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windows-nt/Source/XPSP1/NT/base/ntos/se/tokendup.c
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/*++
Copyright (c) 1989 Microsoft Corporation
Module Name:
tokendup.c
Abstract:
This module implements the token duplication service.
Author:
Jim Kelly (JimK) 5-April-1990
Environment:
Kernel mode only.
Revision History:
--*/
//#ifndef TOKEN_DEBUG
//#define TOKEN_DEBUG
//#endif
#include "pch.h"
#pragma hdrstop
#ifdef ALLOC_PRAGMA
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,NtDuplicateToken)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepDuplicateToken)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepMakeTokenEffectiveOnly)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepSidInSidAndAttributes)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepRemoveDisabledGroupsAndPrivileges)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeCopyClientToken)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,NtFilterToken)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeFilterToken)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SeFastFilterToken)
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE,SepFilterToken)
#endif
NTSTATUS
NtDuplicateToken(
IN HANDLE ExistingTokenHandle,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
IN BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly,
IN TOKEN_TYPE TokenType,
OUT PHANDLE NewTokenHandle
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Create a new token that is a duplicate of an existing token.
Arguments:
ExistingTokenHandle - Is a handle to a token already open for
TOKEN_DUPLICATE access.
DesiredAccess - Is an access mask indicating which access types
are desired to the newly created token. If specified as zero,
the granted access mask of the existing token handle
is used as the desired access mask for the new token.
ObjectAttributes - Points to the standard object attributes data
structure. Refer to the NT Object Management
Specification for a description of this data structure.
If the new token type is TokenImpersonation, then this
parameter may be used to specify the impersonation level
of the new token. If no value is provided, and the source
token is an impersonation token, then the impersonation level
of the source will become that of the target as well. If the
source token is a primary token, then an impersonation level
must be explicitly provided.
If the token being duplicated is an impersonation token, and
an impersonation level is explicitly provided for the target,
then the value provided must not be greater than that of the
source token. For example, an Identification level token can
not be duplicated to produce a Delegation level token.
EffectiveOnly - Is a boolean flag indicating whether the entire
source token should be duplicated into the target token or
just the effective (currently enabled) part of the token.
This provides a means for a caller of a protected subsystem
to limit which privileges and optional groups are made
available to the protected subsystem. A value of TRUE
indicates only the currently enabled parts of the source
token are to be duplicated. Otherwise, the entire source
token is duplicated.
TokenType - Indicates which type of object the new object is to
be created as (primary or impersonation). If you are duplicating
an Impersonation token to produce a Primary token, then
the Impersonation token must have an impersonation level of
either DELEGATE or IMPERSONATE.
NewTokenHandle - Receives the handle of the newly created token.
Return Value:
STATUS_SUCCESS - Indicates the operation was successful.
STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - Indicates one or more of the parameter values
was invalid. This value is returned if the target token is not
an impersonation token.
STATUS_BAD_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL - Indicates the impersonation level
requested for the duplicate token is not compatible with the
level of the source token. The duplicate token may not be assigned
a level greater than that of the source token.
--*/
{
PTOKEN Token;
PTOKEN NewToken;
KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode;
NTSTATUS Status;
SECURITY_ADVANCED_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE SecurityQos;
BOOLEAN SecurityQosPresent = FALSE;
HANDLE LocalHandle = NULL;
OBJECT_HANDLE_INFORMATION HandleInformation;
ACCESS_MASK EffectiveDesiredAccess;
PAGED_CODE();
PreviousMode = KeGetPreviousMode();
//
// Probe parameters
//
if (PreviousMode != KernelMode) {
try {
//
// Make sure the TokenType is valid
//
if ( (TokenType < TokenPrimary) || (TokenType > TokenImpersonation) ) {
return(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
//
// Make sure we can write the handle
//
ProbeForWriteHandle(NewTokenHandle);
} except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
return GetExceptionCode();
} // end_try
} //end_if
Status = SeCaptureSecurityQos(
ObjectAttributes,
PreviousMode,
&SecurityQosPresent,
&SecurityQos
);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
return Status;
}
//
// Check the handle's access to the existing token and get
// a pointer to that token. Pick up the default desired
// access mask from the handle while we're at it.
//
Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(
ExistingTokenHandle, // Handle
TOKEN_DUPLICATE, // DesiredAccess
SeTokenObjectType, // ObjectType
PreviousMode, // AccessMode
(PVOID *)&Token, // Object
&HandleInformation // GrantedAccess
);
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
if (SecurityQosPresent) {
SeFreeCapturedSecurityQos( &SecurityQos );
}
return Status;
}
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Debug
SepAcquireTokenReadLock( Token );
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("Token being duplicated: \n");
SepDumpToken( Token );
SepReleaseTokenReadLock( Token );
// Debug
//
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif //TOKEN_DEBUG
//
// Check to see if an alternate desired access mask was provided.
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT((PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)DesiredAccess)) {
EffectiveDesiredAccess = DesiredAccess;
} else {
EffectiveDesiredAccess = HandleInformation.GrantedAccess;
}
//
// If no impersonation level was specified, pick one up from
// the source token.
//
if ( !SecurityQosPresent ) {
SecurityQos.ImpersonationLevel = Token->ImpersonationLevel;
}
if (Token->TokenType == TokenImpersonation) {
//
// Make sure a legitimate transformation is being requested:
//
// (1) The impersonation level of a target duplicate must not
// exceed that of the source token.
//
//
ASSERT( SecurityDelegation > SecurityImpersonation );
ASSERT( SecurityImpersonation > SecurityIdentification );
ASSERT( SecurityIdentification > SecurityAnonymous );
if ( (SecurityQos.ImpersonationLevel > Token->ImpersonationLevel) ) {
ObDereferenceObject( (PVOID)Token );
if (SecurityQosPresent) {
SeFreeCapturedSecurityQos( &SecurityQos );
}
return STATUS_BAD_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL;
}
}
//
// If we are producing a Primary token from an impersonation
// token, then specify an impersonation level of at least
// Impersonate.
//
if ( (Token->TokenType == TokenImpersonation) &&
(TokenType == TokenPrimary) &&
(Token->ImpersonationLevel < SecurityImpersonation)
) {
ObDereferenceObject( (PVOID)Token );
if (SecurityQosPresent) {
SeFreeCapturedSecurityQos( &SecurityQos );
}
return STATUS_BAD_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL;
}
//
// Duplicate the existing token
//
NewToken = NULL;
Status = SepDuplicateToken(
Token,
ObjectAttributes,
EffectiveOnly,
TokenType,
SecurityQos.ImpersonationLevel,
PreviousMode,
&NewToken
);
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
//
// Insert the new token
//
Status = ObInsertObject( NewToken,
NULL,
EffectiveDesiredAccess,
0,
(PVOID *)NULL,
&LocalHandle
);
if (!NT_SUCCESS( Status )) {
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
DbgPrint( "SE: ObInsertObject failed (%x) for token at %x\n", Status, NewToken );
#endif
}
} else
if (NewToken != NULL) {
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
DbgPrint( "SE: SepDuplicateToken failed (%x) but allocated token at %x\n", Status, NewToken );
#endif
}
//
// We no longer need our reference to the source token
//
ObDereferenceObject( (PVOID)Token );
if (SecurityQosPresent) {
SeFreeCapturedSecurityQos( &SecurityQos );
}
//
// Return the new handle
//
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
try {
*NewTokenHandle = LocalHandle;
} except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
return GetExceptionCode();
}
}
return Status;
}
NTSTATUS
SepDuplicateToken(
IN PTOKEN ExistingToken,
IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
IN BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly,
IN TOKEN_TYPE TokenType,
IN SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel OPTIONAL,
IN KPROCESSOR_MODE RequestorMode,
OUT PTOKEN *DuplicateToken
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine does the bulk of the work to actually duplicate
a token. This routine assumes all access validation and argument
probing (except the ObjectAttributes) has been performed.
