt/Source/XPSP1/NT/ds/security/protocols/digest/userapi.cxx

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//+-----------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Microsoft Windows
//
// Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation 2000
//
// File: userapi.cxx
//
// Contents: User-mode APIs to the NtDigest security package
//
// Main user mode entry points into this dll:
// SpUserModeInitialize
// SpInstanceInit
// SpDeleteUserModeContext
// SpInitUserModeContext
// SpMakeSignature
// SpVerifySignature
// SpSealMessage
// SpUnsealMessage
// SpGetContextToken
// SpQueryContextAttributes
// SpCompleteAuthToken
// SpFormatCredentials
// SpMarshallSupplementalCreds
// SpExportSecurityContext
// SpImportSecurityContext
//
// Helper functions:
// SspCreateTokenDacl
// SspMapContext (this is called in Lsa mode)
//
// History: ChandanS 26-Jul-1996 Stolen from kerberos\client2\userapi.cxx
// KDamour 18Mar00 Stolen from NTLM userapi.cxx
//
//------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// This area is still under determination as to support for userlevel functions
//
#include "global.h"
#include <stdio.h> // For sprintf
#if DBG
#define TEMPSIZE 4000
#endif
// Winsock-ish host/network byte order converters for short and long integers.
//
#define htons(x) ((((x) >> 8) & 0x00FF) | (((x) << 8) & 0xFF00))
#define htonl(x) ((((x) >> 24) & 0x000000FFL) | \
(((x) >> 8) & 0x0000FF00L) | \
(((x) << 8) & 0x00FF0000L) | \
(((x) << 24) & 0xFF000000L))
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpUserModeInitialize
//
// Synopsis: Initialize an the Digest DLL in a client's
// address space also called in LSA
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: LsaVersion - Version of the security dll loading the package
// PackageVersion - Version of the Digest package
// UserFunctionTable - Receives a copy of Digests's user mode
// function table
// pcTables - Receives count of tables returned.
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS - normal completion
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - LsaVersion specified is incorrect
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS
SEC_ENTRY
SpUserModeInitialize(
IN ULONG LsaVersion,
OUT PULONG PackageVersion,
OUT PSECPKG_USER_FUNCTION_TABLE * UserFunctionTable,
OUT PULONG pcTables
)
{
#if DBG
DebugInitialize();
#endif
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpUserModeInitialize: Entering\n" ));
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (LsaVersion != SECPKG_INTERFACE_VERSION)
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto CleanUp;
}
*PackageVersion = SECPKG_INTERFACE_VERSION;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.InstanceInit = SpInstanceInit;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.MakeSignature = SpMakeSignature;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.VerifySignature = SpVerifySignature;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.SealMessage = SpSealMessage;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.UnsealMessage = SpUnsealMessage;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.GetContextToken = SpGetContextToken;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.QueryContextAttributes = SpQueryContextAttributes;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.CompleteAuthToken = SpCompleteAuthToken;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.InitUserModeContext = SpInitUserModeContext;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.DeleteUserModeContext = SpDeleteUserModeContext;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.FormatCredentials = SpFormatCredentials;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.MarshallSupplementalCreds = SpMarshallSupplementalCreds;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.ExportContext = SpExportSecurityContext;
g_NtDigestUserFuncTable.ImportContext = SpImportSecurityContext;
*UserFunctionTable = &g_NtDigestUserFuncTable;
*pcTables = 1;
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpUserModeInitialize: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpInstanceInit
//
// Synopsis: Initialize an instance of the NtDigest package in a client's
// address space. Also called once in LSA
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: Version - Version of the security dll loading the package
// and it is Unused and Un-initialized
// FunctionTable - Contains helper routines for use by NtDigest
// and it is fixed static
// UserFunctions - Receives a copy of NtDigest's user mode
// function table - NOPE - has No information at all
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpInstanceInit(
IN ULONG Version,
IN PSECPKG_DLL_FUNCTIONS DllFunctionTable,
OUT PVOID * UserFunctionTable
)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpInstanceInit: Entering\n" ));
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
// Save the Alloc/Free functions
// Check if called in LSA or from Usermode - LSA calls SPInitialize then SPInstanceInit
if (g_NtDigestState != NtDigestLsaMode)
{
g_NtDigestState = NtDigestUserMode; // indicate in user address space
}
g_UserFunctions = DllFunctionTable;
// Need to initialize Crypto stuff and nonce creations
Status = NonceInitialize();
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInstanceInit: Error from NonceInitialize is %d\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
//
// Init the UserMode Context stuff
//
Status = UserCtxtHandlerInit();
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInstanceInit: Error from UserCtxtHandlerInit 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
//
// Read in the registry values for SSP configuration - in user mode space
//
SPLoadRegOptions();
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpInstanceInit: Leaving Status = 0x%lx\n", Status ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpDeleteUserModeContext
//
// Synopsis: Deletes a user mode context by unlinking it and then
// dereferencing it.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Lsa context handle of the context to delete
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS on success, STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE if the
// context can't be located
//
// Notes:
// If this is an exported context, send a flag back to the LSA so that
// Lsa does not call the SecpDeleteSecurityContext in the lsa process
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpDeleteUserModeContext(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle
)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpDeleteUserModeContext: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pUserContext = NULL;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
//
// Find the currently existing user context and delink it
// so that another context cannot Reference it before we
// Dereference this one.
//
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, TRUE, &pUserContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
//
// pContext is legally NULL when we are dealing with an incomplete
// context. This can often be the case when the second call to
// InitializeSecurityContext() fails.
//
/// Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
DebugLog((DEB_WARN, "SpDeleteUserModeContext: UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext not found 0x%x\n", Status ));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Now deference
if (pUserContext != NULL)
{
Status = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pUserContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpDeleteUserModeContext: DereferenceUserContext error Status 0x%x\n", Status ));
}
}
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpDeleteUserModeContext: Leaving ContextHandle 0x%lx status 0x%x\n",
ContextHandle, Status ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpInitUserModeContext
//
// Synopsis: Creates a user-mode context from a packed LSA mode context
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Lsa mode context handle for the context
// PackedContext - A marshalled buffer containing the LSA
// mode context.
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS or STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpInitUserModeContext(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN PSecBuffer PackedContext
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT pPackedUserContext = NULL;
UINT Length = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpInitUserModeContext: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
ASSERT(PackedContext);
// If Marshalled data is too small for holding a Client Context - reject it
if (PackedContext->cbBuffer < sizeof(DIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT))
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: ContextData size < DIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
pPackedUserContext = (PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT) DigestAllocateMemory(PackedContext->cbBuffer);
if (!pPackedUserContext)
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: DigestAllocateMemory for Packed Copy returns NULL\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Copy the Packed User Context from LSA to local memory so it wil be long word aligned
memcpy(pPackedUserContext, PackedContext->pvBuffer, PackedContext->cbBuffer);
// Now we will unpack this transfered LSA context into UserMode space Context List
pContext = (PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT) DigestAllocateMemory( sizeof(DIGEST_USERCONTEXT) );
if (!pContext)
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: DigestAllocateMemory returns NULL\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
Status = UserCtxtInit(pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: UserContextInit error 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Store the location of the context in the LSA
pContext->LsaContext = ContextHandle;
Status = DigestUnpackContext(pPackedUserContext, pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: DigestUnpackContext error 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
UserContextPrint(pContext);
Status = UserCtxtHandlerInsertCred(pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpInitUserModeContext: UserCtxtHandlerInsertCred error status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpInitUserModeContext: (RefCount) UserContextInit created & listed 0x%x\n", pContext));
CleanUp:
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
if (pContext != NULL)
{
// Release the User context on error if allocated
UserCtxtFree(pContext);
pContext = NULL;
}
}
if (pPackedUserContext)
{
DigestFreeMemory(pPackedUserContext);
pPackedUserContext = NULL;
}
// Let FreeContextBuffer handle freeing the virtual allocs
if (PackedContext->pvBuffer != NULL)
{
FreeContextBuffer(PackedContext->pvBuffer);
PackedContext->pvBuffer = NULL;
PackedContext->cbBuffer = 0;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpInitUserModeContext: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpMakeSignature
//
// Synopsis: Signs a message buffer by calculating a checksum over all
// the non-read only data buffers and encrypting the checksum
// along with a nonce.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Handle of the context to use to sign the
// message.
// QualityOfProtection - Unused flags.
// MessageBuffers - Contains an array of buffers to sign and
// to store the signature.
// MessageSequenceNumber - Sequence number for this message,
// only used in datagram cases.
//
// Requires: STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE - the context could not be found or
// was not configured for message integrity.
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - the signature buffer could not
// be found.
// STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL - the signature buffer is too small
// to hold the signature
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: This was stolen from net\svcdlls\ntlmssp\client\sign.c ,
// routine SspHandleSignMessage. It's possible that
// bugs got copied too
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpMakeSignature(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN ULONG fQOP,
IN PSecBufferDesc pMessage,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
BOOL bServer = FALSE;
DIGESTMODE_TYPE typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_UNDEFINED; // Are we in SASL or HTTP mode
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpMakeSignature:Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(fQOP);
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, &pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpMakeSignature: Could not find ContextHandle\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// Check to see if Integrity is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
if ((pContext->typeDigest == SASL_CLIENT) ||
(pContext->typeDigest == SASL_SERVER))
{
typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_SASL;
}
else
{
typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_HTTP;
}
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpMakeSignature: HTTP SignMessage selected\n"));
Status = DigestUserHTTPHelper(
pContext,
eSign,
pMessage,
MessageSeqNo
);
}
else
{
if ((bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY)) ||
(!bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY)) )
{
Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpMakeSignature: Did not negotiate INTEGRITY\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpMakeSignature: SASL SignMessage selected\n"));
Status = DigestUserSignHelper(
pContext,
pMessage,
MessageSeqNo
);
}
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpMakeSignature: DigestUserHTTP/SASLSignHelper returns %lx\n", Status ));
goto CleanUp;
}
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL)
{
SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
// Don't destroy previous status
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = SubStatus;
}
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpMakeSignature:Leaving status 0x%lx\n", Status ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpVerifySignature
//
// Synopsis: Verifies a signed message buffer by calculating the Digest Access
// for data bufferswith the current Security Context state.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Handle of the context to use to sign the
// message.
// MessageBuffers - Contains an array of signed buffers and
// a signature buffer.
// MessageSequenceNumber - Unused ULONG
// QualityOfProtection - Unused flags.
//
// Requires: STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE - the context could not be found or
// was not configured for message integrity.
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - the signature buffer could not
// be found or was too small.
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: This routine should be called AFTER you have a valid security context
// from (usually) acceptsecuritycontext. The usermode context has a nonce
// count that is automatically incremented for each successful verify signature
// function call. Therefore, calling this functio with the same noncecount
// will return a failed status message.
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpVerifySignature(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN PSecBufferDesc pMessage,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo,
OUT PULONG pfQOP
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
BOOL bServer = FALSE;
DIGESTMODE_TYPE typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_UNDEFINED; // Are we in SASL or HTTP mode
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpVerifySignature:Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
// Reset output flags
if (pfQOP)
{
*pfQOP = 0;
}
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, &pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpVerifySignature: Could not find ContextHandle\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// Check to see if Integrity is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
if ((pContext->typeDigest == SASL_CLIENT) ||
(pContext->typeDigest == SASL_SERVER))
{
typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_SASL;
}
else
{
typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_HTTP;
}
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpVerifySignature: HTTP VerifyMessage selected\n"));
Status = DigestUserHTTPHelper(
pContext,
eVerify,
pMessage,
MessageSeqNo
);
}
else
{
if ((bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY)) ||
(!bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY)) )
{
Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpVerifySignature: Did not negotiate INTEGRITY\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
else
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpVerifySignature: SASL VerifyMessage selected\n"));
Status = DigestUserVerifyHelper(
pContext,
pMessage,
MessageSeqNo
);
}
}
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpVerifySignature: DigestUserHTTP/SASLSignHelper returns %lx\n", Status ));
goto CleanUp;
}
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL)
{
SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
// Don't destroy previous status
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = SubStatus;
}
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpVerifySignature:Leaving status 0x%lx\n", Status ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpSealMessage
//
// Synopsis: Verifies a signed message buffer by calculating a checksum over all
// the non-read only data buffers and encrypting the checksum
// along with a nonce.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Handle of the context to use to sign the
// message.
