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windows-nt/Source/XPSP1/NT/com/ole32/oleui/util.cpp
CryptoAlgo Inc b3cac27891 Add source files
2020-09-26 16:20:57 +08:00

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//+---------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Microsoft Windows
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation, 1993 - 1997.
//
// File: util.cpp
//
// Contents: Implements the utility class CUtility
//
// Classes:
//
// Methods: CUtility::CkForAccessDenied
// CUtility::CkAccessRights
// CUtility::PostErrorMessage (x2)
// CUtility::WriteRegSzNamedValue
// CUtility::WriteRegDwordNamedValue
// CUtility::WriteRegSingleACL
// CUtility::WriteRegKeyACL
// CUtility::WriteRegKeyACL2
// CUtility::WriteLsaPassword
// CUtility::DeleteRegKey
// CUtility::DeleteRegValue
// CUtility::WriteSrvIdentity
// CUtility::ACLEditor
// CUtility::ACLEditor2
// CUtility::InvokeUserBrowser
// CUtility::InvokeMachineBrowser
// CUtility::StringFromGUID
// CUtility::IsEqualGuid
// CUtility::AdjustPrivilege
// CUtility::VerifyRemoteMachine
// CUtility::RetrieveUserPassword
// CUtility::StoreUserPassword
// CUtility::LookupProcessInfo
// CUtility::MakeSecDesc
// CUtility::CheckForValidSD
// CUtility::SDisIAC
// CUtility::CheckSDForCOM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE
// CUtility::ChangeService
// CUtility::UpdateDCOMInfo(void)
// CUtility::FixHelp
// CUtility::CopySD
// CUtility::SetInheritanceFlags
//
// Functons: callBackFunc
// ControlFixProc
//
// History: 23-Apr-96 BruceMa Created.
//
//----------------------------------------------------------------------
#include "stdafx.h"
#include "assert.h"
#include "resource.h"
#include "afxtempl.h"
#include "types.h"
#include "datapkt.h"
#include "clspsht.h"
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
extern "C"
{
#include <getuser.h>
}
#endif
#include "util.h"
#include "virtreg.h"
extern "C"
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
#include <ntlsa.h>
#include <ntseapi.h>
#include <sedapi.h>
#endif
#include <winnetwk.h>
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
#include <uiexport.h>
#include <lm.h>
#endif
#include <rpc.h>
#include <rpcdce.h>
#include <aclapi.h>
}
#ifdef _DEBUG
#define new DEBUG_NEW
#undef THIS_FILE
static char BASED_CODE THIS_FILE[] = __FILE__;
#endif
const IID IID_IAccessControl = {0xEEDD23E0,0x8410,0x11CE,{0xA1,0xC3,0x08,0x00,0x2B,0x2B,0x8D,0x8F}};
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
extern "C"
{
int _stdcall UpdateActivationSettings(HANDLE hRpc, RPC_STATUS *status);
}
#endif
static const BYTE GuidMap[] = { 3, 2, 1, 0, '-', 5, 4, '-', 7, 6, '-',
8, 9, '-', 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 };
static const WCHAR wszDigits[] = L"0123456789ABCDEF";
static const DWORD SIZEOF_SID = 44;
// This leaves space for 2 access allowed ACEs in the ACL.
const DWORD SIZEOF_ACL = sizeof(ACL) + 2 * sizeof(ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) +
2 * SIZEOF_SID;
static const DWORD SIZEOF_TOKEN_USER = sizeof(TOKEN_USER) + SIZEOF_SID;
static const SID LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID = {SID_REVISION, 1, {0,0,0,0,0,5},
SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID };
static const DWORD NUM_SEC_PKG = 8;
// These are required for the method CUtility::UpdateDCOMInfo which invokes
// an RPC proxy which expects the following
extern "C" void * _stdcall MIDL_user_allocate(size_t size)
{
return new BYTE[size];
}
extern "C" void _stdcall MIDL_user_free(void *p)
{
delete p;
}
CUtility::CUtility(void)
{
HRESULT hr = OleInitialize(NULL);
m_hRpc = NULL;
m_bCheckedDC = NULL; // have we checked if we're on a BDC yet ?
m_bIsBdc = FALSE;
m_pszDomainController = NULL;
}
CUtility::~CUtility(void)
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
if (m_pszDomainController)
NetApiBufferFree(m_pszDomainController);
#endif
OleUninitialize();
if (m_hRpc != NULL)
{
RpcBindingFree(&m_hRpc);
}
}
void CUtility::CkForAccessDenied(int err)
{
if (err == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)
{
CString sMsg;
CString sCaption;
sMsg.LoadString(IDS_ACCESSDENIED);
sCaption.LoadString(IDS_SYSTEMMESSAGE);
MessageBox(NULL, sMsg, sCaption, MB_OK);
}
}
BOOL CUtility::CkAccessRights(HKEY hRoot, LPCTSTR szKeyPath)
{
int err;
HKEY hKey;
BYTE aSid[256];
DWORD cbSid = 256;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSid = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) aSid;
BOOL fFreePsid = FALSE;
// Open the specified key
err = RegOpenKeyEx(hRoot, szKeyPath, 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey);
// The key may not exist
if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)
{
return TRUE;
}
if (err == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
// Fetch the security descriptor on this key
err = RegGetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
(PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) aSid,
&cbSid);
if (err == ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
{
pSid = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) malloc(cbSid);
if (pSid == NULL)
{
return FALSE;
}
fFreePsid = TRUE;
err = RegGetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
(PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) pSid,
&cbSid);
}
// We've read the security descriptor - now try to write it
if (err == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
err = RegSetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
pSid);
}
if (hKey != hRoot)
{
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
}
return err == ERROR_SUCCESS ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
void CUtility::PostErrorMessage(void)
{
TCHAR szMessage[256];
FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, GetLastError(),
0, szMessage, sizeof(szMessage) / sizeof(TCHAR), NULL);
CString sCaption;
sCaption.LoadString(IDS_SYSTEMMESSAGE);
MessageBox(NULL, szMessage, sCaption, MB_OK);
}
void CUtility::PostErrorMessage(int err)
{
TCHAR szMessage[256];
FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, err,
0, szMessage, sizeof(szMessage) / sizeof(TCHAR), NULL);
CString sCaption;
sCaption.LoadString(IDS_SYSTEMMESSAGE);
MessageBox(NULL, szMessage, sCaption, MB_OK);
}
// Write a named string value to the registry
int CUtility::WriteRegSzNamedValue(HKEY hRoot,
LPCTSTR szKeyPath,
LPCTSTR szValueName,
LPCTSTR szVal,
DWORD dwSize)
{
int err;
HKEY hKey;
ULONG lSize;
// Open the key
err = RegOpenKeyEx(hRoot, szKeyPath, 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey);
// The key may not exist
if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)
{
DWORD dwDisp;
err = RegCreateKeyEx(hRoot,
szKeyPath,
0,
NULL,
REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
KEY_ALL_ACCESS,
NULL,
&hKey,
&dwDisp);
}
if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
return err;
// Attempt to write the named value
lSize = _tcslen(szVal) + 1;
err = RegSetValueEx(hKey, szValueName, NULL, REG_SZ, (BYTE *) szVal, lSize*sizeof(TCHAR));
if (hKey != hRoot)
RegCloseKey(hKey);
return err;
}
// Write a named multi string value to the registry
int CUtility::WriteRegMultiSzNamedValue(HKEY hRoot,
LPCTSTR szKeyPath,
LPCTSTR szValueName,
LPCTSTR szVal,
DWORD dwSize)
{
int err = ERROR_SUCCESS;
HKEY hKey;
// Open the key
err = RegOpenKeyEx(hRoot, szKeyPath, 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey);
// The key may not exist
if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)
{
DWORD dwDisp;
err = RegCreateKeyEx(hRoot,
szKeyPath,
0,
NULL,
REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
KEY_ALL_ACCESS,
NULL,
&hKey,
&dwDisp);
}
if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
return err;
// Attempt to write the named value
err = RegSetValueEx(hKey, szValueName, NULL, REG_MULTI_SZ, (BYTE *) szVal, dwSize*sizeof(TCHAR) );
if (hKey != hRoot)
RegCloseKey(hKey);
return err;
}
// Write a named DWORD value to the registry
int CUtility::WriteRegDwordNamedValue(HKEY hRoot,
LPCTSTR szKeyPath,
LPCTSTR szValueName,
DWORD dwVal)
{
int err;
HKEY hKey;
// Open the key
err = RegOpenKeyEx(hRoot, szKeyPath, 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey);
// The key may not exist
if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)
{
DWORD dwDisp;
err = RegCreateKeyEx(hRoot,
szKeyPath,
0,
NULL,
REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
KEY_ALL_ACCESS,
NULL,
&hKey,
&dwDisp);
}
if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
return err;
// Attempt to write the named value
if (RegSetValueEx(hKey, szValueName, NULL, REG_DWORD, (BYTE *) &dwVal,
sizeof(DWORD))
!= ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
if (hKey != hRoot)
{
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
return GetLastError();
}
// Return the value
if (hKey != hRoot)
{
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
// Write an ACL as a registry named value
int CUtility::WriteRegSingleACL(HKEY hRoot,
LPCTSTR szKeyPath,
LPCTSTR szValueName,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSec)
{
int err;
HKEY hKey = hRoot;
PSrSecurityDescriptor pSrSec;
PSrAcl pDacl;
// Open the key unless the key path is NULL
if (szKeyPath)
{
if ((err = RegOpenKeyEx(hRoot, szKeyPath, 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey))
!= ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
return err;
}
}
ULONG cbLen;
BOOL fIsIAC = SDisIAC((SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * )pSec);
// If there are no ACE's and this is DefaultAccessPermission, then
// interpret this as activator access only which we indicate by
// removing the named value
if (!fIsIAC)
{
pSrSec = (PSrSecurityDescriptor) pSec;
pDacl = (PSrAcl) (((BYTE *) pSec) + (pSrSec->Dacl));
if (_tcscmp(szValueName, TEXT("DefaultAccessPermission")) == 0 &&
pDacl->AceCount == 0)
{
err = RegDeleteValue(hKey, szValueName);
return err;
}
cbLen = RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor(pSec);
}
else
{
cbLen = (ULONG) GlobalSize(pSec);
}
// Else write the ACL simply as a REG_SZ value
err = RegSetValueEx(hKey,
szValueName,
0,
REG_BINARY,
(BYTE *) pSec,
cbLen);
if (hKey != hRoot)
{
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
return err;
}
// Write an ACL on a registry key
int CUtility::WriteRegKeyACL(HKEY hKey,