THE CALLER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CHECKING SUBJECT RIGHTS TO CREATE THE
TYPE OF TOKEN BEING CREATED.
This routine acquires a read lock on the token being duplicated.
Arguments:
ExistingToken - Points to the token to be duplicated.
ObjectAttributes - Points to the standard object attributes data
structure. Refer to the NT Object Management
Specification for a description of this data structure.
The security Quality Of Service of the object attributes are ignored.
This information must be specified using parameters to this
routine.
EffectiveOnly - Is a boolean flag indicating whether the entire
source token should be duplicated into the target token or
just the effective (currently enabled) part of the token.
This provides a means for a caller of a protected subsystem
to limit which privileges and optional groups are made
available to the protected subsystem. A value of TRUE
indicates only the currently enabled parts of the source
token are to be duplicated. Otherwise, the entire source
token is duplicated.
TokenType - Indicates the type of token to make the duplicate token.
ImpersonationLevel - This value specifies the impersonation level
to assign to the duplicate token. If the TokenType of the
duplicate is not TokenImpersonation then this parameter is
ignored. Otherwise, it is must be provided.
RequestorMode - Mode of client requesting the token be duplicated.
DuplicateToken - Receives a pointer to the duplicate token.
The token has not yet been inserted into any object table.
No exceptions are expected when tring to set this OUT value.
Return Value:
STATUS_SUCCESS - The service successfully completed the requested
operation.
--*/
{
NTSTATUS Status;
PTOKEN NewToken;
PULONG DynamicPart;
ULONG PagedPoolSize;
ULONG NonPagedPoolSize;
ULONG TokenBodyLength;
ULONG FieldOffset;
ULONG DynamicSize;
ULONG Index;
PSECURITY_TOKEN_PROXY_DATA NewProxyData = NULL;
PSECURITY_TOKEN_AUDIT_DATA NewAuditData = NULL;
PERESOURCE TokenLock;
#if DBG || TOKEN_LEAK_MONITOR
ULONG Frames;
#endif
PAGED_CODE();
ASSERT( sizeof(SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL) <= sizeof(ULONG) );
if ( TokenType == TokenImpersonation ) {
ASSERT( SecurityDelegation > SecurityImpersonation );
ASSERT( SecurityImpersonation > SecurityIdentification );
ASSERT( SecurityIdentification > SecurityAnonymous );
if ( (ImpersonationLevel > SecurityDelegation) ||
(ImpersonationLevel < SecurityAnonymous) ) {
return STATUS_BAD_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL;
}
}
//
// Increment the reference count for this logon session
// This can not fail, since there is already a token in this logon
// session.
//
Status = SepReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
ASSERT( NT_SUCCESS(Status) );
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->ProxyData)) {
Status = SepCopyProxyData(
&NewProxyData,
ExistingToken->ProxyData
);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
SepDeReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
return( Status );
}
} else {
NewProxyData = NULL;
}
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ExistingToken->AuditData )) {
NewAuditData = ExAllocatePool( PagedPool, sizeof( SECURITY_TOKEN_AUDIT_DATA ));
if (NewAuditData == NULL) {
SepFreeProxyData( NewProxyData );
SepDeReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
return( STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES );
} else {
*NewAuditData = *(ExistingToken->AuditData);
}
} else {
NewAuditData = NULL;
}
TokenLock = (PERESOURCE)ExAllocatePoolWithTag( NonPagedPool, sizeof( ERESOURCE ), 'dTeS' );
if (TokenLock == NULL) {
if (NewAuditData != NULL) {
ExFreePool( NewAuditData );
}
SepFreeProxyData( NewProxyData );
SepDeReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
return( STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES );
}
//
// Create a new object
//
TokenBodyLength = FIELD_OFFSET(TOKEN, VariablePart) +
ExistingToken->VariableLength;
NonPagedPoolSize = TokenBodyLength;
PagedPoolSize = ExistingToken->DynamicCharged;
Status = ObCreateObject(
RequestorMode, // ProbeMode
SeTokenObjectType, // ObjectType
ObjectAttributes, // ObjectAttributes
RequestorMode, // OwnershipMode
NULL, // ParseContext
TokenBodyLength, // ObjectBodySize
PagedPoolSize, // PagedPoolCharge
NonPagedPoolSize, // NonPagedPoolCharge
(PVOID *)&NewToken // Return pointer to object
);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
SepDeReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
SepFreeProxyData( NewProxyData );
ExFreePool( TokenLock );
if (NewAuditData != NULL) {
ExFreePool( NewAuditData );
}
return Status;
}
//
// The following fields differ in the new token and can be filled out without the lock.
//
ExAllocateLocallyUniqueId( &(NewToken->TokenId) );
NewToken->TokenInUse = FALSE;
NewToken->TokenType = TokenType;
NewToken->ImpersonationLevel = ImpersonationLevel;
NewToken->TokenLock = TokenLock;
ExInitializeResourceLite( NewToken->TokenLock );
//
// acquire exclusive access to the source token
//
SepAcquireTokenReadLock( ExistingToken );
//
// Main Body initialization
//
//
// The following fields are unchanged from the source token.
// Although some may change if EffectiveOnly has been specified.
//
NewToken->AuthenticationId = ExistingToken->AuthenticationId;
NewToken->ModifiedId = ExistingToken->ModifiedId;
NewToken->ExpirationTime = ExistingToken->ExpirationTime;
NewToken->TokenSource = ExistingToken->TokenSource;
NewToken->DynamicCharged = ExistingToken->DynamicCharged;
NewToken->DynamicAvailable = 0;
NewToken->DefaultOwnerIndex = ExistingToken->DefaultOwnerIndex;
NewToken->UserAndGroupCount = ExistingToken->UserAndGroupCount;
NewToken->RestrictedSidCount = ExistingToken->RestrictedSidCount;
NewToken->PrivilegeCount = ExistingToken->PrivilegeCount;
NewToken->VariableLength = ExistingToken->VariableLength;
NewToken->TokenFlags = ExistingToken->TokenFlags & ~TOKEN_SESSION_NOT_REFERENCED;
NewToken->ProxyData = NewProxyData;
NewToken->AuditData = NewAuditData;
NewToken->SessionId = ExistingToken->SessionId;
NewToken->ParentTokenId = ExistingToken->ParentTokenId;
#if DBG || TOKEN_LEAK_MONITOR
NewToken->ProcessCid = PsGetCurrentThread()->Cid.UniqueProcess;
NewToken->ThreadCid = PsGetCurrentThread()->Cid.UniqueThread;
NewToken->CreateMethod = 0xD; // Duplicate
RtlCopyMemory(
NewToken->ImageFileName,
PsGetCurrentProcess()->ImageFileName,
min(sizeof(NewToken->ImageFileName), sizeof(PsGetCurrentProcess()->ImageFileName))
);
Frames = RtlWalkFrameChain(
(PVOID)NewToken->CreateTrace,
TRACE_SIZE,
0
);
if (KeGetCurrentIrql() < DISPATCH_LEVEL) {
RtlWalkFrameChain(
(PVOID)&NewToken->CreateTrace[Frames],
TRACE_SIZE - Frames,
1
);
}
SepAddTokenLogonSession(NewToken);
#endif
//
// Copy and initialize the variable part.