// MessageBuffers - Contains an array of signed buffers and
// a signature buffer.
// MessageSequenceNumber - Sequence number for this message,
// only used in datagram cases.
// QualityOfProtection - Unused flags.
//
// Requires: STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE - the context could not be found or
// was not configured for message integrity.
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - the signature buffer could not
// be found or was too small.
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: This was stolen from net\svcdlls\ntlmssp\client\sign.c ,
// routine SspHandleSealMessage. It's possible that
// bugs got copied too
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpSealMessage(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN ULONG fQOP,
IN PSecBufferDesc pMessage,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
BOOL bServer = FALSE;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpSealMessage:Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(fQOP);
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, &pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: Could not find ContextHandle\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// Check to see if Confidentiality is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
if ((bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ASC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) ||
(!bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) )
{
// Since CONFIDENTIALITY not negoiated - check if integrity selected
if ((bServer && (pContext->ContextReq & ASC_RET_INTEGRITY)) ||
(!bServer && (pContext->ContextReq & ISC_RET_INTEGRITY)) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpSealMessage: No Confidentiality selected - use Integrity ONLY\n"));
// Just call the Sign routine only
Status = DigestUserSignHelper(
pContext,
pMessage,
MessageSeqNo
);
}
else
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: Neither Confidentiality nor Integrity selected\n"));
Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: Did not negotiate CONFIDENTIALITY\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
else
{
// Use SignHelper for both SASL - HTTP not speced
Status = DigestUserSealHelper(
pContext,
pMessage,
MessageSeqNo
);
}
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpSealMessage: DigestUserSASLHelper returns %lx\n", Status ));
goto CleanUp;
}
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL)
{
SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
// Don't destroy previous status
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = SubStatus;
}
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpSealMessage:Leaving status 0x%lx\n", Status ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpUnsealMessage
//
// Synopsis: Verifies a signed message buffer by calculating a checksum over all
// the non-read only data buffers and encrypting the checksum
// along with a nonce.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - Handle of the context to use to sign the
// message.
// MessageBuffers - Contains an array of signed buffers and
// a signature buffer.
// MessageSequenceNumber - Sequence number for this message,
// only used in datagram cases.
// QualityOfProtection - Unused flags.
//
// Requires: STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE - the context could not be found or
// was not configured for message integrity.
// STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - the signature buffer could not
// be found or was too small.
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: This was stolen from net\svcdlls\ntlmssp\client\sign.c ,
// routine SspHandleUnsealMessage. It's possible that
// bugs got copied too
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpUnsealMessage(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN PSecBufferDesc pMessage,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo,
OUT PULONG pfQOP
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
BOOL bServer; // acting as the server ?
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpUnsealMessage:Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
// Reset output flags
if (pfQOP)
{
*pfQOP = 0;
}
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, &pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: Could not find ContextHandle\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
UserContextPrint(pContext);
// Check to see if Confidentiality is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
if ((bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ASC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) ||
(!bServer && !(pContext->ContextReq & ISC_RET_CONFIDENTIALITY)) )
{
if ((bServer && (pContext->ContextReq & ASC_RET_INTEGRITY)) ||
(!bServer && (pContext->ContextReq & ISC_RET_INTEGRITY)) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpUnsealMessage: No Confidentiality selected - use Integrity ONLY\n"));
Status = DigestUserVerifyHelper(
pContext,
pMessage,
MessageSeqNo
);
// signal QOP was only for integrity
if (pfQOP)
{
*pfQOP = SIGN_ONLY;
}
}
else
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: Neither Confidentiality nor Integrity selected\n"));
Status = SEC_E_QOP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: Did not negotiate CONFIDENTIALITY\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
else
{
Status = DigestUserUnsealHelper(
pContext,
pMessage,
MessageSeqNo
);
}
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpUnsealMessage: DigestUserSASLHelper returns %lx\n", Status ));
goto CleanUp;
}
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL)
{
SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
// Don't destroy previous status
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = SubStatus;
}
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpUnsealMessage:Leaving status 0x%lx\n", Status ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpGetContextToken
//
// Synopsis: returns a pointer to the token for a server-side context
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes: Used in ImpersonateSecurityContext SSPI Call
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpGetContextToken(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
OUT PHANDLE ImpersonationToken
)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpGetContextToken: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, &pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpGetContextToken: UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext error 0x%x\n", Status));
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpGetContextToken: Client ImpersonationToken 0x%lx\n", pContext->ClientTokenHandle ));
if (pContext && pContext->ClientTokenHandle)
{
*ImpersonationToken = pContext->ClientTokenHandle;
goto CleanUp;
}
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpGetContextToken: no token handle\n" ));
CleanUp:
if (pContext != NULL)
{
Status = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpGetContextToken: Leaving Status 0x%lx\n", Status ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpQueryContextAttributes
//
// Synopsis: Querys attributes of the specified context
// This API allows a customer of the security
// services to determine certain attributes of
// the context. These are: sizes, names, and lifespan.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// ContextHandle - Handle to the context to query.
//
// Attribute - Attribute to query.
//
//
// Buffer - Buffer to copy the data into. The buffer must
// be large enough to fit the queried attribute.
//
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// STATUS_SUCCESS - Call completed successfully
//
// STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE -- Credential/Context Handle is invalid
// STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED -- Function code is not supported
//
// Notes:
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpQueryContextAttributes(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN ULONG Attribute,
IN OUT PVOID Buffer
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext = NULL;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpQueryContextAttributes: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
PSecPkgContext_Sizes ContextSizes = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_Flags ContextFlags = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_DceInfo ContextDceInfo = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_Names ContextNames = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_PackageInfo PackageInfo = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_NegotiationInfo NegInfo = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_PasswordExpiry PasswordExpires = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_KeyInfo KeyInfo = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_AccessToken AccessToken = NULL;
PSecPkgContext_StreamSizes StreamSizes = NULL;
ULONG PackageInfoSize = 0;
BOOL bServer = FALSE;
LPWSTR pszEncryptAlgorithmName = NULL;
LPWSTR pszSignatureAlgorithmName = NULL;
DWORD dwBytes = 0;
ULONG ulMaxMessage = 0;
DIGESTMODE_TYPE typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_UNDEFINED; // Are we in SASL or HTTP mode
Status = UserCtxtHandlerHandleToContext(ContextHandle, FALSE, &pContext);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SpQueryContextAttributes: HandleToContext error 0x%x\n", Status));
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
goto CleanUp;
}
// Check to see if Integrity is negotiated for SC
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
if ((pContext->typeDigest == SASL_CLIENT) ||
(pContext->typeDigest == SASL_SERVER))
{
typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_SASL;
}
else
{
typeDigestMode = DIGESTMODE_HTTP;
}
//
// Handle each of the various queried attributes
//
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SpQueryContextAttributes : 0x%lx\n", Attribute ));
switch ( Attribute) {
case SECPKG_ATTR_SIZES:
ContextSizes = (PSecPkgContext_Sizes) Buffer;
ZeroMemory(ContextSizes, sizeof(SecPkgContext_Sizes));
ContextSizes->cbMaxToken = NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE;
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP)
{ // HTTP has signature the same as token in Authentication Header info
ContextSizes->cbMaxSignature = NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE;
}
else
{ // SASL has specialized signature block
ContextSizes->cbMaxSignature = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING;
}
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) ||
(pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES))
{
ContextSizes->cbBlockSize = DES_BLOCKSIZE;
ContextSizes->cbSecurityTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING;
}
else if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4) ||
(pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40) ||
(pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56))
{
ContextSizes->cbBlockSize = RC4_BLOCKSIZE;
ContextSizes->cbSecurityTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING;
}
else
{
ContextSizes->cbBlockSize = 0;
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP)
{ // HTTP has signature the same as token in Authentication Header info
ContextSizes->cbSecurityTrailer = 0;
}
else
{ // SASL has specialized signature block
ContextSizes->cbSecurityTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING; // handle Auth-int case
}
}
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_DCE_INFO:
ContextDceInfo = (PSecPkgContext_DceInfo) Buffer;
ZeroMemory(ContextDceInfo, sizeof(SecPkgContext_DceInfo));
ContextDceInfo->AuthzSvc = 0;
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_NAMES:
ContextNames = (PSecPkgContext_Names) Buffer;
ZeroMemory(ContextNames, sizeof(SecPkgContext_Names));
if (pContext->ustrAccountName.Length && pContext->ustrAccountName.Buffer)
{
dwBytes = pContext->ustrAccountName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
ContextNames->sUserName = (LPWSTR)g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(dwBytes);
if (ContextNames->sUserName)
{
ZeroMemory(ContextNames->sUserName, dwBytes);
memcpy(ContextNames->sUserName, pContext->ustrAccountName.Buffer, pContext->ustrAccountName.Length);
}
else
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
}
}
else
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
}
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_PACKAGE_INFO:
case SECPKG_ATTR_NEGOTIATION_INFO:
//
// Return the information about this package. This is useful for
// callers who used SPNEGO and don't know what package they got.
//
if ((Attribute == SECPKG_ATTR_NEGOTIATION_INFO) && (g_fParameter_Negotiate == FALSE))
{
Status = STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto CleanUp;
}
PackageInfo = (PSecPkgContext_PackageInfo) Buffer;
ZeroMemory(PackageInfo, sizeof(SecPkgContext_PackageInfo));
PackageInfoSize = sizeof(SecPkgInfoW) + sizeof(WDIGEST_SP_NAME) + sizeof(NTDIGEST_SP_COMMENT);
PackageInfo->PackageInfo = (PSecPkgInfoW) g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(PackageInfoSize);
if (PackageInfo->PackageInfo == NULL)
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
goto CleanUp;
}
PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Name = (LPWSTR) (PackageInfo->PackageInfo + 1);
PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Comment = (LPWSTR) ((((PBYTE) PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Name)) + sizeof(WDIGEST_SP_NAME));
wcscpy(
PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Name,
WDIGEST_SP_NAME
);
wcscpy(
PackageInfo->PackageInfo->Comment,
NTDIGEST_SP_COMMENT
);
PackageInfo->PackageInfo->wVersion = SECURITY_SUPPORT_PROVIDER_INTERFACE_VERSION;
PackageInfo->PackageInfo->wRPCID = RPC_C_AUTHN_DIGEST;
PackageInfo->PackageInfo->fCapabilities = NTDIGEST_SP_CAPS;
PackageInfo->PackageInfo->cbMaxToken = NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE;
if ( Attribute == SECPKG_ATTR_NEGOTIATION_INFO )
{
NegInfo = (PSecPkgContext_NegotiationInfo) PackageInfo ;
NegInfo->NegotiationState = SECPKG_NEGOTIATION_COMPLETE ;
}
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_PASSWORD_EXPIRY:
PasswordExpires = (PSecPkgContext_PasswordExpiry) Buffer;
if (pContext->Expires.QuadPart != 0)
{
PasswordExpires->tsPasswordExpires = pContext->Expires;
}
else
Status = STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_KEY_INFO:
KeyInfo = (PSecPkgContext_KeyInfo) Buffer;
ZeroMemory(KeyInfo, sizeof(SecPkgContext_KeyInfo));
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP)
{
// HTTP mode
KeyInfo->SignatureAlgorithm = CALG_MD5;
}
else
{
// SASL mode
KeyInfo->KeySize = 128; // All modes use a 128 bit key - may have less entropy though (i.e. rc4-XX)
KeyInfo->SignatureAlgorithm = CALG_HMAC;
pszSignatureAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_HMAC_MD5;
switch (pContext->typeCipher)
{
case CIPHER_RC4:
case CIPHER_RC4_40:
case CIPHER_RC4_56:
KeyInfo->KeySize = 16 * 8; // All modes use a 128 bit key - may have less entropy though (i.e. rc4-XX)
KeyInfo->SignatureAlgorithm = CALG_RC4;
pszEncryptAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_RC4;
break;
case CIPHER_DES:
KeyInfo->KeySize = 7 * 8;
KeyInfo->SignatureAlgorithm = CALG_DES;
pszEncryptAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_DES;
break;
case CIPHER_3DES:
KeyInfo->KeySize = 14 * 8;
KeyInfo->SignatureAlgorithm = CALG_3DES_112;
pszEncryptAlgorithmName = WSTR_CIPHER_3DES;
break;
}
if (pszEncryptAlgorithmName)
{
KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName = (LPWSTR)
g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(sizeof(WCHAR) * (wcslen(pszEncryptAlgorithmName) + 1));
if (KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName != NULL)
{
wcscpy(
KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName,
pszEncryptAlgorithmName
);
}
else
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
}
}
if (pszSignatureAlgorithmName)
{
KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName = (LPWSTR)
g_UserFunctions->AllocateHeap(sizeof(WCHAR) * (wcslen(pszSignatureAlgorithmName) + 1));
if (KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName != NULL)
{
wcscpy(
KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName,
pszSignatureAlgorithmName
);
}
else
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
}
}
}
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_STREAM_SIZES:
StreamSizes = (PSecPkgContext_StreamSizes) Buffer;
ZeroMemory(StreamSizes, sizeof(SecPkgContext_StreamSizes));
if (typeDigestMode == DIGESTMODE_HTTP)
{
}
else
{ // SASL
ulMaxMessage = pContext->ulRecvMaxBuf;
if (pContext->ulSendMaxBuf < ulMaxMessage)
{
ulMaxMessage = pContext->ulSendMaxBuf;
}
StreamSizes->cbMaximumMessage = ulMaxMessage - (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING);
}
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) ||
(pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES))
{
StreamSizes->cbBlockSize = DES_BLOCKSIZE;
StreamSizes->cbTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING;
}
else if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4) ||
(pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40) ||
(pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56))
{
StreamSizes->cbBlockSize = RC4_BLOCKSIZE;
StreamSizes->cbTrailer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING;
}
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_ACCESS_TOKEN:
AccessToken = (PSecPkgContext_AccessToken) Buffer;
//
// ClientTokenHandle can be NULL, for instance:
// 1. client side context.