HKEY *phClsids,
unsigned cClsids,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSec,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecOrig)
{
int err;
// The logic is somewhat different depending on whether we're starting
// with HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT or a specific AppID
if (hKey == HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT)
{
return WriteRegKeyACL2(hKey, hKey, pSec, pSecOrig);
}
// It's a specific AppID
else
{
// Write the security on the AppID key
if (err = RegSetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
pSec) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
return err;
}
// Iterate over the CLSID's covered by this AppID and recursively
// write security on them and their subkeys
for (UINT k = 0; k < cClsids; k++)
{
if (err = WriteRegKeyACL2(phClsids[k], phClsids[k], pSec, pSecOrig)
!= ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
return err;
}
}
}
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
// Write an ACL recursively on a registry key provided the current
// security descriptor on the key is the same as the passed in
// original security descriptor
int CUtility::WriteRegKeyACL2(HKEY hRoot,
HKEY hKey,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSec,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecOrig)
{
BYTE aCurrSD[256] = {0};
DWORD cbCurrSD = 256;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pCurrSD = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) aCurrSD;
BOOL fFreePCurrSD = FALSE;
int err;
BOOL fProceed;
// Read the current security descriptor on this key
err = RegGetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
aCurrSD,
&cbCurrSD);
if (err == ERROR_MORE_DATA || err == ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
{
pCurrSD = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED, cbCurrSD);
if (pCurrSD == NULL)
{
return ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
}
fFreePCurrSD = TRUE;
}
else if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
return err;
}
if ((err = RegGetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
pCurrSD,
&cbCurrSD)
!= ERROR_SUCCESS))
{
if (fFreePCurrSD)
{
GlobalFree(pCurrSD);
}
return err;
}
// Only proceed down this subtree if the current SD and the
// original SD are the same
fProceed = CompareSDs((PSrSecurityDescriptor) pCurrSD,
(PSrSecurityDescriptor) pSecOrig);
// We're done with the current security descriptor
if (fFreePCurrSD)
{
GlobalFree(pCurrSD);
}
if (!fProceed)
{
if (hKey != hRoot)
{
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
// Write the top level ACL
err = RegSetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
pSec);
// Now enumerate the subkeys and write ACL's on them
DWORD iSubKey;
TCHAR szSubKeyName[128];
HKEY hKey2;
iSubKey = 0;
while (err == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
// Enumerate the next key
err = RegEnumKey(hKey, iSubKey, szSubKeyName, 128);
if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
break;
}
// Prepare for the next key
iSubKey++;
// Open this subkey and recursively write the ACL on it and
// all of its subkeys
if (RegOpenKeyEx(hKey, szSubKeyName, 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey2)
== ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
err = WriteRegKeyACL2(hRoot, hKey2, pSec, pSecOrig);
}
}
if (hKey != hRoot)
{
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
return err == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS ? ERROR_SUCCESS : err;
}
// Write a user's password to the private LSA database
int CUtility::WriteLsaPassword(CLSID appid, LPCTSTR szPassword)
{
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
int CUtility::DeleteRegKey(HKEY hRoot, LPCTSTR szKeyPath)
{
return RegDeleteKey(hRoot, szKeyPath);
}
int CUtility::DeleteRegValue(HKEY hRoot, LPCTSTR szKeyPath, LPCTSTR szValueName)
{
int err;
HKEY hKey;
if ((err = RegOpenKeyEx(hRoot, szKeyPath, 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey)) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
err = RegDeleteValue(hKey, szValueName);
if (hRoot != hKey)
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
return err;
}
// Change the identity under which a service runs
int CUtility::WriteSrvIdentity(LPCTSTR szService, LPCTSTR szIdentity)
{
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
DWORD __stdcall callBackFunc(HWND hwndParent,
HANDLE hInstance,
ULONG_PTR CallBackContext,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecDesc,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecDescNewObjects,
BOOLEAN ApplyToSubContainers,
BOOLEAN ApplyToSubObjects,
LPDWORD StatusReturn)
{
int err = ERROR_SUCCESS;
PCallBackContext pCallBackContext = (PCallBackContext) CallBackContext;
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR* pSD = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR*) SecDesc;
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE* pSDr = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE*) SecDesc;
PSrAcl pDacl;
PSrAce pAce;
DWORD cbAces;
// Check whether the security descriptor is self-relative
if (!(pSD->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE))
{
pDacl = (PSrAcl) pSD->Dacl;
}
else
{
pDacl = (PSrAcl) (((BYTE *) pSDr) + (pSDr->Dacl));
}
if (pDacl)
{
// Do over the ACE's
for (pAce = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pDacl) + sizeof(SSrAcl)),
cbAces = pDacl->AceCount;cbAces;
pAce = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pAce) + pAce->AceSize),cbAces--)
{
if (pAce->Type == 1 && pAce->AccessMask == GENERIC_ALL)
{
pAce->AccessMask = COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE;
}
}
}
// Set the inheritance flags on the new security descriptor
if (pCallBackContext->pktType == RegKeyACL)
{
g_util.SetInheritanceFlags((SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) SecDesc);
}
if (pCallBackContext->fIsIAC)
{
// try to convert to a serialized IAccessControl
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pNewSD = g_util.IACfromSD((SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *)SecDesc);
if (pNewSD)
{
SecDesc = pNewSD;
}
else
{
pCallBackContext->fIsIAC = FALSE; // failed so treat it as if it is an old-style SD
CString sMsg;
CString sCaption;
sMsg.LoadString(IDS_CANTCONVERT);
sCaption.LoadString(IDS_SYSTEMMESSAGE);
MessageBox(NULL, sMsg, sCaption, MB_OK);
}
}
else
{
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pNewSD;
#if 0 // set to 0 to remove this test code
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pTempSD = g_util.IACfromSD((SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *)SecDesc);
pNewSD = g_util.SDfromIAC((SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *)pTempSD);
BOOL fResult = g_util.CompareSDs((PSrSecurityDescriptor)pNewSD, (PSrSecurityDescriptor)SecDesc);
GlobalFree(pTempSD);
#else
// just copy the security descriptor to get it into Global Memory
g_util.CopySD((SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *)SecDesc, &pNewSD);
#endif
SecDesc = pNewSD;
}
// Write the new or modified security descriptor
if (*pCallBackContext->pIndex == -1)
{
if (pCallBackContext->pktType == SingleACL)
{
err = g_virtreg.NewRegSingleACL(
pCallBackContext->info.single.hRoot,
pCallBackContext->info.single.szKeyPath,
pCallBackContext->info.single.szValueName,
(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) SecDesc,
pCallBackContext->fIsIAC, // If it's an IAC then it's already SELF-RELATIVE
pCallBackContext->pIndex);
}
else
{
err = g_virtreg.NewRegKeyACL(
pCallBackContext->info.regKey.hKey,
pCallBackContext->info.regKey.phClsids,
pCallBackContext->info.regKey.cClsids,
pCallBackContext->info.regKey.szTitle,
pCallBackContext->origSD,
(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) SecDesc,
pCallBackContext->fIsIAC, // If it's an IAC then it's already SELF-RELATIVE
pCallBackContext->pIndex);
}
}
else
{
g_virtreg.ChgRegACL(*pCallBackContext->pIndex,
(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) SecDesc,
pCallBackContext->fIsIAC); // If it's an IAC then it's already SELF-RELATIVE
}
*StatusReturn = err;
return err;
}
// Invoke the ACL editor on the specified named value. This method
// writes an ACL data packet to the virtual registry. This method is for
// Access and Launch security only (pktType SingleACL).
int CUtility::ACLEditor(HWND hWnd,
HKEY hRoot,
LPCTSTR szKeyPath,
LPCTSTR szValueName,
int *pIndex,
PACKETTYPE pktType,
dcomAclType eAclType)
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
int err;
HKEY hKey;
BYTE aSD[128];
DWORD cbSD = 128;
DWORD dwType;
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *pSD = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) aSD;
BOOL fFreePSD = FALSE;
SID *pSid;
TCHAR szAllow[32];
TCHAR szDeny[32];
CString szAllow_;
CString szDeny_;
// Build the allow and deny strings
switch (eAclType)
{
case dcomAclAccess:
szAllow_.LoadString(IDS_ALLOW_ACCESS);
szDeny_.LoadString(IDS_DENY_ACCESS);
break;
case dcomAclLaunch:
szAllow_.LoadString(IDS_ALLOW_LAUNCH);
szDeny_.LoadString(IDS_DENY_LAUNCH);
break;
case dcomAclConfig:
szAllow_.LoadString(IDS_ALLOW_CONFIG);
szDeny_.LoadString(IDS_DENY_CONFIG);
break;
}
_tcscpy(szAllow, (LPCTSTR) szAllow_);
_tcscpy(szDeny, (LPCTSTR) szDeny_);
// Fetch the current SD, either from the registry, by default if the
// named value doesn't exist or from the virtual registry
if (*pIndex == -1)
{
// Open the specified key
if ((err = RegOpenKeyEx(hRoot, szKeyPath, 0,
KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &hKey))
!= ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
return err;
}
// Attempt to read the specified named value
err = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, szValueName, 0, &dwType, (BYTE *) aSD,
&cbSD);
if (err == ERROR_MORE_DATA || err == ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
{
pSD = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED, cbSD);
if (pSD == NULL)
{
return ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
}
fFreePSD = TRUE;
err = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, szValueName, 0, &dwType,
(BYTE *) pSD, &cbSD);
}
// The named valued doesn't exist. If this is
// \\HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\...