// The variable part is assumed to be position independent.
//
RtlCopyMemory( (PVOID)&(NewToken->VariablePart),
(PVOID)&(ExistingToken->VariablePart),
ExistingToken->VariableLength
);
//
// Set the address of the UserAndGroups array.
//
ASSERT( ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->UserAndGroups ) );
ASSERT( (ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->UserAndGroups) >=
(ULONG_PTR)(&(ExistingToken->VariablePart)) );
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->UserAndGroups) -
(ULONG_PTR)(&(ExistingToken->VariablePart)));
NewToken->UserAndGroups =
(PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)(FieldOffset + (ULONG_PTR)(&(NewToken->VariablePart)));
//
// Now go through and change the address of each SID pointer
// for the user and groups
//
Index = 0;
while (Index < ExistingToken->UserAndGroupCount) {
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->UserAndGroups[Index].Sid) -
(ULONG_PTR)(&(ExistingToken->VariablePart)));
NewToken->UserAndGroups[Index].Sid =
(PSID)( FieldOffset + (ULONG_PTR)(&(NewToken->VariablePart)) );
Index += 1;
}
//
// Set the address of the RestrictedSids array.
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->RestrictedSids ) ) {
ASSERT( (ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->RestrictedSids) >=
(ULONG_PTR)(&(ExistingToken->VariablePart)) );
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->RestrictedSids) -
(ULONG_PTR)(&(ExistingToken->VariablePart)));
NewToken->RestrictedSids =
(PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)(FieldOffset + (ULONG_PTR)(&(NewToken->VariablePart)) );
//
// Now go through and change the address of each SID pointer
// for the user and groups
//
Index = 0;
while (Index < ExistingToken->RestrictedSidCount) {
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->RestrictedSids[Index].Sid) -
(ULONG_PTR)(&(ExistingToken->VariablePart)));
NewToken->RestrictedSids[Index].Sid =
(PSID)( FieldOffset + (ULONG_PTR)(&(NewToken->VariablePart)) );
Index += 1;
}
} else {
NewToken->RestrictedSids = NULL;
}
//
// If present, set the address of the privileges
//
if (ExistingToken->PrivilegeCount > 0) {
ASSERT( ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->Privileges ) );
ASSERT( (ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->Privileges) >=
(ULONG_PTR)(&(ExistingToken->VariablePart)) );
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->Privileges) -
(ULONG_PTR)(&(ExistingToken->VariablePart)));
NewToken->Privileges = (PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)(
FieldOffset +
(ULONG_PTR)(&(NewToken->VariablePart))
);
} else {
NewToken->Privileges = NULL;
}
//
// Allocate the dynamic portion
//
DynamicSize = SeLengthSid( ExistingToken->PrimaryGroup );
if (ExistingToken->DefaultDacl) {
DynamicSize += ExistingToken->DefaultDacl->AclSize;
}
DynamicPart = (PULONG)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(
PagedPool,
DynamicSize,
'dTeS'
);
NewToken->DynamicPart = DynamicPart;
if (DynamicPart == NULL) {
SepReleaseTokenReadLock( ExistingToken );
ObDereferenceObject (NewToken);
return( STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES );
}
//
// Copy and initialize the dynamic part.
// The dynamic part is assumed to be position independent.
//
RtlCopyMemory( (PVOID)DynamicPart,
(PVOID)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart),
DynamicSize
);
//
// If present, set the address of the default Dacl
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->DefaultDacl)) {
ASSERT( (ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DefaultDacl) >=
(ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart) );
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DefaultDacl) -
(ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart));
NewToken->DefaultDacl = (PACL)(FieldOffset + (ULONG_PTR)DynamicPart);
} else {
NewToken->DefaultDacl = NULL;
}
//
// Set the address of the primary group
//
ASSERT(ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->PrimaryGroup));
ASSERT( (ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->PrimaryGroup) >=
(ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart) );
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->PrimaryGroup) -
(ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart));
//
// Release the source token.
//
SepReleaseTokenReadLock( ExistingToken );
NewToken->PrimaryGroup = (PACL)(FieldOffset + (ULONG_PTR)(DynamicPart));
//
// For the time being, take the easy way to generating an "EffectiveOnly"
// duplicate. That is, use the same space required of the original, just
// eliminate any IDs or privileges not active.
//
// Ultimately, if duplication becomes a common operation, then it will be
// worthwhile to recalculate the actual space needed and copy only the
// effective IDs/privileges into the new token.
//
if (EffectiveOnly) {
SepMakeTokenEffectiveOnly( NewToken );
}
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Debug
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("Duplicate token:\n");
SepDumpToken( NewToken );
// Debug
//
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif //TOKEN_DEBUG
(*DuplicateToken) = NewToken;
return Status;
}
VOID
SepMakeTokenEffectiveOnly(
IN PTOKEN Token
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine eliminates all but the effective groups and privileges from
a token. It does this by moving elements of the SID and privileges arrays
to overwrite lapsed IDs/privileges, and then reducing the array element
counts. This results in wasted memory within the token object.
One side effect of this routine is that a token that initially had a
default owner ID corresponding to a lapsed group will be changed so
that the default owner ID is the user ID.
THIS ROUTINE MUST BE CALLED ONLY AS PART OF TOKEN CREATION (FOR TOKENS
WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN INSERTED INTO AN OBJECT TABLE.) THIS ROUTINE
MODIFIES READ ONLY TOKEN FIELDS.
Note that since we are operating on a token that is not yet visible
to the user, we do not bother acquiring a read lock on the token
being modified.
Arguments:
Token - Points to the token to be made effective only.
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
ULONG Index;
ULONG ElementCount;
PAGED_CODE();
//
// Walk the privilege array, discarding any lapsed privileges
//
ElementCount = Token->PrivilegeCount;
Index = 0;
while (Index < ElementCount) {
//
// If this privilege is not enabled, replace it with the one at
// the end of the array and reduce the size of the array by one.
// Otherwise, move on to the next entry in the array.
//
if ( !(SepTokenPrivilegeAttributes(Token,Index) & SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED)
) {
(Token->Privileges)[Index] =
(Token->Privileges)[ElementCount - 1];
ElementCount -= 1;
} else {
Index += 1;
}
} // endwhile
Token->PrivilegeCount = ElementCount;
//
// Walk the UserAndGroups array (except for the first entry, which is
// the user - and can't be disabled) discarding any lapsed groups.
//
ElementCount = Token->UserAndGroupCount;
ASSERT( ElementCount >= 1 ); // Must be at least a user ID
Index = 1; // Start at the first group, not the user ID.
while (Index < ElementCount) {
//
// If this group is not enabled, replace it with the one at
// the end of the array and reduce the size of the array by one.
