/* Copyright (c) 1993, Microsoft Corporation, all rights reserved ** ** raspap.h ** Remote Access PPP Password Authentication Protocol ** ** 11/05/93 Steve Cobb */ #ifndef _RASPAP_H_ #define _RASPAP_H_ //General macros #define GEN_RAND_ENCODE_SEED ((CHAR) ( 1 + rand() % 250 )) /* PAP packet codes from PAP spec. */ #define PAPCODE_Req 1 #define PAPCODE_Ack 2 #define PAPCODE_Nak 3 #define MAXPAPCODE 3 /* Returned by receive buffer parsing routines that discover the packet is ** corrupt, usually because the length fields don't make sense. */ #define ERRORBADPACKET (DWORD )-1 /* Defines states within the PAP protocol. */ #define PAPSTATE enum tagPAPSTATE PAPSTATE { PS_Initial, PS_RequestSent, PS_WaitForRequest, PS_WaitForAuthenticationToComplete, PS_Done }; /* Defines the WorkBuf stored for us by the PPP engine. */ #define PAPWB struct tagPAPWB PAPWB { /* True if role is server, false if client. */ BOOL fServer; /* The domain\username and password (applies to client only). */ CHAR szAccount[ DNLEN + 1 + UNLEN + 1 ]; CHAR szPassword[ PWLEN ]; /* The current state in the PAP protocol. */ PAPSTATE state; /* Last sequencing ID sent on this port. Incremented for each ** Authenticate-Req packet sent. Client side only. */ BYTE bIdSent; HPORT hPort; /* Id of the last Authenticate-Req packet received on this port. ** Server side only. */ BYTE bLastIdReceived; // // Used to get information to send to back-end server. // RAS_AUTH_ATTRIBUTE * pUserAttributes; /* The final result, used to duplicate the original response for all ** subsequent Authenticate-Req packets. This is per PAP spec to cover ** lost Ack/Nak case without allowing malicious client to discover ** alternative identities under the covers during a connection. (applies ** to server only) */ PPPAP_RESULT result; CHAR chSeed; //Used to encode password. Strange. We //send password cleartext on the line //and encode it in the program... }; /* Prototypes. */ DWORD CheckCredentials( CHAR*, CHAR*, CHAR*, DWORD*, BOOL*, CHAR*, BYTE*, CHAR*, HANDLE* ); DWORD PapCMakeMessage( PAPWB*, PPP_CONFIG*, PPP_CONFIG*, DWORD, PPPAP_RESULT* ); DWORD GetCredentialsFromRequest( PPP_CONFIG*, CHAR*, CHAR* ); DWORD GetErrorFromNak( PPP_CONFIG* ); VOID PapMakeRequestMessage( PAPWB*, PPP_CONFIG*, DWORD ); VOID PapMakeResultMessage( DWORD, BYTE, PPP_CONFIG*, DWORD, RAS_AUTH_ATTRIBUTE* ); DWORD PapBegin( VOID**, VOID* ); DWORD PapEnd( VOID* ); DWORD PapMakeMessage( VOID*, PPP_CONFIG*, PPP_CONFIG*, DWORD, PPPAP_RESULT*, PPPAP_INPUT* pInput ); VOID PapExtractMessage(PPP_CONFIG*, PPPAP_RESULT*); DWORD PapSMakeMessage( PAPWB*, PPP_CONFIG*, PPP_CONFIG*, DWORD, PPPAP_INPUT* pInput, PPPAP_RESULT* ); /* Globals. */ #ifdef RASPAPGLOBALS #define GLOBALS #define EXTERN #else #define EXTERN extern #endif /* Next packet identifier to assign. Unlike CPs, APs must handle updating ** this sequence number themselves because the engine can't make as many ** assumptions about the protocol. It is stored global to all ports and ** authentication sessions to make it less likely that an ID will be used in ** sequential authentication sessions. Not to be confused with the 'bIdSent' ** updated on a per-port basis and used for matching. */ EXTERN BYTE BNextIdPap #ifdef GLOBALS = 0 #endif ; /* This value indicates whether or not to follow strict sequencing as defined ** in the PPP RFC for PAP. The RFC says that the PAP client MUST increase the ** sequence number for every new CONFIG_REQ packet sent out. However this ** causes problems with slow servers. See bug # 22508. Default is FALSE. */ EXTERN BOOL fFollowStrictSequencing #ifdef GLOBALS = FALSE #endif ; EXTERN DWORD g_dwTraceIdPap #ifdef GLOBALS = INVALID_TRACEID; #endif ; #undef EXTERN #undef GLOBALS #endif // _RASPAP_H_