// then use the default named value if it exists
else if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
if (hRoot != HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE)
{
if (err = RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
TEXT("SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\OLE"),
0,
KEY_ALL_ACCESS,
&hKey)
!= ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
return err;
}
// Attempt to read the specified named value
TCHAR szDefault[32];
_tcscpy(szDefault, TEXT("Default"));
_tcscat(szDefault, szValueName);
err = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, szDefault, 0, &dwType,
(BYTE *) aSD, &cbSD);
if (err == ERROR_MORE_DATA)
{
pSD = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED, cbSD);
if (pSD == NULL)
{
return ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
}
fFreePSD = TRUE;
err = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, szDefault, 0, &dwType,
(BYTE *) pSD, &cbSD);
}
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
}
// If still don't have an SD, then simply create one
if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
if (!g_util.LookupProcessInfo(&pSid, NULL))
{
return GetLastError();
}
if (!g_util.MakeSecDesc(pSid, &pSD))
{
delete pSid;
return GetLastError();
}
fFreePSD = TRUE;
}
}
// Fetch the most recently edited SD
else
{
CDataPacket *pCdp = g_virtreg.GetAt(*pIndex);
pSD = pCdp -> pkt.acl.pSec;
}
// Initialize the callback context
m_sCallBackContext.pktType = pktType;
m_sCallBackContext.pIndex = pIndex;
m_sCallBackContext.origSD = pSD;
m_sCallBackContext.info.single.hRoot = hRoot;
m_sCallBackContext.info.single.szKeyPath = (TCHAR*)szKeyPath;
m_sCallBackContext.info.single.szValueName = (TCHAR*)szValueName;
// Invoke the ACL editor
DWORD dwStatus;
GENERIC_MAPPING genericMapping;
CString szObjectType;
szObjectType.LoadString(IDS_Registry_value);
SED_HELP_INFO helpInfo =
{
TEXT("dcomcnfg.hlp"),
{HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG}
};
SED_OBJECT_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR objTyp =
{1, // Revision
FALSE, // Is container?
FALSE, // Allow new object perms?
FALSE, // Specific to generic?
&genericMapping, // Generic mapping
NULL, // Generic mapping new
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szObjectType), // Object type name
&helpInfo, // Help info
TEXT(""), // Ckbox title
TEXT(""), // Apply title
TEXT(""), //
NULL, // Special object access
NULL // New special object access
};
SED_APPLICATION_ACCESS appAccess[] =
{{SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE, COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE, 0, szAllow},
{SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE, 0, 0, szDeny}};
SED_APPLICATION_ACCESSES appAccesses =
{2, // Count of access groups
appAccess, // Access array
szAllow // Default access name
};
// Intialize the help contexts
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_MAIN_DLG] =
IDH_REGISTRY_VALUE_PERMISSIONS;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_SPECIAL_ACCESS_DLG] =
IDH_SPECIAL_ACCESS_GLOBAL;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_NEW_ITEM_SPECIAL_ACCESS_DLG] =
IDH_SPECIAL_ACCESS_GLOBAL;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_ADD_USER_DLG] =
IDH_ADD_USERS_AND_GROUPS;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_ADD_USER_MEMBERS_LG_DLG] =
IDH_LOCAL_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_ADD_USER_MEMBERS_GG_DLG] =
IDH_GLOBAL_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_ADD_USER_SEARCH_DLG] =
IDH_FIND_ACCOUNT1;
genericMapping.GenericRead = GENERIC_ALL;
genericMapping.GenericWrite = GENERIC_ALL;
genericMapping.GenericExecute = GENERIC_ALL;
genericMapping.GenericAll = GENERIC_ALL;
if (!CheckForValidSD(pSD))
{
// make a valid security descriptor so we can continue
if (!g_util.LookupProcessInfo(&pSid, NULL))
{
return GetLastError();
}
if (!g_util.MakeSecDesc(pSid, &pSD))
{
delete pSid;
return GetLastError();
}
fFreePSD = TRUE;
}
m_sCallBackContext.fIsIAC = SDisIAC(pSD);
if (m_sCallBackContext.fIsIAC)
{
// convert to a true security descriptor
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pNewSD = SDfromIAC(pSD);
if (!pNewSD)
{
// failed so pop up an error box
CString sMsg, sCaption;
sMsg.LoadString(IDS_BADSD);
sCaption.LoadString(IDS_SYSTEMMESSAGE);
MessageBox(NULL, sMsg, sCaption, MB_OK);
// make a valid security descriptor so we can continue
if (!g_util.LookupProcessInfo(&pSid, NULL))
{
return GetLastError();
}
if (!g_util.MakeSecDesc(pSid, &pNewSD))
{
delete pSid;
return GetLastError();
}
}
if (fFreePSD)
{
GlobalFree(pSD);
}
pSD=pNewSD;
fFreePSD = TRUE;
}
// If this is for Access or Launch permissons then check that the
// SD contains only allows and deny's for COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE
if (!CheckSDForCOM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE(pSD))
{
return IDCANCEL;
}
// Invoke the ACL editor
SedDiscretionaryAclEditor(hWnd, // Owner hWnd
GetModuleHandle(NULL), // Owner hInstance
NULL, // Server
&objTyp, // ObjectTyp,
&appAccesses, // Application accesses
(TCHAR*)szValueName, // Object name,
callBackFunc, // Callback function
(ULONG_PTR) &m_sCallBackContext, // Callback context
pSD, // Security descriptor,
FALSE, // Couldnt read Dacl,
FALSE, // Can't write Dacl,
&dwStatus, // SED status return,
0); // Flags
// Check status return
if (dwStatus != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
// PostErrorMessage(dwStatus);
}
// We're done
if (fFreePSD)
{
GlobalFree(pSD);
}
return dwStatus == 0 ? ERROR_SUCCESS : IDCANCEL;
#else
return IDCANCEL;
#endif
}
// Invoke the ACL editor on the specified key. This method writes an ACL
// data packet to the virtual registry. This method supports configuration
// security only (pktType RegKeyACL).
int CUtility::ACLEditor2(HWND hWnd,
HKEY hKey,
HKEY *phClsids,
unsigned cClsids,
TCHAR *szTitle,
int *pIndex,
PACKETTYPE pktType)
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
int err;
BYTE aSD[128];
DWORD cbSD = 128;
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *pSD = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) aSD;
BOOL fFreePSD = FALSE;
TCHAR szKeyRead[32];
CString szKeyRead_;
TCHAR szHkeyClassesRoot[32];
CString szHkeyClassesRoot_;
// Initialize strings
szKeyRead_.LoadString(IDS_Key_Read);
_tcscpy(szKeyRead, (LPCTSTR) szKeyRead_);
szHkeyClassesRoot_.LoadString(IDS_HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT);
_tcscpy(szHkeyClassesRoot, (LPCTSTR) szHkeyClassesRoot_);
if (*pIndex == -1)
{
// Read the security descriptor on this key
err = RegGetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
aSD,
&cbSD);
if (err == ERROR_MORE_DATA || err == ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
{
pSD = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED, cbSD);
if (pSD == NULL)
{
return ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
}
fFreePSD = TRUE;
}
else if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
return err;
}
if ((err = RegGetKeySecurity(hKey,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
pSD,
&cbSD)
!= ERROR_SUCCESS))
{
if (fFreePSD)
{
GlobalFree(pSD);
}
return err;
}
}
// Fetch the most recently edited SD
else
{
CDataPacket *pCdp = g_virtreg.GetAt(*pIndex);
pSD = pCdp -> pkt.racl.pSec;
}
// Initialize the callback context
m_sCallBackContext.pktType = pktType;
m_sCallBackContext.pIndex = pIndex;
m_sCallBackContext.origSD = pSD;
m_sCallBackContext.info.regKey.hKey = hKey;
m_sCallBackContext.info.regKey.phClsids = phClsids;
m_sCallBackContext.info.regKey.cClsids = cClsids;
m_sCallBackContext.info.regKey.szTitle = szTitle;
// Invoke the ACL editor
DWORD dwStatus;
GENERIC_MAPPING genericMapping;
CString szObjectType;
szObjectType.LoadString(IDS_Registry_Key);
CString szQueryValue;
szQueryValue.LoadString(IDS_Query_Value);
CString szSetValue;
szSetValue.LoadString(IDS_Set_Value);
CString szCreateSubkeys;
szCreateSubkeys.LoadString(IDS_Create_Subkey);
CString szEnumerateSubkeys;
szEnumerateSubkeys.LoadString(IDS_Enumerate_Subkeys);
CString szNotify;
szNotify.LoadString(IDS_Notify);
CString szCreateLink;
szCreateLink.LoadString(IDS_Create_Link);
CString szDelete;
szDelete.LoadString(IDS_Delete);
CString szWriteDAC;
szWriteDAC.LoadString(IDS_Write_DAC);
CString szWriteOwner;
szWriteOwner.LoadString(IDS_Write_Owner);
CString szReadControl;
szReadControl.LoadString(IDS_Read_Control);
CString szRead;
szRead.LoadString(IDS_Read);
CString szFullControl;
szFullControl.LoadString(IDS_Full_Control);
CString szSpecialAccess;
szSpecialAccess.LoadString(IDS_Special_AccessDotDotDot);
SED_HELP_INFO helpInfo =
{
TEXT("dcomcnfg.hlp"),
{HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG,
HC_MAIN_DLG}
};
SED_OBJECT_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR objTyp =
{SED_REVISION1, // Revision
FALSE, // Is container?