//
if ( !(SepTokenGroupAttributes(Token, Index) & SE_GROUP_ENABLED) &&
!(SepTokenGroupAttributes(Token, Index) & SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY) ) {
//
// Reset the TOKEN_HAS_ADMIN_GROUP flag
//
if (RtlEqualSid(
Token->UserAndGroups[Index].Sid,
SeAliasAdminsSid
)) {
Token->TokenFlags &= ~TOKEN_HAS_ADMIN_GROUP;
}
(Token->UserAndGroups)[Index] =
(Token->UserAndGroups)[ElementCount - 1];
ElementCount -= 1;
} else {
Index += 1;
}
} // endwhile
Token->UserAndGroupCount = ElementCount;
return;
}
BOOLEAN
SepSidInSidAndAttributes (
IN PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES SidAndAttributes,
IN ULONG SidCount,
IN PSID PrincipalSelfSid,
IN PSID Sid
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Checks to see if a given SID is in the given token.
N.B. The code to compute the length of a SID and test for equality
is duplicated from the security runtime since this is such a
frequently used routine.
Arguments:
SidAndAttributes - Pointer to the sid and attributes to be examined
PrincipalSelfSid - If the object being access checked is an object which
represents a principal (e.g., a user object), this parameter should
be the SID of the object. Any ACE containing the constant
PRINCIPAL_SELF_SID is replaced by this SID.
The parameter should be NULL if the object does not represent a principal.
Sid - Pointer to the SID of interest
Return Value:
A value of TRUE indicates that the SID is in the token, FALSE
otherwise.
--*/
{
ULONG i;
PISID MatchSid;
ULONG SidLength;
PTOKEN Token;
PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES TokenSid;
ULONG UserAndGroupCount;
PAGED_CODE();
if (!ARGUMENT_PRESENT( SidAndAttributes ) ) {
return(FALSE);
}
//
// If Sid is the constant PrincipalSelfSid,
// replace it with the passed in PrincipalSelfSid.
//
if ( PrincipalSelfSid != NULL &&
RtlEqualSid( SePrincipalSelfSid, Sid ) ) {
Sid = PrincipalSelfSid;
}
//
// Get the length of the source SID since this only needs to be computed
// once.
//
SidLength = 8 + (4 * ((PISID)Sid)->SubAuthorityCount);
//
// Get address of user/group array and number of user/groups.
//
TokenSid = SidAndAttributes;
UserAndGroupCount = SidCount;
//
// Scan through the user/groups and attempt to find a match with the
// specified SID.
//
for (i = 0 ; i < UserAndGroupCount ; i += 1) {
MatchSid = (PISID)TokenSid->Sid;
//
// If the SID revision and length matches, then compare the SIDs
// for equality.
//
if ((((PISID)Sid)->Revision == MatchSid->Revision) &&
(SidLength == (8 + (4 * (ULONG)MatchSid->SubAuthorityCount)))) {
if (RtlEqualMemory(Sid, MatchSid, SidLength)) {
return TRUE;
}
}
TokenSid += 1;
}
return FALSE;
}
VOID
SepRemoveDisabledGroupsAndPrivileges(
IN PTOKEN Token,
IN ULONG Flags,
IN ULONG GroupCount,
IN PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES GroupsToDisable,
IN ULONG PrivilegeCount,
IN PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES PrivilegesToDelete
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine eliminates all groups and privileges that are marked
to be deleted/disabled. It does this by looping through the groups in
the token and checking each one agains the groups to disable. Similary
the privilegs are compared. It does this by moving elements of the SID and privileges arrays
to overwrite lapsed IDs/privileges, and then reducing the array element
counts. This results in wasted memory within the token object.
THIS ROUTINE MUST BE CALLED ONLY AS PART OF TOKEN CREATION (FOR TOKENS
WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN INSERTED INTO AN OBJECT TABLE.) THIS ROUTINE
MODIFIES READ ONLY TOKEN FIELDS.
Note that since we are operating on a token that is not yet visible
to the user, we do not bother acquiring a read lock on the token
being modified.
Arguments:
Token - Points to the token to be made effective only.
Flags - Flags indicating additional filtering. The flags may be:
DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE - Disable all privileges
GroupCount - Count of groups to be removed
GroupsToDisable - Groups to disable and mark with SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
PrivilegeCount - Count of privileges to remove
PrivilegesToDelete - List of privileges to remove
Return Value:
None.
--*/
{
ULONG Index;
ULONG Index2;
ULONG ElementCount;
BOOLEAN Found;
PAGED_CODE();
//
// Walk the privilege array, discarding any lapsed privileges
//
ElementCount = Token->PrivilegeCount;
Index = 0;
while (Index < ElementCount) {
//
// If the caller asked us to disable all privileges except change
// notify, do so now.
//
if (((Flags & DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE) != 0) &&
!RtlEqualLuid(
&Token->Privileges[Index].Luid,
&SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
)) {
(Token->Privileges)[Index] =
(Token->Privileges)[ElementCount - 1];
ElementCount -= 1;
} else {
//
// If this privilege is in the list of those to be removed, replace it
// with the one at the end of the array and reduce the size of the
// array by one. Otherwise, move on to the next entry in the array.
//
Found = FALSE;
for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < PrivilegeCount ; Index2++ ) {
if (RtlEqualLuid(
&Token->Privileges[Index].Luid,
&PrivilegesToDelete[Index2].Luid
)) {
(Token->Privileges)[Index] =
(Token->Privileges)[ElementCount - 1];
ElementCount -= 1;
//
// If this was SeChangeNotifyPrivilege, we need to turn off
// the TOKEN_HAS_TRAVERSE_PRIVILEGE in the token
//
if (RtlEqualLuid(
&PrivilegesToDelete[Index2].Luid,
&SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
)) {
Token->TokenFlags &= ~TOKEN_HAS_TRAVERSE_PRIVILEGE;
}
Found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (!Found) {
Index += 1;
}
}
} // endwhile
Token->PrivilegeCount = ElementCount;
//
// Walk the UserAndGroups array marking any disabled groups.
//
ElementCount = Token->UserAndGroupCount;
ASSERT( ElementCount >= 1 ); // Must be at least a user ID
Index = 0; // Start at the first group, not the user ID.
while (Index < ElementCount) {
//
// If this group is not enabled, replace it with the one at
// the end of the array and reduce the size of the array by one.
//
if ( SepSidInSidAndAttributes(
GroupsToDisable,
GroupCount,
NULL, // no principal self sid
Token->UserAndGroups[Index].Sid
)){
(Token->UserAndGroups)[Index].Attributes &= ~(SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
(Token->UserAndGroups)[Index].Attributes |= SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY;
//
// If this was the owner, reset the owner to be the user
//
if (Index == Token->DefaultOwnerIndex) {
Token->DefaultOwnerIndex = 0;
}
//
// If this is the admins sid, turn off the admin group flag
//
if (RtlEqualSid(
Token->UserAndGroups[Index].Sid,
SeAliasAdminsSid
)) {
Token->TokenFlags &= ~TOKEN_HAS_ADMIN_GROUP;
}
}
Index += 1;
} // endwhile
return;
}
NTSTATUS
SeCopyClientToken(
IN PACCESS_TOKEN ClientToken,
IN SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel,
IN KPROCESSOR_MODE RequestorMode,
OUT PACCESS_TOKEN *DuplicateToken
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine copies a client's token as part of establishing a client
context for impersonation.
The result will be an impersonation token.
No handles to the new token are established.
The token will be an exact duplicate of the source token. It is the
caller's responsibility to ensure an effective only copy of the token
is produced when the token is opened, if necessary.