// 2. incomplete server context.
// Token is not duped - caller must not CloseHandle
AccessToken->AccessToken = (void*)pContext->ClientTokenHandle;
break;
default:
Status = STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
}
CleanUp:
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
switch (Attribute) {
case SECPKG_ATTR_NAMES:
if (ContextNames != NULL && ContextNames->sUserName )
{
g_UserFunctions->FreeHeap(ContextNames->sUserName);
ContextNames->sUserName = NULL;
}
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_DCE_INFO:
if (ContextDceInfo != NULL && ContextDceInfo->pPac)
{
g_UserFunctions->FreeHeap(ContextDceInfo->pPac);
ContextDceInfo->pPac = NULL;
}
break;
case SECPKG_ATTR_KEY_INFO:
if (KeyInfo != NULL && KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName)
{
g_UserFunctions->FreeHeap(KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName);
KeyInfo->sEncryptAlgorithmName = NULL;
}
if (KeyInfo != NULL && KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName)
{
g_UserFunctions->FreeHeap(KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName);
KeyInfo->sSignatureAlgorithmName = NULL;
}
break;
}
}
if (pContext != NULL)
{
SubStatus = UserCtxtHandlerRelease(pContext);
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpQueryContextAttributes: Leaving ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpCompleteAuthToken
//
// Synopsis: Completes a context - used to perform user mode verification of
// challenge response for non-persistent connections re-established via ASC
// call.
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpCompleteAuthToken(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN PSecBufferDesc InputBuffer
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ULONG ulQOP = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpCompleteAuthToken: Entering ContextHandle 0x%lx\n", ContextHandle ));
Status = SpVerifySignature(ContextHandle, InputBuffer, 0, &ulQOP);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpCompleteAuthToken: Leaving ContextHandle 0x%lx Status = 0x%x\n",
ContextHandle, Status));
return(Status);
}
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpFormatCredentials(
IN PSecBuffer Credentials,
OUT PSecBuffer FormattedCredentials
)
{
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (Credentials);
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (FormattedCredentials);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpFormatCredentials: Entering/Leaving\n"));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION);
}
NTSTATUS NTAPI
SpMarshallSupplementalCreds(
IN ULONG CredentialSize,
IN PUCHAR Credentials,
OUT PULONG MarshalledCredSize,
OUT PVOID * MarshalledCreds
)
{
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (CredentialSize);
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (Credentials);
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (MarshalledCredSize);
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (MarshalledCreds);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpMarshallSupplementalCreds: Entering/Leaving\n"));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: NtDigestMakePackedContext
//
// Synopsis: Maps a context to the caller's address space
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments: Context - The context to map
// MappedContext - Set to TRUE on success
// ContextData - Receives a buffer in the caller's address space
// with the mapped context.
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS
NtDigestMakePackedContext(
IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT Context,
OUT PBOOLEAN MappedContext,
OUT PSecBuffer ContextData,
IN ULONG Flags
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT PackedContext = NULL;
ULONG ContextSize = 0, ContextNameSize = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "NtDigestMakePackedContext: Entering/Leaving\n"));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpExportSecurityContext
//
// Synopsis: Exports a security context to another process
//
// Effects: Allocates memory for output
//
// Arguments: ContextHandle - handle to context to export
// Flags - Flags concerning duplication. Allowable flags:
// SECPKG_CONTEXT_EXPORT_DELETE_OLD - causes old context
// to be deleted.
// PackedContext - Receives serialized context to be freed with
// FreeContextBuffer
// TokenHandle - Optionally receives handle to context's token.
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS
SpExportSecurityContext(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN ULONG Flags,
OUT PSecBuffer PackedContext,
OUT PHANDLE TokenHandle
)
{
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT Context = NULL, pvContext = NULL;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ULONG ContextSize = 0;
BOOLEAN MappedContext = FALSE;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpExportSecurityContext:Entering/Leaving ContextHandle 0x%x\n", ContextHandle ));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: NtDigestCreateUserModeContext
//
// Synopsis: Creates a user-mode context to support impersonation and
// message integrity and privacy
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS
NtDigestCreateUserModeContext(
IN ULONG_PTR ContextHandle,
IN HANDLE Token,
IN PSecBuffer MarshalledContext,
OUT PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT * NewContext
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "NtDigestCreateUserModeContext: Entering/Leaving ContextHandle 0x%x\n", ContextHandle ));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: SpImportSecurityContext
//
// Synopsis:
//
// Effects:
//
// Arguments:
//
// Requires:
//
// Returns:
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS
SpImportSecurityContext(
IN PSecBuffer PackedContext,
IN HANDLE Token,
OUT PULONG_PTR ContextHandle
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT Context = NULL;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SpImportSecurityContext: Entering/Leaving ContextHandle 0x%x\n", ContextHandle));
return(SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION);
}
/*++
RoutineDescription:
Gets the TOKEN_USER from an open token
Arguments:
Token - Handle to a token open for TOKEN_QUERY access
Return Value:
STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES - not enough memory to complete the
function.
Errors from NtQueryInformationToken.
--*/
NTSTATUS
SspGetTokenUser(
HANDLE Token,
PTOKEN_USER * pTokenUser
)
{
PTOKEN_USER LocalTokenUser = NULL;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ULONG TokenUserSize = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SspGetTokenUser: Entering Token 0x%x pTokenUser 0x%x\n", Token, pTokenUser));
//
// Query the token user. First pass in NULL to get back the
// required size.
//
Status = NtQueryInformationToken(
Token,
TokenUser,
NULL,
0,
&TokenUserSize
);
if (Status != STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
{
ASSERT(Status != STATUS_SUCCESS);
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspGetTokenUser: NtQueryInformationToken (1st call) returns 0x%lx for Token 0x%x\n", Status, Token ));
goto CleanUp;
}
//
// Now allocate the required ammount of memory and try again.
//
LocalTokenUser = (PTOKEN_USER) DigestAllocateMemory(TokenUserSize);
if (LocalTokenUser == NULL)
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
goto CleanUp;
}
Status = NtQueryInformationToken(
Token,
TokenUser,
LocalTokenUser,
TokenUserSize,
&TokenUserSize
);
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
*pTokenUser = LocalTokenUser;
}
else
{
DigestFreeMemory(LocalTokenUser);
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspGetTokenUser: NtQueryInformationToken (2nd call) returns 0x%lx for Token 0x%x\n", Status, Token ));
}
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SspGetTokenUser: Leaving Token 0x%x with Status 0x%x\n", Token, Status));
return(Status);
}
/*++
RoutineDescription:
Create a local context for a real context
Don't link it to out list of local contexts.
Called inside LSA to prep packed Context buffer to send to UserMode addr space
Arguments:
pLsaContext - pointer to a Context in LSA to map over to User space
pDigest - pointer to digest auth parameters - may be NULL and use Context instead
ContextData - packed Context information to send to usermode process
Return Value:
--*/
NTSTATUS
SspMapDigestContext(
IN PDIGEST_CONTEXT pLsaContext, // LSA Context
IN PDIGEST_PARAMETER pDigest,
OUT PSecBuffer ContextData
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT pPackedUserCtxt = NULL; // Return buffer to on good auth to UserMode addr space
USHORT cbLenNeeded = 0;
PUCHAR pucLoc = NULL;
HANDLE hTemp = NULL;
int iAuth = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SspMapContext: Entering for LSA context %lx\n", pLsaContext));
ASSERT(ContextData);
ASSERT(pLsaContext);
if (!pLsaContext)
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspMapContext: pLsaContext invalid\n"));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Copy over only selected fields
cbLenNeeded = sizeof(DIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT);
if (pDigest)
{
cbLenNeeded += pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_REALM].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NONCE].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_QOP].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE].Length;
}
else
{
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_REALM].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_NONCE].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_QOP].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length;
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE].Length;
}
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->strSessionKey.Length;
cbLenNeeded += pLsaContext->ustrAccountName.Length;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SspMapContext: Packed Digest will be %d bytes \n", cbLenNeeded));
// DigestAllocateMemory will use g_LsaFunctions->AllocateLsaHeap()
pPackedUserCtxt = (PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT)g_LsaFunctions->AllocateLsaHeap(cbLenNeeded);
if (!pPackedUserCtxt)
{
// Failed to allocate memory to send info to usermode space
ContextData->cbBuffer = 0;
Status = SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspMapContext: out of memory on usermode contextdata\n"));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Now initialize the UserMode Context struct to return
ZeroMemory(pPackedUserCtxt, cbLenNeeded);
pPackedUserCtxt->Expires = pLsaContext->PasswordExpires;
pPackedUserCtxt->typeAlgorithm = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeAlgorithm;
pPackedUserCtxt->typeCipher = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeCipher;
pPackedUserCtxt->typeCharset = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeCharset;
pPackedUserCtxt->typeDigest = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeDigest;
pPackedUserCtxt->typeQOP = (ULONG)pLsaContext->typeQOP;
pPackedUserCtxt->ulSendMaxBuf = pLsaContext->ulSendMaxBuf;
pPackedUserCtxt->ulRecvMaxBuf = pLsaContext->ulRecvMaxBuf;
pPackedUserCtxt->ContextReq = (ULONG)pLsaContext->ContextReq;
pPackedUserCtxt->CredentialUseFlags = (ULONG)pLsaContext->CredentialUseFlags;
// Now mark that there is data for these items ONLY non-zero items will be written out!!!