FALSE, // Allow new object perms?
FALSE, // Specific to generic?
&genericMapping, // Generic mapping
NULL, // Generic mapping new
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szObjectType), // Object type name
&helpInfo, // Help info
TEXT(""), // Ckbox title
TEXT(""), // Apply title
TEXT(""), //
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szSpecialAccess), // Special Access menu item
NULL // New special object access
};
SED_APPLICATION_ACCESS appAccess[] =
{
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szQueryValue) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, KEY_SET_VALUE, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szSetValue) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, KEY_CREATE_SUB_KEY, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szCreateSubkeys) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, KEY_ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szEnumerateSubkeys) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, KEY_NOTIFY, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szNotify) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, KEY_CREATE_LINK, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szCreateLink) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, 0x00010000, /* DELETE, */ 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szDelete) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, WRITE_DAC, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szWriteDAC) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, WRITE_OWNER, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szWriteOwner) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE_SPECIAL, READ_CONTROL, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szReadControl) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE, KEY_READ, 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szRead) },
{ SED_DESC_TYPE_RESOURCE, GENERIC_ALL, /* KEY_ALL_ACCESS, */ 0,
(TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szFullControl) }
};
SED_APPLICATION_ACCESSES appAccesses =
{12, // Count of access groups
appAccess, // Access array
szKeyRead // Default access name
};
// Intialize the help contexts
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_MAIN_DLG] =
IDH_REGISTRY_KEY_PERMISSIONS;
if (hKey == HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT)
{
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_SPECIAL_ACCESS_DLG] =
IDH_SPECIAL_ACCESS_GLOBAL;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_NEW_ITEM_SPECIAL_ACCESS_DLG] =
IDH_SPECIAL_ACCESS_GLOBAL;
}
else
{
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_SPECIAL_ACCESS_DLG] =
IDH_SPECIAL_ACCESS_PER_APPID;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_NEW_ITEM_SPECIAL_ACCESS_DLG] =
IDH_SPECIAL_ACCESS_PER_APPID;
}
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_ADD_USER_DLG] =
IDH_ADD_USERS_AND_GROUPS;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_ADD_USER_MEMBERS_LG_DLG] =
IDH_LOCAL_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_ADD_USER_MEMBERS_GG_DLG] =
IDH_GLOBAL_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP;
helpInfo.aulHelpContext[HC_ADD_USER_SEARCH_DLG] =
IDH_FIND_ACCOUNT1;
genericMapping.GenericRead = KEY_READ;
genericMapping.GenericWrite = KEY_WRITE;
genericMapping.GenericExecute = KEY_READ;
genericMapping.GenericAll = KEY_ALL_ACCESS;
if (!CheckForValidSD(pSD))
{
return IDCANCEL;
}
m_sCallBackContext.fIsIAC = SDisIAC(pSD);
if (m_sCallBackContext.fIsIAC)
{
// convert to a true security descriptor
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pNewSD = SDfromIAC(pSD);
if (!pNewSD)
{
// failed so pop up an error box
CString sMsg, sCaption;
sMsg.LoadString(IDS_BADSD);
sCaption.LoadString(IDS_SYSTEMMESSAGE);
MessageBox(NULL, sMsg, sCaption, MB_OK);
return IDCANCEL;
}
if (fFreePSD)
{
GlobalFree(pSD);
}
pSD=pNewSD;
fFreePSD = TRUE;
}
// Invoke the ACL editor
SedDiscretionaryAclEditor(hWnd, // Owner hWnd
GetModuleHandle(NULL), // Owner hInstance
NULL, // Server
&objTyp, // ObjectTyp,
&appAccesses, // Application accesses
szTitle ? szTitle : szHkeyClassesRoot,// Object name,
callBackFunc, // Callback function
(ULONG_PTR) &m_sCallBackContext, // Callback context
pSD, // Security descriptor,
FALSE, // Couldnt read Dacl,
FALSE, // Can't write Dacl,
&dwStatus, // SED status return,
0); // Flags
// Check status return
if (dwStatus != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
// PostErrorMessage(dwStatus);
}
// We're done
if (fFreePSD)
{
GlobalFree(pSD);
}
return dwStatus == 0 ? ERROR_SUCCESS : IDCANCEL;
#else
return IDCANCEL;
#endif
}
BOOL CUtility::InvokeUserBrowser(HWND hWnd, TCHAR *szUser)
{
BOOL fRet = FALSE;
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
HUSERBROW hUser;
USERBROWSER sUserBrowser;
SUserDetailsPlus sUserDetailsPlus;
ULONG ulSize = USER_DETAILS_BUFFER_SIZE;
CString szTitle;
szTitle.LoadString(IDS_Browse_for_users);
sUserBrowser.ulStructSize = sizeof(USERBROWSER);
sUserBrowser.fUserCancelled = FALSE;
sUserBrowser.fExpandNames = TRUE;
sUserBrowser.hwndOwner = hWnd;
sUserBrowser.pszTitle = (TCHAR *) ((LPCTSTR) szTitle);
sUserBrowser.pszInitialDomain = NULL;
sUserBrowser.Flags = USRBROWS_SINGLE_SELECT |
USRBROWS_INCL_ALL |
USRBROWS_SHOW_USERS;
sUserBrowser.ulHelpContext = IDH_BROWSE_FOR_USERS;
sUserBrowser.pszHelpFileName = TEXT("dcomcnfg.hlp");
hUser = OpenUserBrowser(&sUserBrowser);
if (hUser == NULL)
{
return FALSE;
}
else
{
CString szBackslash;
szBackslash.LoadString(IDS_backslash);
if (EnumUserBrowserSelection(hUser,
&sUserDetailsPlus.sUserDetails,
&ulSize))
{
_tcscpy(szUser, sUserDetailsPlus.sUserDetails.pszDomainName);
_tcscat(szUser, (LPCTSTR) szBackslash);
_tcscat(szUser, sUserDetailsPlus.sUserDetails.pszAccountName);
fRet = TRUE;
}
}
CloseUserBrowser(hUser);
#endif
return fRet;
}
BOOL CUtility::InvokeMachineBrowser(TCHAR *szMachine)
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
///////////////////////////////////////////////////
// If we end up not wanting to use I_SystemFocusDialog, then the code below
// is the start for fetching machine resources ourselves
/*
DWORD dwErr;
NETRESOURCE aNetResource[1000];
HANDLE hNetwork;
DWORD dwEntries = 100;
DWORD dwBufSize = sizeof(aNetResource);
dwErr = WNetOpenEnum(RESOURCE_GLOBALNET,
RESOURCETYPE_ANY,
0,
NULL,
&hNetwork);
if (dwErr == NO_ERROR)
{
dwEntries = 0xffffffff;
dwErr = WNetEnumResource(hNetwork,
&dwEntries,
aNetResource,
&dwBufSize);
}
WNetCloseEnum(hNetwork);
dwErr = WNetOpenEnum(RESOURCE_GLOBALNET,
RESOURCETYPE_ANY,
0,
aNetResource,
&hNetwork);
if (dwErr == NO_ERROR)
{
dwEntries = 0xffffffff;
dwErr = WNetEnumResource(hNetwork,
&dwEntries,
&aNetResource[1],
&dwBufSize);
}
return dwErr == NO_ERROR ? TRUE : FALSE;
*/
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////
UINT err;
BOOL fOkPressed = FALSE;
err = I_SystemFocusDialog(GetForegroundWindow(),
// FOCUSDLG_BROWSE_LOGON_DOMAIN |
// FOCUSDLG_BROWSE_WKSTA_DOMAIN,
0x30003,
szMachine,
128,
&fOkPressed,
TEXT("dcomcnfg.hlp"),
IDH_SELECT_DOMAIN);
if (err == ERROR_SUCCESS && fOkPressed)
{
return TRUE;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
#else
return FALSE;
#endif
}
int CUtility::StringFromGUID(GUID &rguid, TCHAR *lpsz, int cbMax)
{
int i;
LPWSTR p = lpsz;
const BYTE * pBytes = (const BYTE *) &rguid;
*p++ = L'{';
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(GuidMap); i++)
{
if (GuidMap[i] == '-')
{
*p++ = L'-';
}
else
{
*p++ = wszDigits[ (pBytes[GuidMap[i]] & 0xF0) >> 4 ];
*p++ = wszDigits[ (pBytes[GuidMap[i]] & 0x0F) ];
}
}
*p++ = L'}';
*p = L'\0';
return GUIDSTR_MAX;
}
BOOL CUtility::IsEqualGuid(GUID &guid1, GUID &guid2)
{
return (
((PLONG) &guid1)[0] == ((PLONG) &guid2)[0] &&
((PLONG) &guid1)[1] == ((PLONG) &guid2)[1] &&
((PLONG) &guid1)[2] == ((PLONG) &guid2)[2] &&
((PLONG) &guid1)[3] == ((PLONG) &guid2)[3]);
}
BOOL CUtility::AdjustPrivilege(TCHAR *szPrivilege)
{
HANDLE hProcessToken = 0;
BOOL bOK = FALSE;
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES privileges;
if( !OpenProcessToken( GetCurrentProcess(),
TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES,
&hProcessToken ) )
{
return FALSE;
}
privileges.PrivilegeCount = 1;
privileges.Privileges[ 0 ].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
if( !LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, szPrivilege,
&privileges.Privileges[ 0 ].Luid ) )
{
return FALSE;
}
if( !AdjustTokenPrivileges( hProcessToken, FALSE,
&privileges,
0L, NULL, NULL ) )
{
return FALSE;
}
if( hProcessToken )
{
CloseHandle( hProcessToken );
}
return TRUE;
}
BOOL CUtility::VerifyRemoteMachine(TCHAR *szRemoteMachine)
{
NETRESOURCE sResource;
NETRESOURCE sResource2;
DWORD dwErr;
HANDLE hEnum;
DWORD cbEntries;
DWORD cbBfr;
// TODO: Get this function to work. Right now WNetEnumResource is
// screwing up the stack, causing an AV and anyway returns the error
// ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS which I don't understand.