Arguments:
ClientToken - Points to the token to be duplicated. This may be either
a primary or impersonation token.
ImpersonationLevel - The impersonation level to be assigned to the new
token.
RequestorMode - Mode to be assigned as the owner mode of the new token.
DuplicateToken - Receives a pointer to the duplicate token.
The token has not yet been inserted into any object table.
No exceptions are expected when tring to set this OUT value.
Return Value:
STATUS_SUCCESS - The service successfully completed the requested
operation.
--*/
{
NTSTATUS Status;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes;
PTOKEN NewToken;
PAGED_CODE();
InitializeObjectAttributes(
&ObjectAttributes,
NULL,
0,
NULL,
NULL
);
Status = SepDuplicateToken(
(PTOKEN)ClientToken, // ExistingToken
&ObjectAttributes, // ObjectAttributes
FALSE, // EffectiveOnly
TokenImpersonation, // TokenType (target)
ImpersonationLevel, // ImpersonationLevel
RequestorMode, // RequestorMode
&NewToken // DuplicateToken
);
if (NT_SUCCESS (Status)) {
//
// Insert the new token
//
Status = ObInsertObject( NewToken,
NULL,
0,
0,
NULL,
NULL
);
}
if (NT_SUCCESS (Status)) {
*DuplicateToken = (PACCESS_TOKEN)NewToken;
} else {
*DuplicateToken = NULL;
}
return Status;
}
NTSTATUS
NtFilterToken (
IN HANDLE ExistingTokenHandle,
IN ULONG Flags,
IN PTOKEN_GROUPS SidsToDisable OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES PrivilegesToDelete OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN_GROUPS RestrictedSids OPTIONAL,
OUT PHANDLE NewTokenHandle
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Create a new token that is a subset of an existing token.
Arguments:
ExistingTokenHandle - Is a handle to a token already open for
TOKEN_DUPLICATE access.
Flags - Flags indicating additional filtering. The flags may be:
DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE - Disable all privileges
SANDBOX_INERT - Record this SAIFER flag in the token.
SidsToDisable - Contains a list of sids and attributes. All sids with
the USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY attribute that also exist in the token will
cause the new token to have that sid set with the USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
attribte.
PrivilegesToDelete - Privileges in this list that are present in the
existing token will not exist in the final token. This is similar
to duplicating a token effective only with these privileges set to
disabled.
RestrictedSids - Contains a list of SIDs and attributes that will be
stored in the RestrictedSids field of the new token. These SIDs
are used after a normal access check to futher restrict access.
The attributes of these groups are always SE_GROUP_MANDATORY |
SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT. If there already
exist RestrictedSids in the original token, these sids will be
appended.
NewTokenHandle - Receives the handle of the newly created token.
Return Value:
STATUS_SUCCESS - Indicates the operation was successful.
STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - Indicates one or more of the parameter values
was invalid. This value is returned if the target token is not
an impersonation token.
--*/
{
PTOKEN Token;
PTOKEN NewToken;
KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ULONG CapturedSidCount = 0;
PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES CapturedSids = NULL;
ULONG CapturedSidsLength = 0;
ULONG CapturedGroupCount = 0;
PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES CapturedGroups = NULL;
ULONG CapturedGroupsLength = 0;
ULONG CapturedPrivilegeCount = 0;
PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES CapturedPrivileges = NULL;
ULONG CapturedPrivilegesLength = 0;
ULONG Index;
HANDLE LocalHandle = NULL;
OBJECT_HANDLE_INFORMATION HandleInformation;
ACCESS_MASK EffectiveDesiredAccess;
PAGED_CODE();
PreviousMode = KeGetPreviousMode();
//
// Probe parameters
//
try {
//
// Make sure we can write the handle
//
ProbeForWriteHandle(NewTokenHandle);
//
// Capture Sids to remove
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(SidsToDisable)) {
ProbeForReadSmallStructure( SidsToDisable, sizeof(TOKEN_GROUPS), sizeof(ULONG) );
CapturedGroupCount = SidsToDisable->GroupCount;
Status = SeCaptureSidAndAttributesArray(
SidsToDisable->Groups,
CapturedGroupCount,
PreviousMode,
NULL, 0,
PagedPool,
TRUE,
&CapturedGroups,
&CapturedGroupsLength
);
}
//
// Capture PrivilegesToDelete
//
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status) && ARGUMENT_PRESENT(PrivilegesToDelete)) {
ProbeForReadSmallStructure( PrivilegesToDelete, sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES), sizeof(ULONG) );
CapturedPrivilegeCount = PrivilegesToDelete->PrivilegeCount;
Status = SeCaptureLuidAndAttributesArray(
PrivilegesToDelete->Privileges,
CapturedPrivilegeCount,
PreviousMode,
NULL, 0,
PagedPool,
TRUE,
&CapturedPrivileges,
&CapturedPrivilegesLength
);
}
//
// Capture Restricted Sids
//
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status) && ARGUMENT_PRESENT(RestrictedSids)) {
ProbeForReadSmallStructure( RestrictedSids, sizeof(TOKEN_GROUPS), sizeof(ULONG) );
CapturedSidCount = RestrictedSids->GroupCount;
Status = SeCaptureSidAndAttributesArray(
RestrictedSids->Groups,
CapturedSidCount,
PreviousMode,
NULL, 0,
PagedPool,
TRUE,
&CapturedSids,
&CapturedSidsLength
);
}
} except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
Status = GetExceptionCode();
} // end_try
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
goto Cleanup;
}
//
// Check that the attribtes are all zero for the restricted sids
//
for (Index = 0; Index < CapturedSidCount ; Index++ )
{
if (CapturedSids[Index].Attributes != 0) {
Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto Cleanup;
}
}
//
// Check the handle's access to the existing token and get
// a pointer to that token. Pick up the default desired
// access mask from the handle while we're at it.
//
Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(
ExistingTokenHandle, // Handle
TOKEN_DUPLICATE, // DesiredAccess
SeTokenObjectType, // ObjectType
PreviousMode, // AccessMode
(PVOID *)&Token, // Object
&HandleInformation // GrantedAccess
);
if ( !NT_SUCCESS(Status) ) {
goto Cleanup;
}
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Debug
SepAcquireTokenReadLock( Token );
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("Token being filtered: \n");
SepDumpToken( Token );
SepReleaseTokenReadLock( Token );
// Debug
//
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif //TOKEN_DEBUG
//
// Check to see if an alternate desired access mask was provided.