if (pDigest)
{
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_REALM] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_REALM].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_NONCE] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NONCE].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_QOP] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_QOP].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE] = (ULONG)pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE].Length;
}
else
{
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_USERNAME].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_REALM] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_REALM].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_NONCE] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_NONCE].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_CNONCE].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_ALGORITHM].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_QOP] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_QOP].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_AUTHZID].Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE] = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strDirective[MD5_AUTH_OPAQUE].Length;
}
pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen = (ULONG)pLsaContext->strSessionKey.Length;
pPackedUserCtxt->uAccountNameLen = (ULONG)pLsaContext->ustrAccountName.Length;
// dup token if it exists
if (pLsaContext->TokenHandle != NULL)
{
Status = g_LsaFunctions->DuplicateHandle(
pLsaContext->TokenHandle,
&(hTemp));
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
if (pPackedUserCtxt)
{
DigestFreeMemory(pPackedUserCtxt);
}
ContextData->cbBuffer = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "SspMapContext: DuplicateHandle returns 0x%lx\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Must pack the HANDLE into a fixed size structure for IA64 and i32 formats
pPackedUserCtxt->ClientTokenHandle = (ULONG) ((ULONG_PTR)hTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "SspMapContext: DuplicateHandle successful ClientTokenHandle 0x%x\n", pPackedUserCtxt->ClientTokenHandle));
}
// Now copy over the string data elements
pucLoc = &(pPackedUserCtxt->ucData);
if (pDigest)
{
for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++)
{
if (pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth])
{
memcpy(pucLoc, pDigest->refstrParam[iAuth].Buffer, pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth]);
pucLoc += pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth];
}
}
}
else
{
for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++)
{
if (pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth])
{
memcpy(pucLoc, pLsaContext->strDirective[iAuth].Buffer, pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth]);
pucLoc += pPackedUserCtxt->uDigestLen[iAuth];
}
}
}
if (pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen)
{
memcpy(pucLoc, pLsaContext->strSessionKey.Buffer, pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen);
pucLoc += pPackedUserCtxt->uSessionKeyLen;
}
if (pPackedUserCtxt->uAccountNameLen)
{
memcpy(pucLoc, pLsaContext->ustrAccountName.Buffer, pPackedUserCtxt->uAccountNameLen);
pucLoc += pPackedUserCtxt->uAccountNameLen;
}
ContextData->pvBuffer = pPackedUserCtxt;
ContextData->cbBuffer = cbLenNeeded;
ContextData->BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "SspMapContext: Leaving LsaContext %lx Status 0x%x\n", pLsaContext, Status));
return(Status);
}
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserHTTPHelper
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with HTTP for auth after initial ASC/ISC exchange
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
DigestUserHTTPHelper(
IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext,
IN eSignSealOp Op,
IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ULONG ulSeqNo = 0;
PSecBuffer pChalRspInputToken = NULL;
PSecBuffer pMethodInputToken = NULL;
PSecBuffer pURIInputToken = NULL;
PSecBuffer pHEntityInputToken = NULL;
PSecBuffer pFirstOutputToken = NULL;
DIGEST_PARAMETER Digest;
PDIGEST_CONTEXT pNewContext = NULL; // keep pointer to release new context on error
int iTemp = 0;
int iAuth = 0;
char *cptr = NULL;
char szNCOverride[2*NCNUM]; // Overrides the provided NC if non-zero using only NCNUM digits
STRING strURI;
UNICODE_STRING refustrURI;
BOOL fDefChars = FALSE;
ZeroMemory(&strURI, sizeof(strURI));
ZeroMemory(&refustrURI, sizeof(refustrURI));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Entering \n"));
DigestInit(&Digest);
if (pSecBuff->cBuffers < 1)
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Not enough input buffers 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
pChalRspInputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[0]);
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pChalRspInputToken, NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (ChalRspInputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// We have input in the SECBUFFER 0th location - parse it
Status = DigestParser2(pChalRspInputToken, MD5_AUTH_NAMES, MD5_AUTH_LAST, &Digest);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: DigestParser error 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Now determine all of the other buffers
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: pContext->ContextReq 0x%lx \n", pContext->ContextReq));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: HTTP SecBuffer Format\n"));
// Retrieve the information from the SecBuffers & check proper formattting
if (pSecBuff->cBuffers < 4)
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Not enough input buffers 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
pMethodInputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[1]);
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pMethodInputToken, NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE))
{ // Check to make sure that string is present
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (MethodInputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
pURIInputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[2]);
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pURIInputToken, NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (URIInputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
pHEntityInputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[3]);
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pHEntityInputToken, NTDIGEST_SP_MAX_TOKEN_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (HEntityInputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Take care of the output buffer
if (Op == eSign)
{
if (pSecBuff->cBuffers < 5)
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: No Output Buffers %d\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
pFirstOutputToken = &(pSecBuff->pBuffers[4]);
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pFirstOutputToken, 0))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper, ContextIsTokenOK (FirstOutputToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Reset output buffer
if (pFirstOutputToken && (pFirstOutputToken->pvBuffer) && (pFirstOutputToken->cbBuffer >= 1))
{
cptr = (char *)pFirstOutputToken->pvBuffer;
*cptr = '\0';
}
}
else
{
pFirstOutputToken = NULL; // There is no output buffer
}
// Verify that there is a valid Method provided
if (!pMethodInputToken->pvBuffer || !pMethodInputToken->cbBuffer ||
(PBUFFERTYPE(pMethodInputToken) != SECBUFFER_PKG_PARAMS))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Method SecBuffer must have valid method string status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
iTemp = strlencounted((char *)pMethodInputToken->pvBuffer, pMethodInputToken->cbBuffer);
if (!iTemp)
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Method SecBuffer must have valid method string status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_METHOD].Length = (USHORT)iTemp;
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_METHOD].MaximumLength = (unsigned short)(pMethodInputToken->cbBuffer);
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_METHOD].Buffer = (char *)pMethodInputToken->pvBuffer; // refernce memory - no alloc!!!!
// Check to see if we have H(Entity) data to utilize
if (pHEntityInputToken->cbBuffer)
{
// Verify that there is a valid Method provided
if (!pHEntityInputToken->pvBuffer || (PBUFFERTYPE(pMethodInputToken) != SECBUFFER_PKG_PARAMS))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: HEntity SecBuffer must have valid string status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
iTemp = strlencounted((char *)pHEntityInputToken->pvBuffer, pHEntityInputToken->cbBuffer);
if ((iTemp != 0) && (iTemp != (MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE * 2)))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: HEntity SecBuffer must have valid MD5 Hash data 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
if (iTemp)
{
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_HENTITY].Length = (USHORT)iTemp;
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_HENTITY].MaximumLength = (unsigned short)(pHEntityInputToken->cbBuffer);
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_HENTITY].Buffer = (char *)pHEntityInputToken->pvBuffer; // refernce memory - no alloc!!!!
}
}
// Import the URI if it is a sign otherwise verify URI match if verify
if (Op == eSign)
{
// Pull in the URI provided in SecBuffer
if (!pURIInputToken || !pURIInputToken->cbBuffer || !pURIInputToken->pvBuffer)
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: URI SecBuffer must have valid string 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
iTemp = 0;
if (PBUFFERTYPE(pURIInputToken) == SECBUFFER_PKG_PARAMS)
{
iTemp = strlencounted((char *)pURIInputToken->pvBuffer, pURIInputToken->cbBuffer);
if (iTemp > 0)
{
Status = StringCharDuplicate(&strURI, (char *)pURIInputToken->pvBuffer, (USHORT)iTemp);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: StringCharDuplicate error 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
}
else
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: URI buffer type invalid error %d\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
StringReference(&(Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_URI]), &strURI); // refernce memory - no alloc!!!!
}
// If we have a NonceCount in the MessageSequenceNumber then use that
if (MessageSeqNo)
{
ulSeqNo = MessageSeqNo;
}
else
{
ulSeqNo = pContext->ulNC + 1; // Else use the next sequence number
}
sprintf(szNCOverride, "%0.8x", ulSeqNo); // Buffer is twice as big as we need (for safety) so just clip out first 8 characters
szNCOverride[NCNUM] = '\0'; // clip to 8 digits
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Message Sequence NC is %s\n", szNCOverride));
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].Length = (USHORT)NCNUM;
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].MaximumLength = (unsigned short)(NCNUM+1);
Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].Buffer = (char *)szNCOverride; // refernce memory - no alloc!!!!
// Now link in the stored context values into the digest if this is a SignMessage
// If there are values there from the input auth line then override them with context's value
if (Op == eSign)
{
for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++)
{
if (pContext->strParam[iAuth].Length)
{ // Link in only if passed into the user context from the LSA context
Digest.refstrParam[iAuth].Length = pContext->strParam[iAuth].Length;
Digest.refstrParam[iAuth].MaximumLength = pContext->strParam[iAuth].MaximumLength;
Digest.refstrParam[iAuth].Buffer = pContext->strParam[iAuth].Buffer; // reference memory - no alloc!!!!