//
// Also, it is not clear that we should verify the remote machine name.
// It may have different formats, e.g. IP address or a URL specification.
// It may not even be on an NT network. In any case it may be offline
// currently.
return TRUE;
sResource.dwScope = RESOURCE_GLOBALNET;
sResource.dwType = RESOURCETYPE_ANY;
sResource.dwDisplayType = RESOURCEDISPLAYTYPE_GENERIC;
sResource.dwUsage = RESOURCEUSAGE_CONTAINER;
sResource.lpLocalName = NULL;
sResource.lpRemoteName = szRemoteMachine;
sResource.lpComment = NULL;
sResource.lpProvider = NULL;
dwErr = WNetOpenEnum(RESOURCE_GLOBALNET,
RESOURCETYPE_ANY,
RESOURCEUSAGE_CONTAINER,
&sResource,
&hEnum);
if (dwErr == NO_ERROR)
{
cbEntries = 1;
cbBfr = sizeof(NETRESOURCE);
dwErr = WNetEnumResource(hEnum, &cbEntries, &sResource2, &cbBfr);
}
CloseHandle(hEnum);
return TRUE;
}
BOOL CUtility::RetrieveUserPassword(TCHAR *szAppid, CString &sPassword)
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
LSA_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES sObjAttributes;
HANDLE hPolicy = NULL;
LSA_UNICODE_STRING sKey;
PLSA_UNICODE_STRING psPassword;
TCHAR szKey[4 + GUIDSTR_MAX + 1];
// Formulate the access key
_tcscpy(szKey, TEXT("SCM:"));
_tcscat(szKey, szAppid);
// UNICODE_STRING length fields are in bytes and include the NULL
// terminator
sKey.Length = (_tcslen(szKey) + 1) * sizeof(TCHAR);
sKey.MaximumLength = (GUIDSTR_MAX + 5) * sizeof(TCHAR);
sKey.Buffer = szKey;
// Open the local security policy
InitializeObjectAttributes(&sObjAttributes, NULL, 0L, NULL, NULL);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(LsaOpenPolicy(NULL, &sObjAttributes,
POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION, &hPolicy)))
{
return FALSE;
}
// Read the user's password
if (!NT_SUCCESS(LsaRetrievePrivateData(hPolicy, &sKey, &psPassword)))
{
LsaClose(hPolicy);
return FALSE;
}
// Close the policy handle, we're done with it now.
LsaClose(hPolicy);
// Possible for LsaRetrievePrivateData to return success but with a NULL
// psPassword. If this happens we fail.
if (!psPassword)
{
return FALSE;
}
// Copy the password
sPassword = psPassword->Buffer;
// Clear and free lsa's buffer
memset(psPassword->Buffer, 0, psPassword->Length);
LsaFreeMemory( psPassword );
return TRUE;
#else
return FALSE;
#endif
}
BOOL CUtility::StoreUserPassword(TCHAR *szAppid, CString &szPassword)
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
LSA_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES sObjAttributes;
HANDLE hPolicy = NULL;
LSA_UNICODE_STRING sKey;
LSA_UNICODE_STRING sPassword;
TCHAR szKey[4 + GUIDSTR_MAX + 1];
// Formulate the access key
_tcscpy(szKey, TEXT("SCM:"));
_tcscat(szKey, szAppid);
// UNICODE_STRING length fields are in bytes and include the NULL
// terminator
sKey.Length = (_tcslen(szKey) + 1) * sizeof(TCHAR);
sKey.MaximumLength = (GUIDSTR_MAX + 5) * sizeof(TCHAR);
sKey.Buffer = szKey;
// Make the password a UNICODE string
sPassword.Length = (_tcslen(LPCTSTR(szPassword)) + 1) * sizeof(TCHAR);
sPassword.Buffer = (TCHAR *) LPCTSTR(szPassword);
sPassword.MaximumLength = sPassword.Length;
// Open the local security policy
InitializeObjectAttributes(&sObjAttributes, NULL, 0L, NULL, NULL);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(LsaOpenPolicy(NULL, &sObjAttributes,
POLICY_CREATE_SECRET, &hPolicy)))
{
return FALSE;
}
// Store the user's password
if (!NT_SUCCESS(LsaStorePrivateData(hPolicy, &sKey, &sPassword)))
{
g_util.PostErrorMessage();
LsaClose(hPolicy);
return FALSE;
}
// Close the policy handle, we're done with it now.
LsaClose(hPolicy);
return TRUE;
#else
return FALSE;
#endif
}
BOOL CUtility::LookupProcessInfo(SID **ppSid, TCHAR **ppszPrincName)
{
BYTE aMemory[SIZEOF_TOKEN_USER];
TOKEN_USER *pTokenUser = (TOKEN_USER *) &aMemory;
HANDLE hToken = NULL;
DWORD lIgnore;
DWORD lSidLen;
DWORD lNameLen = 0;
DWORD lDomainLen = 0;
TCHAR *pDomainName = NULL;
SID_NAME_USE sIgnore;
if (ppszPrincName != NULL)
*ppszPrincName = NULL;
// Open the process's token.
if (OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken))
{
// Lookup SID of process token.
if (GetTokenInformation( hToken, TokenUser, pTokenUser,
sizeof(aMemory), &lIgnore ))
{
// Allocate memory to hold the SID.
lSidLen = GetLengthSid( pTokenUser->User.Sid );
*ppSid = (SID *) new BYTE[lSidLen];
if (*ppSid == NULL)
{
return FALSE;
}
memcpy(*ppSid, pTokenUser->User.Sid, lSidLen);
// Stop now if the caller doesn't want the user name.
if (ppszPrincName != NULL)
{
// Find out how much memory to allocate for the name.
LookupAccountSid(NULL, pTokenUser->User.Sid, NULL, &lNameLen,
NULL, &lDomainLen, NULL );
if (lNameLen != 0)
{
// Allocate memory for the user's name.
*ppszPrincName =
(TCHAR *) new BYTE[lNameLen*sizeof(TCHAR)];
if (ppszPrincName == NULL)
{
CloseHandle( hToken );
return FALSE;
}
pDomainName = (TCHAR *) new BYTE[lDomainLen*sizeof(TCHAR)];
if (pDomainName == NULL)
{
delete ppszPrincName;
CloseHandle( hToken );
return FALSE;
}
// Find the user's name.
if (!LookupAccountSid( NULL, pTokenUser->User.Sid,
*ppszPrincName, &lNameLen,
pDomainName,
&lDomainLen, &sIgnore))
{
delete ppszPrincName;
delete pDomainName;
CloseHandle( hToken );
return FALSE;
}
}
delete ppszPrincName;
delete pDomainName;
}
}
CloseHandle( hToken );
}
return TRUE;
}
BOOL CUtility::MakeSecDesc(SID *pSid, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR **ppSD)
{
ACL *pAcl;
DWORD lSidLen;
SID *pGroup;
SID *pOwner;
// In case we fail
*ppSD = NULL;
// Allocate the security descriptor.
lSidLen = GetLengthSid( pSid );
*ppSD = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED,
sizeof(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) + 2*lSidLen + SIZEOF_ACL);
if (*ppSD == NULL)
{
return FALSE;
}
pGroup = (SID *) (*ppSD + 1);
pOwner = (SID *) (((BYTE *) pGroup) + lSidLen);
pAcl = (ACL *) (((BYTE *) pOwner) + lSidLen);
// Initialize a new security descriptor.
if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(*ppSD, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION))
{
GlobalFree(*ppSD);
return FALSE;
}
// Initialize a new ACL.
if (!InitializeAcl(pAcl, SIZEOF_ACL, ACL_REVISION2))
{
GlobalFree(*ppSD);
return FALSE;
}
// Comment out this code because the only time we create a default SD is
// when attempting to edit
// \\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OLE.DefaultAccessPermission
// which we want to start with 0 ACE's
/*
// Allow the current user access.
if (!AddAccessAllowedAce( pAcl, ACL_REVISION2, COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE, pSid ))
{
GlobalFree(*ppSD);
return FALSE;
}
// Allow local system access.
if (!AddAccessAllowedAce( pAcl, ACL_REVISION2, COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE,
(void *) &LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID ))
{
GlobalFree(*ppSD);
return FALSE;
}
*/
// Add a new ACL to the security descriptor.
if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl( *ppSD, TRUE, pAcl, FALSE ))
{
GlobalFree(*ppSD);
return FALSE;
}
// Set the group.
memcpy( pGroup, pSid, lSidLen );
if (!SetSecurityDescriptorGroup( *ppSD, pGroup, FALSE ))
{
GlobalFree(*ppSD);
return FALSE;
}
// Set the owner.
memcpy( pOwner, pSid, lSidLen );
if (!SetSecurityDescriptorOwner( *ppSD, pOwner, FALSE ))
{
GlobalFree(*ppSD);
return FALSE;
}
// Check the security descriptor.
assert(IsValidSecurityDescriptor(*ppSD));
return TRUE;
}
// Accepts either a traditional security descriptor or an IAccessControl
BOOL CUtility::CheckForValidSD(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *pSD)
{
WORD dwType = 0;
if (pSD)
{
dwType = *((WORD *)pSD);
}
if ((dwType != 1) && (dwType != 2))
{
CString sMsg, sCaption;
sMsg.LoadString(IDS_BADSD);
sCaption.LoadString(IDS_SYSTEMMESSAGE);
MessageBox(NULL, sMsg, sCaption, MB_OK);
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
// Check to see if the security descriptor is really a serialized IAccessControl.