//
EffectiveDesiredAccess = HandleInformation.GrantedAccess;
//
// Filter the existing token
//
NewToken = NULL;
Status = SepFilterToken(
Token,
PreviousMode,
Flags,
CapturedGroupCount,
CapturedGroups,
CapturedPrivilegeCount,
CapturedPrivileges,
CapturedSidCount,
CapturedSids,
CapturedSidsLength,
&NewToken
);
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
//
// Insert the new token
//
Status = ObInsertObject( NewToken,
NULL,
EffectiveDesiredAccess,
0,
(PVOID *)NULL,
&LocalHandle
);
if (!NT_SUCCESS( Status )) {
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
DbgPrint( "SE: ObInsertObject failed (%x) for token at %x\n", Status, NewToken );
#endif
}
} else
if (NewToken != NULL) {
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
DbgPrint( "SE: SepFilterToken failed (%x) but allocated token at %x\n", Status, NewToken );
#endif
}
//
// We no longer need our reference to the source token
//
ObDereferenceObject( (PVOID)Token );
//
// Return the new handle
//
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
try { *NewTokenHandle = LocalHandle; }
except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
Status = GetExceptionCode();
}
}
Cleanup:
if (CapturedGroups != NULL) {
SeReleaseSidAndAttributesArray(
CapturedGroups,
PreviousMode,
TRUE
);
}
if (CapturedPrivileges != NULL) {
SeReleaseLuidAndAttributesArray(
CapturedPrivileges,
PreviousMode,
TRUE
);
}
if (CapturedSids != NULL) {
SeReleaseSidAndAttributesArray(
CapturedSids,
PreviousMode,
TRUE
);
}
return Status;
}
NTSTATUS
SeFilterToken (
IN PACCESS_TOKEN ExistingToken,
IN ULONG Flags,
IN PTOKEN_GROUPS SidsToDisable OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES PrivilegesToDelete OPTIONAL,
IN PTOKEN_GROUPS RestrictedSids OPTIONAL,
OUT PACCESS_TOKEN * NewToken
)
/*++
Routine Description:
Create a new token that is a subset of an existing token.
Arguments:
ExistingToken - Is a token already open for
TOKEN_DUPLICATE access.
Flags - Flags indicating additional filtering. The flags may be:
DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE - Disable all privileges
SANDBOX_INERT - Record this SAIFER flag in the token.
SidsToDisable - Contains a list of sids and attributes. All sids with
the USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY attribute that also exist in the token will
cause the new token to have that sid set with the USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
attribte.
PrivilegesToDelete - Privileges in this list that are present in the
existing token will not exist in the final token. This is similar
to duplicating a token effective only with these privileges set to
disabled.
RestrictedSids - Contains a list of SIDs and attributes that will be
stored in the RestrictedSids field of the new token. These SIDs
are used after a normal access check to futher restrict access.
The attributes of these groups are always SE_GROUP_MANDATORY |
SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT. If there already
exist RestrictedSids in the original token, these sids will be
appended.
NewToken - Receives a pointer to the newly created token.
Return Value:
STATUS_SUCCESS - Indicates the operation was successful.
STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER - Indicates one or more of the parameter values
was invalid. This value is returned if the target token is not
an impersonation token.
--*/
{
PTOKEN Token;
PTOKEN FilteredToken = NULL;
KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode;
NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
ULONG Index;
ULONG CapturedSidCount = 0;
PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES CapturedSids = NULL;
ULONG CapturedSidsLength = 0;
ULONG CapturedGroupCount = 0;
PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES CapturedGroups = NULL;
ULONG CapturedGroupsLength = 0;
ULONG CapturedPrivilegeCount = 0;
PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES CapturedPrivileges = NULL;
ULONG CapturedPrivilegesLength = 0;
HANDLE LocalHandle;
OBJECT_HANDLE_INFORMATION HandleInformation;
ACCESS_MASK EffectiveDesiredAccess;
PAGED_CODE();
PreviousMode = KeGetPreviousMode();
//
// Probe parameters
//
*NewToken = NULL;
//
// Capture Sids to remove
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(SidsToDisable)) {
CapturedGroupCount = SidsToDisable->GroupCount;
CapturedGroups = SidsToDisable->Groups;
}
//
// Capture PrivilegesToDelete
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(PrivilegesToDelete)) {
CapturedPrivilegeCount = PrivilegesToDelete->PrivilegeCount;
CapturedPrivileges = PrivilegesToDelete->Privileges;
}
//
// Capture Restricted Sids
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(RestrictedSids)) {
CapturedSidCount = RestrictedSids->GroupCount;
CapturedSids = RestrictedSids->Groups;
//
// Check that the attribtes are all zero for the restricted sids
//
for (Index = 0; Index < CapturedSidCount ; Index++ ) {
if (CapturedSids[Index].Attributes != 0) {
return(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
}
}
//
// Check the handle's access to the existing token and get
// a pointer to that token. Pick up the default desired
// access mask from the handle while we're at it.
//
Token = (PTOKEN) ExistingToken;
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Debug
SepAcquireTokenReadLock( Token );
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("Token being filtered: \n");
SepDumpToken( Token );
SepReleaseTokenReadLock( Token );
// Debug
//
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif //TOKEN_DEBUG
//
// Filter the existing token
//
Status = SepFilterToken(
Token,
KernelMode,
Flags,
CapturedGroupCount,
CapturedGroups,
CapturedPrivilegeCount,
CapturedPrivileges,
CapturedSidCount,
CapturedSids,
CapturedSidsLength,
&FilteredToken
);
if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
//
// Insert the new token
//
Status = ObInsertObject( FilteredToken,
NULL,
0,
0,
NULL,
NULL
);
if (NT_SUCCESS( Status )) {
*NewToken = FilteredToken;
} else {
//
// ObInsertObject dereferences the passed object on failure
// so we don't have to clean up here.
//
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
DbgPrint( "SE: ObInsertObject failed (%x) for token at %x\n", Status, NewToken );
#endif
}
}
return Status;
}
NTSTATUS
SeFastFilterToken(
IN PACCESS_TOKEN ExistingToken,
IN KPROCESSOR_MODE RequestorMode,
IN ULONG Flags,
IN ULONG GroupCount,
IN PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES GroupsToDisable OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG PrivilegeCount,
IN PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES PrivilegesToDelete OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG SidCount,
IN PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES RestrictedSids OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG SidLength,
OUT PACCESS_TOKEN * FilteredToken
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This is a fast wrapper for the Ps code to filter a token
inline of an impersonate.
This routine acquires a read lock on the token being filtered.
Arguments:
ExistingToken - Points to the token to be duplicated.
RequestorMode - Mode of client requesting the token be duplicated.
Flags - Flags indicating additional filtering. The flags may be:
DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE - Disable all privileges
SANDBOX_INERT - Record this SAIFER flag in the token.
GroupCount - Count of groups to disable
GroupsToDisable - Contains a list of sids and attributes. All sids with
the USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY attribute that also exist in the token will
cause the new token to have that sid set with the USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
attribute.
PrivilegeCount - Count of privileges to delete
PrivilegesToDelete - Privileges in this list that are present in the
existing token will not exist in the final token. This is similar
to duplicating a token effective only with these privileges set to
disabled.
SidCount - Count of restricted sids to add.
RestrictedSids - Contains a list of SIDs and attributes that will be
stored in the RestrictedSids field of the new token. These SIDs
are used after a normal access check to futher restrict access.
The attributes of these groups are always SE_GROUP_MANDATORY |
SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT. If there already
exist RestrictedSids in the original token, these sids will be
appended.
SidLength - Length of added restricted sids.
FilteredToken - Receives a pointer to the duplicate token.
The token has not yet been inserted into any object table.
No exceptions are expected when tring to set this OUT value.
Return Value:
STATUS_SUCCESS - The service successfully completed the requested
operation.