}
}
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Digest inputs processing completed\n"));
Status = DigestUserProcessParameters(pContext, &Digest, pFirstOutputToken);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: DigestUserProcessParameters error 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// For testing if nonce is stale, but digest calc still verified
if (Op == eVerify)
{
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status) && NonceIsExpired(&(Digest.refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NONCE])))
{
Status = SEC_E_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: NONCE is out of date. Flag stale return Status 0x%x\n", Status));
}
}
pContext->ulNC = ulSeqNo; // Everything verified so increment to next nonce count
CleanUp:
DigestFree(&Digest);
StringFree(&strURI);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserHTTPHelper: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserSignHelper
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with SASL section 2.3 RFC
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
DigestUserSignHelper(
IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext,
IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDWORD pdwSeqNum = NULL; // points to the Sequence number to use
PSecBuffer pSecBufToken = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufData = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufPad = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufHMAC = NULL; // Points to the HMAC appended to the data block
PSecBuffer pSecBufMsg = NULL; // Points to the data section
BOOL bServer = FALSE;
SASL_MAC_BLOCK MacBlock;
DWORD dwSeqNumber = 0;
STRING strcSignKeyConst; // pointer to a constant valued string
ULONG Index = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserSignHelper: Entering \n"));
ZeroMemory(&MacBlock, sizeof(SASL_MAC_BLOCK));
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, NULL);
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ )
{
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_TOKEN)
{
pSecBufToken = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_DATA)
{
pSecBufData = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_PADDING)
{
pSecBufPad = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
}
if ((!pSecBufPad) || (!pSecBufPad->cbBuffer))
{ // If no SECBUFFER_PADDING, use SECBUFFER_TOKEN
pSecBufHMAC = pSecBufToken;
}
else
{
pSecBufHMAC = pSecBufPad;
if (pSecBufToken)
{
pSecBufToken->cbBuffer = 0;
}
}
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufHMAC, 0) || (pSecBufHMAC->cbBuffer < MAC_BLOCK_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSignHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SignatureToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufData, 0))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSignHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Determine the sequence number & Constant Key Sring to utilize acting as the server
if (bServer)
{
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwSendSeqNum);
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SIGN_KEY);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSignHelper: Signing in Server Mode (Message StoC) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
}
else
{ // acting as the client
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwSendSeqNum);
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SIGN_KEY);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSignHelper: Signing in Client Mode (Message CtoS) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
}
Status = CalculateSASLHMAC(pContext, TRUE, &strcSignKeyConst, *pdwSeqNum,
(PBYTE)pSecBufData->pvBuffer, pSecBufData->cbBuffer, &MacBlock);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSignHelper: Error in CalculateSASLHMAC status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Write the calculated MAC block out to the SecBuffer
memcpy(pSecBufHMAC->pvBuffer, &MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSignHelper: Wrote out the calculated MAC Block.\n"));
pSecBufHMAC->cbBuffer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE; // indicate number of bytes we used for padding and HMAC block
// completed all tasks down to here. Need to update the sequence number
(*pdwSeqNum)++;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSignHelper: Updated SeqNum to %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserSignHelper: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserVerifyHelper
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with SASL section 2.3 RFC
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
DigestUserVerifyHelper(
IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext,
IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDWORD pdwSeqNum = NULL; // points to the Sequence number to use
PBYTE pMsgHMAC = NULL; // Location of the HMAC in the message
PSecBuffer pSecBufData = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufStream = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufHMAC = NULL; // Points to the HMAC appended to the data block
PSecBuffer pSecBufMsg = NULL; // Points to the data section
BOOL bServer = FALSE;
SASL_MAC_BLOCK MacBlock;
SASL_MAC_BLOCK TokenMacBlock;
DWORD dwSeqNumber = 0;
STRING strcSignKeyConst;
ULONG cbSecBufMsgIntegrity = 0; // Number of bytes in message to calc HMAC on
ULONG Index = 0;
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE];
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
#endif
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Entering \n"));
ZeroMemory(&MacBlock, sizeof(SASL_MAC_BLOCK));
ZeroMemory(&TokenMacBlock, sizeof(SASL_MAC_BLOCK));
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, NULL);
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ )
{
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_DATA)
{
pSecBufData = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_STREAM)
{
pSecBufStream = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
}
// Must be for decrypt/verify
if ((!pSecBufStream) || (!pSecBufStream->cbBuffer))
{ // If no SECBUFFER_STREAM, use SECBUFFER_DATA
pSecBufMsg = pSecBufData;
}
else
{
pSecBufMsg = pSecBufStream;
}
if ((!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufMsg, 0)) || (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < MAC_BLOCK_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) decrypt/verify failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Strip off the MsgType and the Sequence Number
cbSecBufMsgIntegrity = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
// Determine the sequence number to utilize acting as the server
if (bServer)
{
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwRecvSeqNum);
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SIGN_KEY);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Verifying in Server Mode (Message CtoS) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
}
else
{ // acting as the client
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwRecvSeqNum);
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SIGN_KEY);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Verifying in Client Mode (Message StoC) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
}
Status = CalculateSASLHMAC(pContext, FALSE, &strcSignKeyConst, *pdwSeqNum,
(PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer, cbSecBufMsgIntegrity, &MacBlock);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Error in CalculateSASLHMAC status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Ready to compare MacBlocks\n"));
// Check validity of MAC block ONLY do not write it out
pMsgHMAC = (PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer + cbSecBufMsgIntegrity;
memcpy(&TokenMacBlock, pMsgHMAC, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (MacBlock.dwSeqNumber != TokenMacBlock.dwSeqNumber)
{
Status = SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: SASL MAC blocks out of sequence. Failed verify. Status 0x%x\n", Status));
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Token's HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp));
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: TComputed HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp));
#endif
goto CleanUp;
}
if (memcmp(&MacBlock, &TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: SASL MAC blocks do not match. Failed verify. Status 0x%x\n", Status));
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Token's HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp));
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: TComputed HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp));
#endif
goto CleanUp;
}
else
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: SASL MAC blocks match!\n"));
}
// completed all tasks down to here. Need to update the sequence number
(*pdwSeqNum)++;
// Update the Data information (without the attached HMAC info block
if (pSecBufData)
{
pSecBufData->cbBuffer = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - MAC_BLOCK_SIZE;
pSecBufData->pvBuffer = pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Updated SeqNum to %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserVerifyHelper: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserSealHelper
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with SASL section 2.3 RFC
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
DigestUserSealHelper(
IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext,
IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDWORD pdwSeqNum = NULL; // points to the Sequence number to use
PSecBuffer pSecBufToken = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufData = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufPad = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufHMAC = NULL; // Points to the HMAC appended to the data block
PSecBuffer pSecBufMsg = NULL; // Points to the data section
BOOL bServer = FALSE;
SASL_MAC_BLOCK MacBlock;
DWORD dwSeqNumber = 0;
STRING strcSignKeyConst;
STRING strcSealKeyConst;
PUCHAR pbIV = NULL;
BYTE bKcTempData[MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; // Message integrity keys RFC 2831 sec 2.3
ULONG Index = 0;
USHORT cbHA1n = 0; // Number of bytes for Ha1 in Kcc/Kcs
DWORD cbKey = 0; // Number of bytes of Kcc/Kcs to use for the key
DWORD cbKeyNoParity = 0; // Number of bytes of Kcc/Kcs to use for the key with no parity
DWORD cbTempKey = 0;
ULONG cbBlockSize = RC4_BLOCKSIZE; // Blocksize for the given cipher
ULONG cbPrefixPadding = 0; // number of bytes needed for padding out to blocksize
ULONG cbBlocks = 0;
PBYTE pHMACTemp = NULL;
ALG_ID Algid = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserSealHelper: Entering \n"));
ZeroMemory(&MacBlock, sizeof(SASL_MAC_BLOCK));
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, NULL);
RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, NULL);
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ )
{
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_TOKEN)
{
pSecBufToken = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_DATA)
{
pSecBufData = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_PADDING)
{
pSecBufPad = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
}
if ((!pSecBufPad) || (!pSecBufPad->cbBuffer))
{ // If no SECBUFFER_PADDING, use SECBUFFER_TOKEN
pSecBufHMAC = pSecBufToken;
}
else
{
pSecBufHMAC = pSecBufPad;
if (pSecBufToken)
{
pSecBufToken->cbBuffer = 0;
}
}
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufHMAC, 0) || (pSecBufHMAC->cbBuffer < (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + MAX_PADDING)))
{
Status = SEC_E_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SignatureToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufData, 0))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Determine the sequence number & Constant Key Sring to utilize acting as the server
if (bServer)
{
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwSendSeqNum);
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SIGN_KEY);
RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SEAL_KEY);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelper: Signing in Server Mode (Message StoC) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
}
else
{ // acting as the client
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwSendSeqNum);
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SIGN_KEY);
RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SEAL_KEY);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelper: Signing in Client Mode (Message CtoS) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
}
// Based on the Cypher selected - establish the byte count parameters - magic numbers from RFC
if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4)
{
cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4;
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40)
{
cbHA1n = 5; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4;
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56)
{
cbHA1n = 7; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4;
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES)
{
cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 8; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
cbKeyNoParity = 7;
cbBlockSize = DES_BLOCKSIZE; // DES uses a blocksize of 8
Algid = CALG_DES;
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES)
{
cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
cbKeyNoParity = 14;
cbBlockSize = DES_BLOCKSIZE; // DES uses a blocksize of 8
Algid = CALG_3DES_112;
}
else
{
Status = SEC_E_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// If the cipher is not a stream cipher - the place prefix padding before SASL MAC
// Modified to include padding based on message datasize + the 10 byte HMAC
if (cbBlockSize != 1)
{
cbBlocks = (pSecBufData->cbBuffer + SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE) / cbBlockSize; // integer divison
cbPrefixPadding = cbBlockSize - ((pSecBufData->cbBuffer + SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE) - (cbBlockSize * cbBlocks));
if (!cbPrefixPadding)
{
cbPrefixPadding = cbBlockSize; // if padding is zero set it to the blocksize - i.e. always pad
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelper: DataSize %lu BlockSize %lu Padding %lu\n",
pSecBufData->cbBuffer, cbBlockSize, cbPrefixPadding));
}
Status = CalculateSASLHMAC(pContext, TRUE, &strcSignKeyConst, *pdwSeqNum,
(PBYTE)pSecBufData->pvBuffer, pSecBufData->cbBuffer, &MacBlock);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: Error in CalculateSASLHMAC status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Write the calculated MAC block out to the SecBuffer
// Put the padding as the prefix
pHMACTemp = (PBYTE)pSecBufHMAC->pvBuffer;
memset(pHMACTemp, cbPrefixPadding, cbPrefixPadding);
memcpy(pHMACTemp + cbPrefixPadding, &MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelper: Wrote out the calculated MAC Block.\n"));
pSecBufHMAC->cbBuffer = MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + cbPrefixPadding; // indicate number of bytes we used for padding and HMAC block
// Completed the Integrity calculation, now encrypt the data if requested
// Encrypt the message, padding and first SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE (10) bytes of HMAC (the integrity value)
// Compute Kc for encryption (seal) & generate Cryptkey
if (pContext->hSealCryptKey == NULL)
{
ASSERT(*pdwSeqNum == 0); // Should be first call into package
// Compute on first time call to encrypt - save for other sequence numbers
Status = CalculateKc(pContext->bSessionKey, cbHA1n, &strcSealKeyConst, pContext->bKcSealHashData);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: Error in CalculateKc status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// code to expand the DES key into multiple of 8 bytes (key with parity)
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES))
{