BOOL CUtility::SDisIAC(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *pSD)
{
WORD dwType = *((WORD *)pSD);
if (dwType == 2)
{
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * CUtility::SDfromIAC(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pSD)
{
IStream * pStream;
IAccessControl * pIAC;
IPersistStream * pIPS;
HRESULT hr;
BOOL fReturn;
// Un-serialize the IAccessControl
hr = CreateStreamOnHGlobal((HGLOBAL)pSD, FALSE, &pStream);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
return NULL;
}
// skip version
DWORD dwVersion;
hr = pStream->Read(&dwVersion, sizeof(DWORD), NULL);
if (FAILED(hr) || dwVersion != 2)
{
return NULL;
}
// skip CLSID
CLSID clsid;
hr = pStream->Read(&clsid, sizeof(CLSID), NULL);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
return NULL;
}
// create and IAccessControl and get an IPersistStream
hr = CoCreateInstance(clsid,
NULL,
CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER,
IID_IAccessControl,
(void **)&pIAC);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pStream->Release();
return NULL;
}
hr = pIAC->QueryInterface(IID_IPersistStream, (void **) &pIPS);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pIAC->Release();
pStream->Release();
return NULL;
}
hr = pIPS->Load(pStream);
pIPS->Release();
pStream->Release();
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
// Create an EXPLICIT_ACCESS list for each entry in the IAccessControl
DWORD cAces;
ACTRL_ACCESS_ENTRYW * rgAE;
ACTRL_ACCESS * pAccess;
// PTRUSTEE pOwner;
// PTRUSTEE pGroup;
// hr = pIAC->GetAllAccessRights(NULL, &pAccess, &pOwner, &pGroup);
hr = pIAC->GetAllAccessRights(NULL, &pAccess, NULL, NULL);
if (FAILED(hr) || (pAccess->cEntries == 0))
{
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
// we're assuming only one property entry
cAces = pAccess->pPropertyAccessList->pAccessEntryList->cEntries;
rgAE = pAccess->pPropertyAccessList->pAccessEntryList->pAccessList;
EXPLICIT_ACCESS * rgEA = new EXPLICIT_ACCESS[cAces];
DWORD i;
for (i = cAces; i--;)
{
LPTSTR szName = rgAE[i].Trustee.ptstrName;
if (TRUSTEE_IS_NAME == rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeForm && 0 == wcscmp(rgAE[i].Trustee.ptstrName, L"*"))
{
szName = new WCHAR [wcslen(L"EVERYONE") + 1];
if (!szName)
{
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
wcscpy(szName, L"EVERYONE");
}
DWORD dwAccessPermissions = rgAE[i].Access; // should always be COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE or GENERIC_ALL
ACCESS_MODE AccessMode;
switch (rgAE[i].fAccessFlags)
{
case ACTRL_ACCESS_ALLOWED:
AccessMode = SET_ACCESS;
dwAccessPermissions = COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE; // HACK! Required to get ACL editor to work.
break;
case ACTRL_ACCESS_DENIED:
default:
AccessMode = DENY_ACCESS;
dwAccessPermissions = GENERIC_ALL; // HACK! Required to get ACL editor to work.
break;
}
DWORD dwInheritance = rgAE[i].Inheritance; // Carefull. May not be allowed.
BuildExplicitAccessWithName(
&rgEA[i],
szName,
dwAccessPermissions,
AccessMode,
dwInheritance);
}
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pSDNew = NULL;
ULONG cbSize = 0;
// create the new Security descriptor
hr = BuildSecurityDescriptor(NULL, //pOwner,
NULL, //pGroup,
cAces,
rgEA,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
&cbSize,
(void **)&pSDNew);
if (ERROR_SUCCESS != hr)
{
// For some reason this may fail with this error even when it appears to have worked
// A subsequent call seems to have no affect (i.e. it doesn't work like
// other security descriptor calls that expect you to allocate the buffer yourself)
if (ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER != hr)
{
return NULL;
}
}
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pSDCopy = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *)GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED, cbSize);
if (!pSDCopy)
{
LocalFree(pSDNew);
return NULL;
}
memcpy(pSDCopy, pSDNew, cbSize);
LocalFree(pSDNew);
//delete [] rgAE;
pIAC->Release();
return pSDCopy;
}
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * CUtility::IACfromSD(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR * pSD)
{
IAccessControl * pIAC = NULL;
// create new IAccessControl object
HRESULT hr;
hr = CoCreateInstance(CLSID_DCOMAccessControl,
NULL,
CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER,
IID_IAccessControl,
(void **) &pIAC);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
return (NULL);
}
IPersistStream * pIPS;
hr = pIAC->QueryInterface(IID_IPersistStream, (void **) &pIPS);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
hr = pIPS->Load(NULL);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
BOOL fReturn, fDaclPresent, fDaclDefaulted;
ACL * pDacl;
// get the ACL list
fReturn = GetSecurityDescriptorDacl(pSD, &fDaclPresent, &pDacl, &fDaclDefaulted);
if (fReturn && fDaclPresent)
{
PEXPLICIT_ACCESS rgEA;
ULONG cAces;
#if 0 // Set to 1 when GetExplicitEntriesFromAcl works
DWORD dwReturn = GetExplicitEntriesFromAcl(pDacl,
&cAces,
&rgEA);
// enumerate the ACL, building list of objects to add to IAccessControl object
if (dwReturn != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
ACTRL_ACCESSW stAccess;
ACTRL_PROPERTY_ENTRYW stProperty;
ACTRL_ACCESS_ENTRY_LISTW stAccessList;
stAccess.cEntries = 1;
stAccess.pPropertyAccessList = &stProperty;
stProperty.lpProperty = NULL;
stProperty.pAccessEntryList = &stAccessList;
stProperty.fListFlags = 0;
stAccessList.cEntries = cAces;
ACTRL_ACCESS_ENTRYW * rgAE = new ACTRL_ACCESS_ENTRYW[cAces];
stAccessList.pAccessList = rgAE;
ULONG i;
for (i = cAces; i--; )
{
rgAE[i].Trustee = rgEA[i].Trustee;
if (rgEA[i].Trustee.TrusteeForm == TRUSTEE_IS_SID)
{
// convert to a named trustee
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_NAME;
SID * pSid = (SID *)rgEA[i].Trustee.ptstrName;
DWORD cbName = 0;
DWORD cbDomain = 0;
LPTSTR szName = NULL;
LPTSTR szDomain = NULL;
SID_NAME_USE snu;
fReturn = LookupAccountSid(NULL,
pSid,
szName,
&cbName,
szDomain,
&cbDomain,
&snu);
szName = (LPTSTR) new char [cbName];
szDomain = (LPTSTR) new char [cbDomain];
fReturn = LookupAccountSid(NULL,
pSid,
szName,
&cbName,
szDomain,
&cbDomain,
&snu);
CString * pcs = new CString;
(*pcs) = TEXT("\\\\");
(*pcs) += szDomain;
(*pcs) += TEXT("\\");
(*pcs) += szName;
rgAE[i].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)(LPCTSTR)(*pcs);
}
else
{
#if 0 // REMOVE THIS HACK when GetExplicitEntriesFromAcl works as it should
if (rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType < TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP)
{
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = (enum _TRUSTEE_TYPE)((unsigned)rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType + 1);
}
#endif
if (rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType == TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP)
{
// IAccessControl::GrantAccessRights doesn't like TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP for some reason
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP;
}
}
// test for "the world"
if (TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP == rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType &&
0 == _wcsicmp(L"Everyone", rgAE[i].Trustee.ptstrName))
{
rgAE[i].Trustee.ptstrName[0] = L'*';
rgAE[i].Trustee.ptstrName[1] = 0;
}
rgAE[i].Access = rgEA[i].grfAccessPermissions;
rgAE[i].ProvSpecificAccess = 0;
rgAE[i].Inheritance = rgEA[i].grfInheritance;
rgAE[i].lpInheritProperty = NULL;
switch (rgEA[i].grfAccessMode)
{
case SET_ACCESS:
rgAE[i].fAccessFlags = ACTRL_ACCESS_ALLOWED;
break;
case DENY_ACCESS:
default:
rgAE[i].fAccessFlags = ACTRL_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
}
}
#else
ACL_SIZE_INFORMATION aclInfo;
fReturn = GetAclInformation(pDacl, &aclInfo, sizeof(aclInfo), AclSizeInformation);
if (!fReturn)
{
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
cAces = aclInfo.AceCount;
ACE_HEADER * pAceHeader;
ACTRL_ACCESSW stAccess;
ACTRL_PROPERTY_ENTRYW stProperty;
ACTRL_ACCESS_ENTRY_LISTW stAccessList;
stAccess.cEntries = 1;
stAccess.pPropertyAccessList = &stProperty;
stProperty.lpProperty = NULL;
stProperty.pAccessEntryList = &stAccessList;
stProperty.fListFlags = 0;
stAccessList.cEntries = cAces;
ACTRL_ACCESS_ENTRYW * rgAE = new ACTRL_ACCESS_ENTRYW[cAces];
if (!rgAE)
{
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
stAccessList.pAccessList = rgAE;