--*/
{
NTSTATUS Status;
PTOKEN NewToken;
Status = SepFilterToken( (PTOKEN) ExistingToken,
RequestorMode,
Flags,
GroupCount,
GroupsToDisable,
PrivilegeCount,
PrivilegesToDelete,
SidCount,
RestrictedSids,
SidLength,
&NewToken );
if (NT_SUCCESS (Status)) {
//
// Insert the new token
//
Status = ObInsertObject( NewToken,
NULL,
0,
0,
NULL,
NULL
);
}
if (NT_SUCCESS( Status )) {
*FilteredToken = (PACCESS_TOKEN) NewToken;
} else {
*FilteredToken = NULL;
}
return Status;
}
NTSTATUS
SepFilterToken(
IN PTOKEN ExistingToken,
IN KPROCESSOR_MODE RequestorMode,
IN ULONG Flags,
IN ULONG GroupCount,
IN PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES GroupsToDisable OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG PrivilegeCount,
IN PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES PrivilegesToDelete OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG SidCount,
IN PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES RestrictedSids OPTIONAL,
IN ULONG SidLength,
OUT PTOKEN * FilteredToken
)
/*++
Routine Description:
This routine does the bulk of the work to actually filter
a token. This routine assumes all access validation and argument
probing has been performed.
THE CALLER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CHECKING SUBJECT RIGHTS TO CREATE THE
TYPE OF TOKEN BEING CREATED.
This routine acquires a read lock on the token being filtered.
Arguments:
ExistingToken - Points to the token to be duplicated.
RequestorMode - Mode of client requesting the token be duplicated.
Flags - Flags indicating additional filtering. The flags may be:
DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE - Disable all privileges
SANDBOX_INERT - Record this SAIFER flag in the token.
GroupCount - Count of groups to disable
GroupsToDisable - Contains a list of sids and attributes. All sids with
the USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY attribute that also exist in the token will
cause the new token to have that sid set with the USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY
attribute.
PrivilegeCount - Count of privileges to delete
PrivilegesToDelete - Privileges in this list that are present in the
existing token will not exist in the final token. This is similar
to duplicating a token effective only with these privileges set to
disabled.
SidCount - Count of restricted sids to add.
RestrictedSids - Contains a list of SIDs and attributes that will be
stored in the RestrictedSids field of the new token. These SIDs
are used after a normal access check to futher restrict access.
The attributes of these groups are always SE_GROUP_MANDATORY |
SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT. If there already
exist RestrictedSids in the original token, the intersection of the
two sets will be in the final tokense sids will be.
SidLength - Length of added restricted sids.
FilteredToken - Receives a pointer to the duplicate token.
The token has not yet been inserted into any object table.
No exceptions are expected when tring to set this OUT value.
Return Value:
STATUS_SUCCESS - The service successfully completed the requested
operation.
--*/
{
NTSTATUS Status;
PTOKEN NewToken;
PULONG DynamicPart;
ULONG PagedPoolSize;
ULONG NonPagedPoolSize;
ULONG TokenBodyLength;
ULONG FieldOffset;
ULONG_PTR NextFree;
PSID NextSidFree;
ULONG VariableLength;
ULONG Pad;
ULONG DynamicSize;
ULONG Index;
PSECURITY_TOKEN_PROXY_DATA NewProxyData;
PSECURITY_TOKEN_AUDIT_DATA NewAuditData;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjA ;
PERESOURCE TokenLock;
#if DBG || TOKEN_LEAK_MONITOR
ULONG Frames;
#endif
PAGED_CODE();
ASSERT( sizeof(SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL) <= sizeof(ULONG) );
//
// Increment the reference count for this logon session
// This can not fail, since there is already a token in this logon
// session.
//
Status = SepReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
ASSERT( NT_SUCCESS(Status) );
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->ProxyData)) {
Status = SepCopyProxyData(
&NewProxyData,
ExistingToken->ProxyData
);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
SepDeReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
return( Status );
}
} else {
NewProxyData = NULL;
}
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT( ExistingToken->AuditData )) {
NewAuditData = ExAllocatePool( PagedPool, sizeof( SECURITY_TOKEN_AUDIT_DATA ));
if (NewAuditData == NULL) {
SepFreeProxyData( NewProxyData );
SepDeReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
return( STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES );
} else {
*NewAuditData = *(ExistingToken->AuditData);
}
} else {
NewAuditData = NULL;
}
TokenLock = (PERESOURCE)ExAllocatePoolWithTag( NonPagedPool, sizeof( ERESOURCE ), 'dTeS' );
if (TokenLock == NULL) {
if (NewAuditData != NULL) {
ExFreePool( NewAuditData );
}
SepFreeProxyData( NewProxyData );
SepDeReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
return( STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES );
}
//
// Create a new object
//
VariableLength = ExistingToken->VariableLength + SidLength;
#if defined(_WIN64)
//
// Account for some additional alignment requirements later on.
//
VariableLength += sizeof(ULONG);
#endif
TokenBodyLength = FIELD_OFFSET(TOKEN, VariablePart) +
VariableLength;
NonPagedPoolSize = TokenBodyLength;
PagedPoolSize = ExistingToken->DynamicCharged;
InitializeObjectAttributes( &ObjA, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL );
Status = ObCreateObject(
RequestorMode, // ProbeMode
SeTokenObjectType, // ObjectType
NULL, // ObjectAttributes
RequestorMode, // OwnershipMode
NULL, // ParseContext
TokenBodyLength, // ObjectBodySize
PagedPoolSize, // PagedPoolCharge
NonPagedPoolSize, // NonPagedPoolCharge
(PVOID *)&NewToken // Return pointer to object
);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) {
SepDeReferenceLogonSession( &(ExistingToken->AuthenticationId) );
SepFreeProxyData( NewProxyData );
ExFreePool( TokenLock );
if (NewAuditData != NULL) {
ExFreePool( NewAuditData );
}
return Status;
}
//
// The following fields differ in the new token.
//
NewToken->TokenLock = TokenLock;
ExInitializeResourceLite( NewToken->TokenLock );
//
// Allocate a new modified Id to distinguish this token from the orignial
// token.
//
ExAllocateLocallyUniqueId( &(NewToken->ModifiedId) );
ExAllocateLocallyUniqueId( &(NewToken->TokenId) );
NewToken->TokenInUse = FALSE;
//
// acquire exclusive access to the source token
//
SepAcquireTokenReadLock( ExistingToken );
//
// Main Body initialization
//
//
// The following fields are unchanged from the source token.
// Although some may change if EffectiveOnly has been specified.
//
NewToken->AuthenticationId = ExistingToken->AuthenticationId;
NewToken->ExpirationTime = ExistingToken->ExpirationTime;
NewToken->TokenSource = ExistingToken->TokenSource;
NewToken->DynamicCharged = ExistingToken->DynamicCharged;
NewToken->DynamicAvailable = 0;
NewToken->DefaultOwnerIndex = ExistingToken->DefaultOwnerIndex;
NewToken->UserAndGroupCount = ExistingToken->UserAndGroupCount;
NewToken->SessionId = ExistingToken->SessionId;
NewToken->RestrictedSidCount = 0;
NewToken->PrivilegeCount = ExistingToken->PrivilegeCount;
NewToken->VariableLength = VariableLength;
NewToken->TokenFlags = ExistingToken->TokenFlags & ~TOKEN_SESSION_NOT_REFERENCED;
NewToken->ProxyData = NewProxyData;
NewToken->AuditData = NewAuditData;
#if DBG || TOKEN_LEAK_MONITOR
NewToken->ProcessCid = PsGetCurrentThread()->Cid.UniqueProcess;
NewToken->ThreadCid = PsGetCurrentThread()->Cid.UniqueThread;
NewToken->CreateMethod = 0xF; // Filter
RtlCopyMemory(
NewToken->ImageFileName,
PsGetCurrentProcess()->ImageFileName,
min(sizeof(NewToken->ImageFileName), sizeof(PsGetCurrentProcess()->ImageFileName))
);
Frames = RtlWalkFrameChain(
(PVOID)NewToken->CreateTrace,
TRACE_SIZE,
0
);
if (KeGetCurrentIrql() < DISPATCH_LEVEL) {
RtlWalkFrameChain(
(PVOID)&NewToken->CreateTrace[Frames],
TRACE_SIZE - Frames,
1
);
}
SepAddTokenLogonSession(NewToken);
#endif
//
// If the caller passed in the sandbox inert flag then record it.