Status = AddDESParity(pContext->bKcSealHashData,
cbKeyNoParity,
bKcTempData,
&cbTempKey);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: Error in AddDESParity status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// replace with DES parity version
ASSERT(cbKey == cbTempKey);
memcpy(pContext->bSealKey, bKcTempData, cbTempKey);
pbIV = &(pContext->bKcSealHashData[8]);
}
else
{
memcpy(pContext->bSealKey, pContext->bKcSealHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
pbIV = NULL;
}
// generate symmetric key from the cleartext
Status = CreateSymmetricKey(Algid, cbKey, pContext->bSealKey, pbIV, &pContext->hSealCryptKey);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: Error in CalculateKc status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES))
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelper: 3DES/DES Encryption\n"));
// Specify IV - take only the last 8 bytes per RFC 2831 sect 2.4
Status = EncryptData2(pContext->hSealCryptKey, cbBlockSize,
pSecBufData->cbBuffer, (PUCHAR)pSecBufData->pvBuffer,
(cbPrefixPadding + SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE), pHMACTemp);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: Error in EncryptData status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
else
{
Status = EncryptData2(pContext->hSealCryptKey, cbBlockSize,
pSecBufData->cbBuffer, (PUCHAR)pSecBufData->pvBuffer,
(cbPrefixPadding + SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE), pHMACTemp);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserSealHelper: Error in EncryptData status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelper: Data encrypted\n"));
// completed all tasks down to here. Need to update the sequence number
(*pdwSeqNum)++;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserSealHelper: Updated SeqNum to %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserSealHelper: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
//+--------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: DigestUserUnsealHelper
//
// Synopsis: Process a SecBuffer with a given User Security Context
// Used with SASL section 2.3 RFC
//
// Arguments: pContext - UserMode Context for the security state
// Op - operation to perform on the Sec buffers
// pMessage - sec buffers to processs and return output
//
//
// Returns: NTSTATUS
//
// Notes:
//
//---------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS NTAPI
DigestUserUnsealHelper(
IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext,
IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pSecBuff,
IN ULONG MessageSeqNo
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
NTSTATUS SubStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PDWORD pdwSeqNum = NULL; // points to the Sequence number to use
PSecBuffer pSecBufData = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufStream = NULL;
PSecBuffer pSecBufHMAC = NULL; // Points to the HMAC appended to the data block
PSecBuffer pSecBufMsg = NULL; // Points to the data section
BOOL bServer = FALSE;
SASL_MAC_BLOCK MacBlock;
SASL_MAC_BLOCK TokenMacBlock; // Extract the HMAC block imbedded in the message
DWORD dwSeqNumber = 0;
STRING strcSignKeyConst;
STRING strcSealKeyConst;
PBYTE pMsgHMAC = NULL;
BYTE bKcTempData[MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; // Message integrity keys RFC 2831 sec 2.3
PUCHAR pbIV = NULL;
ULONG Index = 0;
USHORT cbHA1n = 0; // Number of bytes for Ha1 in Kcc/Kcs
DWORD cbKey = 0; // Number of bytes of Kcc/Kcs to use for the key
DWORD cbKeyNoParity = 0; // Number of bytes of Kcc/Kcs to use for the key with no parity
DWORD cbTempKey = 0;
ULONG cbBlockSize = 1; // Blocksize for the given cipher
UCHAR cbPrefixPadding = 0; // number of bytes needed for padding out to blocksize
ULONG cbMsg = 0; // number of bytes in the actual message
PBYTE pHMACTemp = NULL;
PBYTE pMsgPadding = NULL; // Location of a padding byte
ALG_ID Algid = 0;
ULONG cbSecBufMsgPrivacy = 0; // Number of bytes to decrypt (unseal)
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE];
ULONG iTempLen = 20;
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
#endif
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Entering\n"));
ZeroMemory(&MacBlock, sizeof(MacBlock));
ZeroMemory(&TokenMacBlock, sizeof(TokenMacBlock));
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, NULL);
RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, NULL);
bServer = pContext->CredentialUseFlags & DIGEST_CRED_INBOUND;
//
// Find the body and signature SecBuffers from pMessage
//
for (Index = 0; Index < pSecBuff->cBuffers ; Index++ )
{
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_DATA)
{
pSecBufData = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
if (BUFFERTYPE(pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index]) == SECBUFFER_STREAM)
{
pSecBufStream = &pSecBuff->pBuffers[Index];
}
}
// Must be for decrypt/verify
if ((!pSecBufStream) || (!pSecBufStream->cbBuffer))
{ // If no SECBUFFER_STREAM, use SECBUFFER_DATA
pSecBufMsg = pSecBufData;
}
else
{
pSecBufMsg = pSecBufStream;
}
if ((!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufMsg, 0)) || (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < MAC_BLOCK_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) decrypt/verify failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Strip off the MsgType and the Sequence Number
cbSecBufMsgPrivacy = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - (SASL_MAC_MSG_SIZE + SASL_MAC_SEQ_SIZE);
if (!ContextIsTokenOK(pSecBufMsg, 0) || (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < MAC_BLOCK_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SignatureToken) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Determine the sequence number & Constant Key Sring to utilize acting as the server
if (bServer)
{
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwRecvSeqNum);
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SIGN_KEY);
RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, SASL_C2S_SEAL_KEY);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Signing in Server Mode (Message StoC) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
}
else
{ // acting as the client
pdwSeqNum = &(pContext->dwRecvSeqNum);
RtlInitString(&strcSignKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SIGN_KEY);
RtlInitString(&strcSealKeyConst, SASL_S2C_SEAL_KEY);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Signing in Client Mode (Message CtoS) SeqNum %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
}
// Based on the Cypher selected - establish the byte count parameters - magic numbers from RFC
if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4)
{
cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4;
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40)
{
cbHA1n = 5; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4;
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56)
{
cbHA1n = 7; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
Algid = CALG_RC4;
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES)
{
cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 8; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
cbKeyNoParity = 7;
cbBlockSize = 8; // DES uses a blocksize of 8
Algid = CALG_DES;
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES)
{
cbHA1n = 16; // RFC 2831 sect 2.4
cbKey = 16; // number of bytes to use from Kcc/Kcs
cbKeyNoParity = 14;
cbBlockSize = 8; // DES uses a blocksize of 8
Algid = CALG_3DES_112;
}
else
{
Status = SEC_E_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: ContextIsTokenOK (SecBufMsg) failed 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Decrypt the message, padding and first SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE (10) bytes of HMAC (the integrity value)
// Compute Kc for encryption (seal)
if (pContext->hUnsealCryptKey == NULL)
{
ASSERT(*pdwSeqNum == 0);
// Compute on first time call to encrypt - save for other sequence numbers
Status = CalculateKc(pContext->bSessionKey, cbHA1n, &strcSealKeyConst, pContext->bKcUnsealHashData);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in CalculateKc status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// code to expand the DES key into multiple of 8 bytes (key with parity)
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES))
{
Status = AddDESParity(pContext->bKcUnsealHashData,
cbKeyNoParity,
bKcTempData,
&cbTempKey);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in AddDESParity status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// replace with DES parity version
ASSERT(cbKey == cbTempKey);
memcpy(pContext->bUnsealKey, bKcTempData, cbKey);
pbIV = &(pContext->bKcUnsealHashData[8]);
}
else
{
// For RC4 ciphers
memcpy(pContext->bUnsealKey, pContext->bKcUnsealHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
pbIV = NULL;
}
// generate the symmetric key from the cleartext
Status = CreateSymmetricKey(Algid, cbKey, pContext->bUnsealKey, pbIV, &pContext->hUnsealCryptKey);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in CalculateKc status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
if ((pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES) || (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES))
{
// Specify IV - take only the last 8 bytes per RFC 2831 sect 2.4
Status = DecryptData(pContext->hUnsealCryptKey, cbSecBufMsgPrivacy,
(PUCHAR)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in DecryptData status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Padding length is indicated in the actual padding - get the pad byte near HMAC
if (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1))
{
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Determining padding not enough space status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
pMsgPadding = (PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer + (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1));
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
if ((MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1) < iTempLen)
{
iTempLen = (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1);
}
BinToHex(pMsgPadding, iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: HMAC & padding byte Data bytes (%dof%d bytes) %s\n",
iTempLen, (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + 1), szTemp));
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: MAC block size %d bytes\n", MAC_BLOCK_SIZE));
#endif
cbPrefixPadding = *pMsgPadding;
if (cbPrefixPadding > MAX_PADDING)
{
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Padding selected (%d) too large status 0x%x\n",
cbPrefixPadding, Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
if (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer < (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + cbPrefixPadding))
{
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Message incorrect length status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
cbMsg = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - (MAC_BLOCK_SIZE + cbPrefixPadding);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Padding found to be %d bytes\n", cbPrefixPadding));
}
else
{
Status = DecryptData(pContext->hUnsealCryptKey, cbSecBufMsgPrivacy,
(PUCHAR)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in EncryptData status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
// There is no padding on stream ciphers, so just remove the SASL HMAC block
cbMsg = pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - MAC_BLOCK_SIZE;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Stream Cipher - No padding\n"));
}
// Locate the beginning of the message
pMsgHMAC = (PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer + (pSecBufMsg->cbBuffer - MAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
Status = CalculateSASLHMAC(pContext, FALSE, &strcSignKeyConst, *pdwSeqNum,
(PBYTE)pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer, cbMsg, &MacBlock);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Error in CalculateSASLHMAC status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Ready to compare MacBlocks\n"));
// Check validity of MAC block ONLY do not write it out
memcpy(&TokenMacBlock, pMsgHMAC, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (MacBlock.dwSeqNumber != TokenMacBlock.dwSeqNumber)
{
Status = SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: SASL MAC blocks out of sequence. Failed verify. Status 0x%x\n", Status));
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Token's HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp));
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: TComputed HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp));
#endif
goto CleanUp;
}
if (memcmp(&MacBlock, &TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE))
{
Status = SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: SASL MAC blocks do not match. Failed verify. Status 0x%x\n", Status));
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&TokenMacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Token's HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp));
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&MacBlock, MAC_BLOCK_SIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: TComputed HMAC-MD5 block %s\n", szTemp));
#endif
goto CleanUp;
}
else
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: SASL MAC blocks match!\n"));
}
// Write out to SECBUFFERDATA the length and location of message
if (pSecBufData)
{
pSecBufData->cbBuffer = cbMsg;
pSecBufData->pvBuffer = pSecBufMsg->pvBuffer;
}
// completed all tasks down to here. Need to update the sequence number
(*pdwSeqNum)++;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Updated SeqNum to %d\n", *pdwSeqNum));
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserUnsealHelper: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
// Process the Digest information with the context info and generate any output token info
NTSTATUS NTAPI
DigestUserProcessParameters(
IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext,
IN PDIGEST_PARAMETER pDigest,
OUT PSecBuffer pFirstOutputToken)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ULONG ulNonceCount = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Entering\n"));
// Some common input verification tests
// We must have a noncecount specified since we specified a qop in the Challenge
// If we decide to support no noncecount modes then we need to make sure that qop is not specified
if (pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].Length)
{
Status = RtlCharToInteger(pDigest->refstrParam[MD5_AUTH_NC].Buffer, HEXBASE, &ulNonceCount);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Nonce Count badly formatted\n"));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
// Check nonceCount is incremented to preclude replay
if (!(ulNonceCount > pContext->ulNC))
{
// We failed to verify next noncecount
Status = SEC_E_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: NonceCount failed to increment!\n"));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Since we are in UserMode we MUST have a sessionkey to use - if non then can not process
if (!pContext->strSessionKey.Length)
{
Status = SEC_E_NO_AUTHENTICATING_AUTHORITY; // indicate that we needed a call to ASC or ISC first
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: No Session Key contained in UserContext\n"));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Copy the SessionKey from the Context into the Digest Structure to verify against
// This will have Digest Auth routines use the SessionKey rather than recompute H(A1)
StringFree(&(pDigest->strSessionKey));
Status = StringDuplicate(&(pDigest->strSessionKey), &(pContext->strSessionKey));
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Failed to copy over SessionKey\n"));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Set the type of Digest Parameters we are to process