ULONG i;
for (i = cAces; i--; )
{
rgAE[i].ProvSpecificAccess = 0;
rgAE[i].Inheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
rgAE[i].lpInheritProperty = NULL;
rgAE[i].Trustee.pMultipleTrustee = NULL;
rgAE[i].Trustee.MultipleTrusteeOperation = NO_MULTIPLE_TRUSTEE;
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_NAME;
rgAE[i].Access = COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE;
fReturn = GetAce(pDacl, i, (LPVOID *)&pAceHeader);
if (!fReturn)
{
delete [] rgAE;
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
SID * pSid = NULL;
switch (pAceHeader->AceType)
{
case ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE:
{
rgAE[i].fAccessFlags = ACTRL_ACCESS_ALLOWED;
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE * pAce = (ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *)pAceHeader;
pSid = (SID *) &(pAce->SidStart);
}
break;
case ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE:
{
rgAE[i].fAccessFlags = ACTRL_ACCESS_DENIED;
ACCESS_DENIED_ACE * pAce = (ACCESS_DENIED_ACE *)pAceHeader;
pSid = (SID *) &(pAce->SidStart);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
TCHAR szName[MAX_PATH];
TCHAR szDomain[MAX_PATH];
DWORD cbName = MAX_PATH;
DWORD cbDomain = MAX_PATH;
SID_NAME_USE use;
if(pSid)
{
fReturn = LookupAccountSid(NULL,
pSid,
szName,
&cbName,
szDomain,
&cbDomain,
&use);
}
else
{
fReturn = FALSE; // i.e., we took default path above
}
if (!fReturn)
{
delete [] rgAE;
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
switch (use)
{
case SidTypeUser:
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_USER;
break;
case SidTypeGroup:
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP;
break;
case SidTypeAlias:
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_ALIAS;
break;
case SidTypeWellKnownGroup:
//rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP;
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP;
break;
case SidTypeDeletedAccount:
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_DELETED;
break;
case SidTypeInvalid:
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_INVALID;
break;
case SidTypeDomain:
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP; //TRUSTEE_IS_DOMAIN;
break;
case SidTypeUnknown:
default:
rgAE[i].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
CString sz;
// test for "the world"
if (0 == wcslen(szDomain) && 0 == _wcsicmp(L"Everyone", szName))
{
sz = "*";
}
else
{
sz = szDomain;
sz += "\\";
sz += szName;
}
WCHAR * wsz = new WCHAR[sz.GetLength() + 1];
wcscpy(wsz, (LPCWSTR)sz);
rgAE[i].Trustee.ptstrName = wsz;
}
#endif
delete [] rgAE;
hr = pIAC->GrantAccessRights(&stAccess);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
// free up structures
// LocalFree(rgEA);
}
// serialize the IAccessControl object
// Find out how big it is
ULARGE_INTEGER size;
hr = pIPS->GetSizeMax(&size);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
size.QuadPart += sizeof(DWORD) + sizeof (CLSID);
HANDLE hMem = GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED, size.LowPart);
if (hMem != NULL)
{
IStream * pStream;
hr = CreateStreamOnHGlobal(hMem, FALSE, &pStream);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
DWORD dwVersion = 2;
CLSID clsid = CLSID_DCOMAccessControl;
hr = pStream->Write(&dwVersion, sizeof(DWORD), NULL);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pStream->Release();
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
hr = pStream->Write(&clsid, sizeof(CLSID), NULL);
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pStream->Release();
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
hr = pIPS->Save(pStream, TRUE);
pStream->Release();
if (FAILED(hr))
{
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return NULL;
}
}
pIPS->Release();
pIAC->Release();
return (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) hMem;
}
BOOL CUtility::CheckSDForCOM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *pSD)
{
PSrAcl pDacl;
PSrAce pAce;
DWORD cbAces;
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE* pSDr = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE*) pSD;
// Check whether the security descriptor is self-relative
if (!(pSD->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE))
{
pDacl = (PSrAcl) pSD->Dacl;
// Check for a deny ALL
if (pDacl == NULL)
{
return TRUE;
}
}
else
{
// First check for a deny ALL
if (pSDr->Dacl == 0)
{
return TRUE;
}
pDacl = (PSrAcl) (((BYTE *) pSDr) + (pSDr->Dacl));
}
// Do over the ACE's
for (pAce = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pDacl) + sizeof(SSrAcl)),
cbAces = pDacl->AceCount;
cbAces;
pAce = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pAce) + pAce->AceSize),
cbAces--)
{
// workaround for the ACL editor bug. If the ACL editor sees a non GENERIC_ALL deny ACE, it
// complains. So we convert COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE to GENERIC_ALL. On the way back we will
// do the reverse. See CallBackFunc for the other half of this fix.
if (pAce->Type == 1 && pAce->AccessMask == COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE)
{
pAce->AccessMask = GENERIC_ALL;
}
// Check that it is
// a) an allow on COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE
// b) a deny on GENERIC_ALL,
// c) a deny on COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE,
// d) a deny ALL (handled above if the DACL is NULL) or
// e) an allow everyone (handled implicitly if cbAces == 0)
if (!(((pAce->Type == 0 && pAce->AccessMask == COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE)
||
(pAce->Type == 1 && pAce->AccessMask == GENERIC_ALL)
||
(pAce->Type == 1 && pAce->AccessMask == COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE))))
{
CString szText;
CString szTitle;
szText.LoadString(IDS_The_security_);
szTitle.LoadString(IDS_DCOM_Configuration_Warning);
if (MessageBox(GetForegroundWindow(),
(LPCTSTR) szText,
(LPCTSTR) szTitle,
MB_YESNO) == IDYES)
{
pAce->Flags = 0;
pAce->Type = 0;
pAce->AccessMask = COM_RIGHTS_EXECUTE;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
}
}
return TRUE;
}
BOOL CUtility::ChangeService(LPCTSTR szService,
LPCTSTR szIdentity,
LPCTSTR szPassword,
LPCTSTR szDisplay)
{
SC_HANDLE hSCManager;
SC_HANDLE hService;
QUERY_SERVICE_CONFIG qsc;
DWORD dwBytesNeeded = 0;
LPTSTR lpszTmpDisplay = (LPTSTR)szDisplay;
// Open the service control manager
if (hSCManager = OpenSCManager(NULL, NULL, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE))
{
// Try to open a handle to the requested service
if (!(hService = OpenService(hSCManager,
szService,
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE)))
{
g_util.PostErrorMessage();
CloseServiceHandle(hSCManager);
return FALSE;
}
// Close the service manager's database
CloseServiceHandle(hSCManager);
if (QueryServiceConfig(hService, &qsc, sizeof(qsc), &dwBytesNeeded))
lpszTmpDisplay = qsc.lpDisplayName;
// Change service identity parameters
if (ChangeServiceConfig(hService,
SERVICE_NO_CHANGE, // SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
SERVICE_NO_CHANGE, // SERVICE_DEMAND_START,
SERVICE_NO_CHANGE,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
szIdentity,
szPassword,
NULL))
{
// Return success
CloseServiceHandle(hService);
return TRUE;
}
else
{
g_util.PostErrorMessage();
CloseServiceHandle(hService);
return FALSE;
}
}
else
{
g_util.PostErrorMessage();
return FALSE;
}
}
BOOL CUtility::UpdateDCOMInfo(void)
{
RPC_STATUS status;
TCHAR *pszBindString;
// Get a binding handle to the SCM if we haven't yet
if (m_hRpc == NULL)
{
status = RpcStringBindingCompose(NULL,
TEXT("ncalrpc"),
NULL,
TEXT("epmapper"),
NULL,
&pszBindString);
if (status != RPC_S_OK)
{
return status;
}
status = RpcBindingFromStringBinding(pszBindString, &m_hRpc);
RpcStringFree(&pszBindString);
if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
return status;
}
}
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
// Call over to the SCM to get the global registry values read
// into memory
UpdateActivationSettings(m_hRpc, &status);
#endif
return status;
}
LRESULT CALLBACK ControlFixProc( HWND hwnd, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam,
LPARAM lParam);
// This is a work-around because there is a bug in msdev 4.1: Cannot get
// WM_HELP message processed by a control on which DDX_Control data exchange
// is done because of subclassing problem. See msdn Q145865 for a discussion
// plus work-around code.