//
if ((Flags & SANDBOX_INERT) != 0) {
NewToken->TokenFlags |= TOKEN_SANDBOX_INERT;
}
NewToken->ParentTokenId = ExistingToken->TokenId;
NewToken->TokenType = ExistingToken->TokenType;
NewToken->ImpersonationLevel = ExistingToken->ImpersonationLevel;
//
// Compute the beginning portion of the variable part, which contains the
// sid & attributes arrays and the privilege set.
//
//
// First copy the privileges. We will later remove the ones that are
// to be deleted.
//
NextFree = (ULONG_PTR)(&NewToken->VariablePart);
NewToken->Privileges = (PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)NextFree;
RtlCopyLuidAndAttributesArray( ExistingToken->PrivilegeCount,
ExistingToken->Privileges,
(PLUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)NextFree
);
NextFree += (ExistingToken->PrivilegeCount * (ULONG)sizeof(LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES));
VariableLength -= ( (ExistingToken->PrivilegeCount * (ULONG)sizeof(LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)) );
#if defined(_WIN64)
//
// At this point NextFree is 4-byte aligned, so no alignment work
// is necessary for the 32-bit product. For Win64, ensure that NextFree
// is 8-byte aligned.
//
Pad = (ULONG)(NextFree & (sizeof(PVOID)-1));
if (Pad != 0) {
Pad = sizeof(PVOID) - Pad;
NextFree += Pad;
VariableLength -= Pad;
}
#endif
//
// Figure out the count of SIDs. This is the count of users&groups +
// the number of existing restricuted SIDs plus the number of new
// restricted Sids
//
#define MAX(_x_,_y_) ((_x_) > (_y_) ? (_x_) : (_y_))
NextSidFree = (PSID) (NextFree + (ExistingToken->UserAndGroupCount +
MAX(ExistingToken->RestrictedSidCount,SidCount)) * sizeof(SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES));
NewToken->UserAndGroups = (PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES) NextFree;
//
// Copy in the existing users & groups. We will later flag the ones
// to be disabled.
//
Status = RtlCopySidAndAttributesArray(
ExistingToken->UserAndGroupCount,
ExistingToken->UserAndGroups,
VariableLength,
(PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)NextFree,
NextSidFree,
&NextSidFree,
&VariableLength
);
ASSERT(NT_SUCCESS(Status));
NextFree += (ExistingToken->UserAndGroupCount * (ULONG)sizeof(SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES));
//
// Now add all the existing restricted sids. We need to take the
// intersection of the two sets.
//
NewToken->RestrictedSids = (PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES) NextFree;
for (Index = 0; Index < SidCount ; Index++ ) {
if ( ( ExistingToken->RestrictedSidCount == 0 ) ||
SepSidInSidAndAttributes(
ExistingToken->RestrictedSids,
ExistingToken->RestrictedSidCount,
NULL, // no self sid
RestrictedSids[Index].Sid
)) {
Status = RtlCopySidAndAttributesArray(
1,
&RestrictedSids[Index],
VariableLength,
(PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)NextFree,
NextSidFree,
&NextSidFree,
&VariableLength
);
ASSERT(NT_SUCCESS(Status));
NextFree += sizeof(SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
NewToken->RestrictedSids[NewToken->RestrictedSidCount].Attributes =
SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_MANDATORY;
NewToken->RestrictedSidCount++;
}
}
//
// Allocate the dynamic portion
//
DynamicSize = SeLengthSid( ExistingToken->PrimaryGroup );
if (ExistingToken->DefaultDacl) {
DynamicSize += ExistingToken->DefaultDacl->AclSize;
}
DynamicPart = (PULONG)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(
PagedPool,
DynamicSize,
'dTeS'
);
NewToken->DynamicPart = DynamicPart;
if (DynamicPart == NULL) {
SepReleaseTokenReadLock( ExistingToken );
ObDereferenceObject( NewToken );
return( STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES );
}
//
// Make sure the new token has some restrictions.
// If it doesn't, then we've ended up with a token
// that gives us more access than the original,
// which we don't want.
//
if ((ExistingToken->RestrictedSidCount != 0) &&
(NewToken->RestrictedSidCount == 0)) {
SepReleaseTokenReadLock( ExistingToken );
Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
//
// Cleanup. ObDereferenceObject will cause the logon
// session to be dereferenced, and will free the proxy data
// as well as the audit data.
//
// See SepTokenDeleteMethod(), which is called by
// the object manager when the token object is
// being freed.
//
ObDereferenceObject( NewToken );
return(Status);
}
//
// If there are any restricted sids in the token, turn on the restricted
// flag
//
if (NewToken->RestrictedSidCount > 0) {
NewToken->TokenFlags |= TOKEN_IS_RESTRICTED;
}
//
// Copy and initialize the dynamic part.
// The dynamic part is assumed to be position independent.
//
RtlCopyMemory( (PVOID)DynamicPart,
(PVOID)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart),
DynamicSize
);
//
// If present, set the address of the default Dacl
//
if (ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->DefaultDacl)) {
ASSERT( (ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DefaultDacl) >=
(ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart) );
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DefaultDacl) -
(ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart));
NewToken->DefaultDacl = (PACL)(FieldOffset + (ULONG_PTR)DynamicPart);
} else {
NewToken->DefaultDacl = NULL;
}
//
// Set the address of the primary group
//
ASSERT(ARGUMENT_PRESENT(ExistingToken->PrimaryGroup));
ASSERT( (ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->PrimaryGroup) >=
(ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart) );
FieldOffset = (ULONG)((ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->PrimaryGroup) -
(ULONG_PTR)(ExistingToken->DynamicPart));
//
// Release the source token.
//
SepReleaseTokenReadLock( ExistingToken );
NewToken->PrimaryGroup = (PACL)(FieldOffset + (ULONG_PTR)(DynamicPart));
//
// For the time being, take the easy way to generating an "EffectiveOnly"
// duplicate. That is, use the same space required of the original, just
// eliminate any IDs or privileges not active.
//
// Ultimately, if duplication becomes a common operation, then it will be
// worthwhile to recalculate the actual space needed and copy only the
// effective IDs/privileges into the new token.
//
SepRemoveDisabledGroupsAndPrivileges(
NewToken,
Flags,
GroupCount,
GroupsToDisable,
PrivilegeCount,
PrivilegesToDelete
);
#ifdef TOKEN_DEBUG
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Debug
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("\n");
DbgPrint("Filter token:\n");
SepDumpToken( NewToken );
// Debug
//
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif //TOKEN_DEBUG
(*FilteredToken) = NewToken;
return Status;
}
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