pDigest->typeDigest = pContext->typeDigest;
pDigest->typeQOP = pContext->typeQOP;
pDigest->typeAlgorithm = pContext->typeAlgorithm;
pDigest->typeCharset = pContext->typeCharset;
DigestPrint(pDigest);
// No check locally that Digest is authentic
Status = DigestCalculation(pDigest, NULL);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Oh no we FAILED Authentication!!!!\n"));
goto CleanUp;
}
// Send to output buffer only if there is an output buffer
// This allows this routine to be used in UserMode
if (pFirstOutputToken)
{
Status = DigestCreateChalResp(pDigest, NULL, pFirstOutputToken);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Failed to create Output String\n"));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUserProcessParameters: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
// Unpack the context from LSA mode into the User mode Context
NTSTATUS
DigestUnpackContext(
IN PDIGEST_PACKED_USERCONTEXT pPackedUserContext,
OUT PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PUCHAR pucLoc = NULL;
USHORT uNumWChars = 0;
int iAuth = 0;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUnpackContext: Entering\n"));
ASSERT(pContext);
//
// If TokenHandle is NULL, we are being called as
// as an effect of InitializeSecurityContext, else we are
// being called because of AcceptSecurityContext
//
if (pPackedUserContext->ClientTokenHandle != NULL)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: Called from ASC\n" ));
pContext->ClientTokenHandle = (HANDLE) ((ULONG_PTR)pPackedUserContext->ClientTokenHandle);
if (FAILED(SspCreateTokenDacl(pContext->ClientTokenHandle)))
{
Status = STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: SspCreateTokenDacl failed\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
}
else
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: Called from ISC\n" ));
}
//
// Copy over all of the other fields - some data might be binary so
// use RtlCopyMemory(Dest, Src, len)
//
pContext->Expires = pPackedUserContext->Expires;
pContext->typeAlgorithm = (ALGORITHM_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeAlgorithm;
pContext->typeCharset = (CHARSET_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeCharset;
pContext->typeCipher = (CIPHER_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeCipher;
pContext->typeDigest = (DIGEST_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeDigest;
pContext->typeQOP = (QOP_TYPE)pPackedUserContext->typeQOP;
pContext->ulSendMaxBuf = pPackedUserContext->ulSendMaxBuf;
pContext->ulRecvMaxBuf = pPackedUserContext->ulRecvMaxBuf;
pContext->ulNC = 1; // Force to one to account for ISC/ASC first message verify
pContext->lReferences = 1;
pContext->ContextReq = pPackedUserContext->ContextReq;
pContext->CredentialUseFlags = pPackedUserContext->CredentialUseFlags;
// Now check on the strings attached
pucLoc = &(pPackedUserContext->ucData);
for (iAuth = 0; iAuth < MD5_AUTH_LAST; iAuth++)
{
if (pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth])
{
Status = StringAllocate(&(pContext->strParam[iAuth]), (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth]);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: DigestAllocateMemory for Params returns NULL\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
memcpy(pContext->strParam[iAuth].Buffer, pucLoc, (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth]);
pContext->strParam[iAuth].Length = (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth];
pucLoc += (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth];
// DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: Param[%d] is length %d - %.50s\n",
// iAuth, pPackedUserContext->uDigestLen[iAuth], pContext->strParam[iAuth].Buffer ));
}
}
// Now do the SessionKey
if (pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen)
{
Status = StringAllocate(&(pContext->strSessionKey), (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: DigestAllocateMemory for SessionKey returns NULL\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
memcpy(pContext->strSessionKey.Buffer, pucLoc, pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen);
pContext->strSessionKey.Length = (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen;
pucLoc += (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uSessionKeyLen;
}
// Now do the AccountName
if (pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen)
{
uNumWChars = (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen / sizeof(WCHAR);
Status = UnicodeStringAllocate(&(pContext->ustrAccountName), uNumWChars);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
{
Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DigestUnpackContext: DigestAllocateMemory for AccountName returns NULL\n" ));
goto CleanUp;
}
memcpy(pContext->ustrAccountName.Buffer, pucLoc, pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen);
pContext->ustrAccountName.Length = (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen;
pucLoc += (USHORT)pPackedUserContext->uAccountNameLen;
}
// Now determine the binary version of the SessionKey from HEX() version
ASSERT(pContext->strSessionKey.Length == MD5_HASH_HEX_SIZE);
HexToBin(pContext->strSessionKey.Buffer, MD5_HASH_HEX_SIZE, pContext->bSessionKey);
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE];
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pContext->bSessionKey, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DigestUnpackContext: verify SessionKey %Z is binary %s\n",
&(pContext->strSessionKey), szTemp));
#endif
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DigestUnpackContext: Leaving Status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
// Printout the fields present in usercontext pContext
NTSTATUS
UserContextPrint(PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
int i = 0;
if (!pContext)
{
return (STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "UserContext: Entering for Context Handle at 0x%x\n", pContext));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: NC %ld\n", pContext->ulNC));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: LSA Context 0x%x\n", pContext->LsaContext));
if (pContext->typeDigest == DIGEST_CLIENT)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: DIGEST_CLIENT\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeDigest == DIGEST_SERVER)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: DIGEST_SERVER\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeDigest == SASL_SERVER)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: SASL_SERVER\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeDigest == SASL_CLIENT)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: SASL_CLIENT\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeQOP == AUTH)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: QOP: AUTH\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeQOP == AUTH_INT)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: QOP: AUTH_INT\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeQOP == AUTH_CONF)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: QOP: AUTH_CONF\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeAlgorithm == MD5)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Algorithm: MD5\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeAlgorithm == MD5_SESS)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Algorithm: MD5_SESS\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeCharset == ISO_8859_1)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Charset: ISO 8859-1\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeCharset == UTF_8)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Charset: UTF-8\n"));
}
if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_RC4\n"));
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_40)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_RC4_40\n"));
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_RC4_56)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_RC4_56\n"));
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_DES)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_DES\n"));
}
else if (pContext->typeCipher == CIPHER_3DES)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Cipher: CIPHER_3DES\n"));
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: ContextReq 0x%lx CredentialUseFlags 0x%x\n",
pContext->ContextReq,
pContext->CredentialUseFlags));
for (i=0; i < MD5_AUTH_LAST;i++)
{
if (pContext->strParam[i].Buffer &&
pContext->strParam[i].Length)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: Digest[%d] = \"%Z\"\n", i, &pContext->strParam[i]));
}
}
if (pContext->strSessionKey.Length)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: SessionKey %Z\n", &pContext->strSessionKey));
}
if (pContext->ustrAccountName.Length)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "UserContext: AccountName %wZ\n", &pContext->ustrAccountName));
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "UserContext: Leaving\n"));
return(Status);
}
// CryptoAPI function support
NTSTATUS
SEC_ENTRY
CreateSymmetricKey(
IN ALG_ID Algid,
IN DWORD cbKey,
IN UCHAR *pbKey,
IN UCHAR *pbIV,
OUT HCRYPTKEY *phKey
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PLAINTEXTBLOB PlainBlob;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CreateSymmetricKey: Entering\n"));
ASSERT(*phKey == NULL);
ZeroMemory(&PlainBlob, sizeof(PlainBlob));
if (cbKey > MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE)
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CreateSymmetricKey: Shared key too long\n"));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE];
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pbKey, cbKey, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CreateSymmetricKey: Creating symmetric for %s\n", szTemp));
}
#endif
PlainBlob.Blob.bType = PLAINTEXTKEYBLOB;
PlainBlob.Blob.bVersion = CUR_BLOB_VERSION;
PlainBlob.Blob.reserved = 0;
PlainBlob.Blob.aiKeyAlg = Algid;
memcpy(PlainBlob.bKey, pbKey, cbKey);
PlainBlob.dwKeyLen = cbKey;
// import thw simpleblob to get a handle to the symmetric key
if (!CryptImportKey(g_hCryptProv,
(BYTE *)&PlainBlob,
sizeof(PlainBlob),
0,
0,
phKey))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CreateSymmetricKey: CryptImportKey failed error 0x%x\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if ((Algid == CALG_DES) || (Algid == CALG_3DES_112))
{
if (!pbIV)
{
DebugLog((DEB_WARN, "CreateSymmetricKey: No IV selected for DES\n"));
}
else
{
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pbIV, 8, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CreateSymmetricKey: IV bytes set to %s\n", szTemp));
}
#endif
if (!CryptSetKeyParam(*phKey, KP_IV, pbIV, 0))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CreateSymmetricKey:CryptSetKeyParam() failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
}
}
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CreateSymmetricKey: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: EncryptData2
//
// Synopsis: Encrypt a data buffer (broken into two pieces DATA and Signature)
//
// Effects: no global effect.
//
// Arguments:
//
// IN Algid -- Encryption algorithm to utilize
// IN pbIV -- DES salt (if any provided)
// IN hKey -- symmetric key to utilize
// IN cbBlocklength -- natural block length for encoding (RC will be 1 and DES will be 8)
// IN cbData -- number of data bytes to encrypt
// IN pbData -- pointer to data bytes to encrypt
// IN cbSignature -- number of signature bytes to encrypt after Data is encrypted
// IN pbSignature -- number of bytes in signature to encrypt
//
// Requires: no global requirements
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS, or resource error
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS
SEC_ENTRY
EncryptData2(
IN HCRYPTKEY hKey,
IN ULONG cbBlocklength,
IN ULONG cbData,
IN OUT UCHAR *pbData,
IN ULONG cbSignature,
IN OUT UCHAR *pbSignature
)
{
DWORD dwBytesEncrypt = 0;
ULONG cbTemp = 0;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ULONG cbBlocks = 0;
ULONG cbDataExtra = 0;
ULONG cbCnt = 0; // number of bytes to alloc for merged data
PBYTE pbBuff2 = NULL; // temp alloc for merge of extra bytes & signature
PBYTE pbDataExtra = NULL; // location for start of extra memory bytes
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "EncryptData2: Entering %lu bytes\n", cbData));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: Blocklength %lu\n", cbBlocklength));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: Signature block %lu bytes\n", cbSignature));
// Check if encrypting 1 or two buffers
if (!cbSignature)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: one buffer only - direct encode\n"));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: buffer %lu bytes\n", cbData));
// Only one buffer utilized
dwBytesEncrypt = cbData;
if (!CryptEncrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbData, &dwBytesEncrypt, cbData))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2:CryptEncrypt one buffer failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
}
else
{
// We have two buffers to encrypt
// Identify if there are extra bytes beyond blocksize for cipher
cbBlocks = cbData / cbBlocklength; // integer division
cbDataExtra = cbData - (cbBlocklength * cbBlocks);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: number of cipher blocks %lu number extra bytes %lu\n",
cbBlocks, cbDataExtra));
if (cbDataExtra)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: merge signature - encrypt two buffers & replace\n"));
// extra data bytes starting memory location
pbDataExtra = pbData + (cbBlocklength * cbBlocks);
// There are bytes outside a multiple of the cipher block size
// create temp buffer for extra bytes and HMAC
cbCnt = cbDataExtra + cbSignature;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: merge block size %lu bytes\n", cbCnt));
pbBuff2 = (PBYTE)DigestAllocateMemory(cbCnt + MAX_PADDING);
if (!pbBuff2)
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2:out of memory\n"));
Status = SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
goto CleanUp;
}
// copy over the bytes to temp buffer
memcpy(pbBuff2, pbDataExtra, cbDataExtra);
memcpy(pbBuff2 + cbDataExtra, pbSignature, cbSignature);
// encrypt any multiples of blocklength in the data section (first buffer)
if (cbBlocks)
{
dwBytesEncrypt = cbBlocklength * cbBlocks;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: buffer 1 %lu bytes\n", dwBytesEncrypt));
if (!CryptEncrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbData, &dwBytesEncrypt, dwBytesEncrypt))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2:CryptEncrypt first buffer (blocklength) failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
}
// encrypt the temp buffer - copy back to original locations afterwards
dwBytesEncrypt = cbCnt;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: buffer 2 encrypt %lu bytes in %lu byte buffer\n",
dwBytesEncrypt, cbCnt + MAX_PADDING));
if (!CryptEncrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbBuff2, &dwBytesEncrypt, cbCnt + MAX_PADDING))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2:CryptEncrypt second buffer (blocklength) failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
memcpy(pbSignature, pbBuff2 + cbDataExtra, cbSignature);
memcpy(pbDataExtra, pbBuff2, cbDataExtra);
}
else
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: multiple of cipher blocksize - encrypt two buffers directly\n"));
// encrypt data buffer and then signature buffer - data buffer is multiple of blocksize
if (cbData)
{
dwBytesEncrypt = cbData;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: buffer 1 %lu bytes\n", dwBytesEncrypt));
if (!CryptEncrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbData, &dwBytesEncrypt, cbData))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2:CryptEncrypt first buffer (blocklength) failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: needed %lu bytes for encrypted buffer 1\n", dwBytesEncrypt));
}
// Final encrypt of signature buffer