void CUtility::FixHelp(CWnd* pWnd)
{
// search all child windows. If their window proc
// is AfxWndProc, then subclass with our window proc
CWnd* pWndChild = pWnd->GetWindow(GW_CHILD);
while(pWndChild != NULL)
{
if (GetWindowLongPtr(pWndChild->GetSafeHwnd(),
GWLP_WNDPROC) == (LONG_PTR)AfxWndProc)
{
SetWindowLongPtr(pWndChild->GetSafeHwnd(), GWLP_WNDPROC,
(LONG_PTR)ControlFixProc);
}
pWndChild = pWndChild->GetWindow(GW_HWNDNEXT);
}
}
LRESULT CALLBACK ControlFixProc(HWND hwnd, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam,
LPARAM lParam)
{
if (uMsg == WM_HELP)
{
// bypass MFC's handler, message will be sent to parent
return DefWindowProc(hwnd, uMsg, wParam, lParam);
}
return AfxWndProc(hwnd,uMsg,wParam,lParam);
}
// Compare two security descriptors in self-relative form to
// determine if they're the same
BOOL CUtility::CompareSDs(PSrSecurityDescriptor pSD1,
PSrSecurityDescriptor pSD2)
{
PSID pSid1, pSid2;
PSrAcl pDacl1, pDacl2;
PSrAce pAce1, pAce2;
BYTE *p1, *p2;
// Compare the owners
pSid1 = (PSID) (((BYTE *) pSD1) + pSD1->Owner);
pSid2 = (PSID) (((BYTE *) pSD2) + pSD2->Owner);
if (!EqualSid(pSid1, pSid2))
{
return FALSE;
}
// Compare the groups
pSid1 = (PSID) (((BYTE *) pSD1) + pSD1->Group);
pSid2 = (PSID) (((BYTE *) pSD2) + pSD2->Group);
if (!EqualSid(pSid1, pSid2))
{
return FALSE;
}
// Compare the DACL's
pDacl1 = (PSrAcl) (((BYTE *) pSD1) + pSD1->Dacl);
pDacl2 = (PSrAcl) (((BYTE *) pSD2) + pSD2->Dacl);
// Check first that they are the same size and have the same
// number of ACE's
if (! (pDacl1->AclSize == pDacl2->AclSize &&
pDacl1->AceCount == pDacl2->AceCount))
{
return FALSE;
}
// Now compare the ACL ACE by ACE
pAce1 = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pDacl1) + sizeof(SSrAcl));
pAce2 = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pDacl2) + sizeof(SSrAcl));
for (int k = 0; k < pDacl1->AceCount; k++)
{
// Check the ACE headers
if (! (pAce1->Type == pAce2->Type &&
pAce1->AceSize == pAce2->AceSize &&
pAce1->AccessMask == pAce2->AccessMask))
{
return FALSE;
}
// Check the SID's
p1 = (BYTE *) (((BYTE *) pAce1) + sizeof(ACE_HEADER));
p2 = (BYTE *) (((BYTE *) pAce2) + sizeof(ACE_HEADER));
for (ULONG j = 0; j < pAce1->AceSize - sizeof(ACE_HEADER); j++)
{
if (p1[j] != p2[j])
{
return FALSE;
}
}
// Go to the next ACE
pAce1 = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pAce1) + pAce1->AceSize);
pAce2 = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pAce2) + pAce2->AceSize);
}
return TRUE;
}
int CUtility::SetAccountRights(LPCTSTR szUser, TCHAR *szPrivilege)
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
int err;
LSA_HANDLE hPolicy;
LSA_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objAtt;
DWORD cbSid = 1;
TCHAR szDomain[MAX_PATH];
DWORD cbDomain = MAX_PATH * sizeof(TCHAR);
PSID pSid = NULL;
SID_NAME_USE snu;
LSA_UNICODE_STRING privStr;
// Fetch the SID for the specified user
if ((err = GetPrincipalSID(szUser, &pSid)) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
return err;
memset(&objAtt, 0, sizeof(LSA_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES));
if (IsBackupDC()) {
TCHAR* pszPDC;
LSA_UNICODE_STRING lsaPDC;
pszPDC = PrimaryDCName();
lsaPDC.Length = _tcslen (pszPDC) * sizeof (TCHAR)-2;
lsaPDC.MaximumLength = lsaPDC.Length + sizeof (TCHAR);
lsaPDC.Buffer = &pszPDC[2];
err = LsaOpenPolicy(&lsaPDC, &objAtt, POLICY_CREATE_ACCOUNT | POLICY_LOOKUP_NAMES | POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION, &hPolicy);
}
else
err = LsaOpenPolicy(NULL, &objAtt, POLICY_CREATE_ACCOUNT | POLICY_LOOKUP_NAMES | POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION, &hPolicy);
if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
return GetLastError();
}
// Set the specified privilege on this account
privStr.Length = _tcslen(szPrivilege) * sizeof(TCHAR);
privStr.MaximumLength = privStr.Length + sizeof(TCHAR);
privStr.Buffer = szPrivilege;
err = LsaAddAccountRights(hPolicy, pSid, &privStr, 1);
// We're done
delete pSid;
LsaClose(hPolicy);
if (err != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
return GetLastError();
}
#endif
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
// NOTE: Cannot handle IAccessControl style SDs
void CUtility::CopyAbsoluteSD( SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *pSDSrc, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR **pSDDest)
{
(*pSDDest)->Revision = pSDSrc->Revision;
(*pSDDest)->Sbz1 = pSDSrc->Sbz1;
(*pSDDest)->Control = pSDSrc->Control;
(*pSDDest)->Group = (*pSDDest)->Owner = (*pSDDest)->Dacl = (*pSDDest)->Sacl = NULL;
BYTE* pOffSet=(BYTE*)(*pSDDest)+sizeof(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR);
if (pSDSrc->Dacl != NULL)
{
memcpy(pOffSet,pSDSrc->Dacl,pSDSrc->Dacl->AclSize);
(*pSDDest)->Dacl = (PACL)pOffSet;
pOffSet += pSDSrc->Dacl->AclSize;
}
if (pSDSrc->Owner != NULL)
{
memcpy(pOffSet,pSDSrc->Owner,GetLengthSid(pSDSrc->Owner));
(*pSDDest)->Owner = (PSID)pOffSet;
pOffSet += GetLengthSid(pSDSrc->Owner);
}
if (pSDSrc->Group != NULL)
{
memcpy(pOffSet,pSDSrc->Group,GetLengthSid(pSDSrc->Group));
(*pSDDest)->Group = (PSID)pOffSet;
}
}
// This method is included only because in the debug version when using
// MFC they validate the C++ heap, whereas RtlCopySecurityDescriptor uses
// the standard process heap, causing MFC to throw a breakpoint
// The return value indicates the success or failure of the operation
// NTBUG 310004. This function is called to copy both self-relative and absolute
// SDs. In its previous incarnation, it corrupted heap when called to
// copy an absolute SD. Now I do the right thing.
// NOTE: This function can not handle IAccessControl style SDs despite
// appearances to the contrary. This is OK, because dcomcnfg.exe does
// not handle such SDs at all.
BOOL CUtility::CopySD(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *pSrc, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR **pDest)
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
ULONG cbLen;
*pDest = NULL;
if (IsValidSecurityDescriptor(pSrc))
{
if (SDisIAC(pSrc))
{
cbLen = (ULONG) GlobalSize(pSrc);
}
else
{
cbLen = RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor(pSrc);
}
*pDest = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED, cbLen);
if (*pDest)
{
// if the SD is already self-relative, just copy
if ((pSrc)->Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE )
{
memcpy(*pDest, pSrc, cbLen);
return TRUE;
}
else
{
// workaround an ACLEDIT bug (NT 352977). When the DACL has no ACES,
// ACLEDIT returns incorrect AclSize, causing an AV
// when I copy it. So fix it here.
if ((pSrc)->Dacl != NULL && ((pSrc)->Dacl->AceCount == 0))
(pSrc)->Dacl->AclSize=sizeof(ACL);
CopyAbsoluteSD(pSrc,pDest);
return TRUE;
}
GlobalFree(*pDest);
}
}
#endif
return FALSE;
}
// Set the inheritance flags on a security descriptor so keys created
// under the key having this security descriptor will inherit all its
// ACE's. We do this as a utility routine rather than via the ACL
// editor because doing that adds check boxes and such to the ACL editor,
// so it's cleaner this way.
//
// Note. The security descriptor is expected to be in absolute form
void CUtility::SetInheritanceFlags(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *pSec)
{
PSrAcl pAcl = (PSrAcl) pSec->Dacl;
PSrAce pAce;
int k;
// Do over the ACE's this DACL
for (k = pAcl->AceCount, pAce = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pAcl) + sizeof(SSrAcl));
k;
k--, pAce = (PSrAce) (((BYTE *) pAce) + pAce->AceSize))
{
pAce->Flags |= CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE;
}
}
HRESULT CUtility::GetPrincipalSID (LPCTSTR Principal, PSID *Sid)
{
DWORD sidSize = 0;
TCHAR refDomain [256];
DWORD refDomainSize = 0;
DWORD returnValue;
SID_NAME_USE snu;
BOOL bSuccess;
bSuccess = LookupAccountName (NULL,
Principal,
*Sid,
&sidSize,
refDomain,
&refDomainSize,
&snu);
// codework - we need to check if this is correct
// what about multisuer machines - ie hydra
if ((returnValue = GetLastError()) != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
return returnValue;
if ((*Sid = new BYTE[sidSize]) == NULL)
return ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY;
if (!LookupAccountName (NULL,
Principal,
*Sid,
&sidSize,
refDomain,
&refDomainSize,
&snu))
{
return GetLastError();
}
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
// this method, on first execution, checks if the current machine is a backup domain controller and if so,
// caches the value and returns TRUE. Subsequent executions will use cached value.
BOOL CUtility::IsBackupDC()
{
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
USER_MODALS_INFO_2 *umi2 = NULL;
SERVER_INFO_101 *si101 = NULL;
DWORD dw;
if (!m_bCheckedDC) {
if ((dw = NetServerGetInfo (NULL, 101, (LPBYTE *) &si101)) == 0)
{
if (si101->sv101_type & SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL)
{
if ((dw = NetUserModalsGet (NULL, 2, (LPBYTE *) &umi2)) == 0)
{
if(umi2)
{
NetGetDCName (NULL, umi2->usrmod2_domain_name, (LPBYTE *) &m_pszDomainController);
NetApiBufferFree (umi2);
}
m_bIsBdc = TRUE;
}
}
}
m_bCheckedDC = TRUE;
if (si101)
NetApiBufferFree (si101);
}
return m_bIsBdc;
#else
return FALSE;
#endif
}
TCHAR* CUtility::PrimaryDCName()
{
static TCHAR s_tszUnknownDomainName[] = _T("UnknownDCName");
#if !defined(STANDALONE_BUILD)
if (IsBackupDC())
{
if(m_pszDomainController){
return m_pszDomainController;
}
else
{
return s_tszUnknownDomainName;
}
}
#endif
return NULL;
}
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