dwBytesEncrypt = cbSignature;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: buffer 2 %lu bytes\n", dwBytesEncrypt));
// We do our own padding so we must have Final=FALSE so CAPI will not add in one
if (!CryptEncrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbSignature, &dwBytesEncrypt, cbSignature))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "EncryptData2:CryptEncrypt second buffer (blocklength) failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "EncryptData2: needed %lu bytes for encrypted buffer 2\n", dwBytesEncrypt));
}
}
goto CleanUp;
CleanUp:
if (pbBuff2)
{
DigestFreeMemory(pbBuff2);
pbBuff2 = NULL;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "EncryptData2: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
NTSTATUS
SEC_ENTRY
DecryptData(
IN HCRYPTKEY hKey,
IN ULONG cbData,
IN OUT UCHAR *pbData
)
{
ULONG cb = cbData;
ULONG cbTemp = 0;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE];
ULONG iTempLen = 20;
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
#endif
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DecryptData: Entering %lu bytes at 0x%x\n", cbData, pbData));
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
iTempLen = 20;
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
if (cbData < iTempLen)
{
iTempLen = cbData;
}
BinToHex(pbData, iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Encrypted Data bytes (%dof%d bytes) %s\n",
iTempLen, cbData, szTemp));
}
iTempLen = 20;
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
if (cbData < iTempLen)
{
iTempLen = cbData;
}
BinToHex((pbData + cbData - iTempLen), iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Encrypted end of buffer (%dof%d bytes) %s\n",
iTempLen, cbData, szTemp));
}
#endif
// import the simpleblob to get a handle to the symmetric key
if (!CryptDecrypt(hKey, 0, FALSE, 0, pbData, &cb))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DecryptData:CryptCreateHash() failed : 0x%x\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
#if DBG
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "DecryptData: Decrypted number of bytes %lu\n", cb));
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
iTempLen = 20;
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
if (cb < iTempLen)
{
iTempLen = cb;
}
BinToHex(pbData, iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Decrypted Data bytes (%dof%d bytes) %s\n",
iTempLen, cbData, szTemp));
}
iTempLen = 20;
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
if (cb < iTempLen)
{
iTempLen = cb;
}
BinToHex((pbData + cb - iTempLen), iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "DecryptData: Decrypted end of buffer (%dof%d bytes) %s\n",
iTempLen, cbData, szTemp));
}
#endif
CleanUp:
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "DecryptData: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
NTSTATUS
SEC_ENTRY
CalculateSASLHMAC(
IN PDIGEST_USERCONTEXT pContext,
IN BOOL fSign,
IN PSTRING pstrSignKeyConst,
IN DWORD dwSeqNum, // Sequence number to process
IN PBYTE pData, // location of data to HMAC
IN ULONG cbData, // How many bytes of data to process
OUT PSASL_MAC_BLOCK pMacBlock)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = NULL;
HCRYPTKEY hCryptKey = NULL;
HMAC_INFO hmacinfo;
BYTE bKiHashData[MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; // Message integrity keys RFC 2831 sec 2.3
DWORD cbKiHashData = 0; // Size of Message integrity keys
BYTE bHMACData[HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE];
DWORD cbHMACData = 0;
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE];
ULONG iTempLen = 20;
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
#endif
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Entering\n"));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Processing %d bytes in data block\n", cbData));
// Clear the output
ZeroMemory(pMacBlock, sizeof(SASL_MAC_BLOCK));
// Initialize local variables
ZeroMemory(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
ZeroMemory(bHMACData, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
ZeroMemory(&hmacinfo, sizeof(HMAC_INFO));
// Always do an integrety calculation on the input data
// We should have clear text data at this stage
if (!dwSeqNum)
{
if ( !CryptCreateHash( g_hCryptProv,
CALG_MD5,
0,
0,
&hHash ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: CryptCreateHash failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash,
(const unsigned char *)pContext->bSessionKey,
MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
if (pstrSignKeyConst->Length)
{
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash,
(const unsigned char *)pstrSignKeyConst->Buffer,
pstrSignKeyConst->Length,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
}
cbKiHashData = MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE;
if ( !CryptGetHashParam( hHash,
HP_HASHVAL,
bKiHashData,
&cbKiHashData,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: CryptGetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
CryptDestroyHash( hHash );
hHash = NULL;
ASSERT(cbKiHashData == MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
// save the key for later sign/verify use
if (fSign == TRUE)
{
memcpy(pContext->bKiSignHashData, bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
}
else
{
memcpy(pContext->bKiVerifyHashData, bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
}
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Calculated Ki hash is %s\n", szTemp));
}
#endif
}
else
{
// retrieve it from the saved context info
if (fSign == TRUE)
{
memcpy(bKiHashData, pContext->bKiSignHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
}
else
{
memcpy(bKiHashData, pContext->bKiVerifyHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
}
cbKiHashData = MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE;
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(bKiHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Ki retrieved from context is %s\n", szTemp));
}
#endif
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Ready to start the HMAC calculation\n"));
// We now have Kic or Kis depending on if we are running as server or client
// Now calculate the SASL_MAC_BLOCK structure to compare or set for message
pMacBlock->wMsgType = htons(1);
pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber = htonl(dwSeqNum);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: SeqNumber is %ld\n", dwSeqNum));
// Need to create the symmetric key from the cleartext shared secret
// Specified CALC_RC4 since we need to provide a valid encrypt type for import key
// not actually utilized when we do the HMAC which is simply a hash function
Status = CreateSymmetricKey(CALG_RC4, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, bKiHashData, NULL, &hCryptKey);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Error in CreateSymmetricKey Status 0x%x\n", Status));
goto CleanUp;
}
if ( !CryptCreateHash( g_hCryptProv,
CALG_HMAC,
hCryptKey,
0,
&hHash ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptCreateHash failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
hmacinfo.HashAlgid = CALG_MD5; // Use MD5 as the hashing function for the HMAC
hmacinfo.cbOuterString = 0; // use default 64 byte outerstring
hmacinfo.cbInnerString = 0; // use default 64 byte innerstring
if ( !CryptSetHashParam( hHash,
HP_HMAC_INFO,
(PBYTE)&hmacinfo,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptSetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
// Prepend SeqNum to the data stream to perform HMAC on
// Need to form the network order version first
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)&pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber, sizeof(DWORD), szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC component SeqNum %s\n", szTemp));
}
#endif
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash,
(const unsigned char *)&pMacBlock->dwSeqNumber,
sizeof(DWORD),
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
// Now HMAC the data to protect
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
if (cbData < iTempLen)
{
iTempLen = cbData;
}
BinToHex(pData, iTempLen, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC component Data (%dof%d bytes) %s\n",
iTempLen, cbData, szTemp));
}
#endif
if (cbData)
{
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash,
pData,
cbData,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
}
cbHMACData = HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE;
if ( !CryptGetHashParam( hHash,
HP_HASHVAL,
bHMACData,
&cbHMACData,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC CryptGetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC hash length %d bytes\n", cbHMACData));
ASSERT(cbHMACData == HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
CryptDestroyKey( hCryptKey );
hCryptKey = NULL;
CryptDestroyHash( hHash );
hHash = NULL;
// We now have the HMAC so form up the MAC block for SASL
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
if (cbHMACData != HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE)
{
// This should never happen
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC-MD5 result length incorrect\n"));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(bHMACData, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC-MD5 is %s\n", szTemp));
#endif
memcpy(pMacBlock->hmacMD5, bHMACData, SASL_MAC_HMAC_SIZE);
#if DBG
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex((PUCHAR)pMacBlock, HMAC_MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateSASLHMAC: HMAC-MD5 block is %s\n", szTemp));
#endif
CleanUp:
// Release Key resources
if (hCryptKey)
{
CryptDestroyKey( hCryptKey );
hCryptKey = NULL;
}
// Release Hash resources
if (hHash)
{
CryptDestroyHash( hHash );
hHash = NULL;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateSASLHMAC: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
NTSTATUS
SEC_ENTRY
CalculateKc(
IN PBYTE pbSessionKey,
IN USHORT cbHA1n,
IN PSTRING pstrSealKeyConst,
IN PBYTE pHashData) // MD5 hash for Kc
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = NULL;
DWORD cbKcHashData = 0; // Size of Message integrity keys
ASSERT(cbHA1n <= MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
ASSERT(cbHA1n > 0);
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE];
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pbSessionKey, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: Entering\n"));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: Binary SessionKey %s\n", szTemp));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: cbHA1n %d\n", cbHA1n));
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: SealKeyConst %Z\n", pstrSealKeyConst));
#endif
// Clear the output
ZeroMemory(pHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
// Kc = MD5( {H(A1)[0...cbHA1n], ConstantString}) take only the first cbHA1n bytes of H(A1)
if ( !CryptCreateHash( g_hCryptProv,
CALG_MD5,
0,
0,
&hHash ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateKc: CryptCreateHash failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash,
(const unsigned char *)pbSessionKey,
cbHA1n,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateKc: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
if (pstrSealKeyConst->Length)
{
if ( !CryptHashData( hHash,
(const unsigned char *)pstrSealKeyConst->Buffer,
pstrSealKeyConst->Length,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateKc: CryptHashData failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
}
cbKcHashData = MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE;
if ( !CryptGetHashParam( hHash,
HP_HASHVAL,
pHashData,
&cbKcHashData,
0 ) )
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "CalculateKc: CryptGetHashParam failed : 0x%lx\n", GetLastError()));
Status = STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED;
goto CleanUp;
}
CryptDestroyHash( hHash );
hHash = NULL;
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateKc: readback hash with %d bytes\n", cbKcHashData));
#if DBG
// Now convert the Hash to Hex - for TESTING ONLY
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pHashData, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE, szTemp);
if (szTemp)
{
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "CalculateKc: Kc hash is %s\n", szTemp));
}
#endif
CleanUp:
// Release Hash resources
if (hHash)
{
CryptDestroyHash( hHash );
hHash = NULL;
}
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE_FUNC, "CalculateKc: Leaving status 0x%x\n", Status));
return(Status);
}
BYTE DESParityTable[] = {0x00,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x02,0x03,
0x01,0x02,0x02,0x03,0x02,0x03,0x03,0x04};
//
// set the parity on the DES key - ODD parity
// NOTE : must be called before deskey
// key must be cbKey number of bytes
// routine from RSA lib
//
void
SetDESParity(
PBYTE pbKey,
DWORD cbKey
)
{
DWORD i;
for (i=0;i<cbKey;i++)
{
if (!((DESParityTable[pbKey[i]>>4] + DESParityTable[pbKey[i]&0x0F]) % 2))
pbKey[i] = pbKey[i] ^ 0x01;
}
}
//+-------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Function: addDESParity
//
// Synopsis: This routine is called for DES plaintext keys to add in Odd parity bits
// Input of 7 bytes will be expanded to 8bytes with parity
// Input of 14 bytes will be expanded to 14 bytes
//
// Effects: no global effect.
//
// Arguments:
//
// IN pbSrckey -- buffer with key to expand
// IN cbKey -- size of input non-parity expanded key
// OUT pbOutputkey -- buffer with key to expand
//
// Requires: no global requirements
//
// Returns: STATUS_SUCCESS, or resource error
//
// Notes:
//
//
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSTATUS
AddDESParity(
IN PBYTE pbSrcKey,
IN DWORD cbSrcKey,
OUT PBYTE pbDstKey,
OUT PDWORD pcbDstKey
)
{
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
BYTE bKiHashData[MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE]; // Message integrity keys RFC 2831 sec 2.3
ASSERT(pbSrcKey);
ASSERT(pbDstKey);
ASSERT(pcbDstKey);
ZeroMemory(pbDstKey, MD5_HASH_BYTESIZE);
if ((cbSrcKey != 7) && (cbSrcKey != 14))
{
DebugLog((DEB_ERROR, "AddDESParity: wrong input size buffer\n"));
Status = STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto CleanUp;
}
pbDstKey[0] = pbSrcKey[0];
pbDstKey[1] = (pbSrcKey[1] >> 1) | ((pbSrcKey[0] & 0x01) << 7);
pbDstKey[2] = (pbSrcKey[2] >> 2) | ((pbSrcKey[1] & 0x03) << 6);
pbDstKey[3] = (pbSrcKey[3] >> 3) | ((pbSrcKey[2] & 0x07) << 5);
pbDstKey[4] = (pbSrcKey[4] >> 4) | ((pbSrcKey[3] & 0x0F) << 4);
pbDstKey[5] = (pbSrcKey[5] >> 5) | ((pbSrcKey[4] & 0x1F) << 3);
pbDstKey[6] = (pbSrcKey[6] >> 6) | ((pbSrcKey[5] & 0x3F) << 2);
pbDstKey[7] = (pbSrcKey[6] << 1);
SetDESParity(pbDstKey, 8);
*pcbDstKey = 8;
// Now check if need to expand the 14 bytes into the full 16 byte buffer
if (cbSrcKey == 14)
{
pbDstKey[0 + 8] = pbSrcKey[0 + 7];
pbDstKey[1 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[1 + 7] >> 1) | ((pbSrcKey[0 + 7] & 0x01) << 7);
pbDstKey[2 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[2 + 7] >> 2) | ((pbSrcKey[1 + 7] & 0x03) << 6);
pbDstKey[3 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[3 + 7] >> 3) | ((pbSrcKey[2 + 7] & 0x07) << 5);
pbDstKey[4 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[4 + 7] >> 4) | ((pbSrcKey[3 + 7] & 0x0F) << 4);
pbDstKey[5 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[5 + 7] >> 5) | ((pbSrcKey[4 + 7] & 0x1F) << 3);
pbDstKey[6 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[6 + 7] >> 6) | ((pbSrcKey[5 + 7] & 0x3F) << 2);
pbDstKey[7 + 8] = (pbSrcKey[6 + 7] << 1);
SetDESParity(pbDstKey + 8, 8);
*pcbDstKey = 16;
}
#if DBG
char szTemp[TEMPSIZE];
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pbSrcKey, (UINT)cbSrcKey, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "AddDESParity: Key no-parity : %s\n", szTemp));
ZeroMemory(szTemp, TEMPSIZE);
BinToHex(pbDstKey, (UINT)*pcbDstKey, szTemp);
DebugLog((DEB_TRACE, "AddDESParity: Key expanded with parity : %s\n", szTemp));
#endif
CleanUp:
return Status;
}
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